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Summary 
Corporate social responsibility has been defined in a number of ways.  Freidman 
(1962) stated that the responsibility of business is to take care of their business.  
According to Freidman there is only one type of social responsibility for business   
which is using resources and engaging in activities designed to increase profits so 
long as it stays within the rules that have been defined.  Corporations are only 
responsible to their shareholders and not to society as a whole.  However, since at 
least the 1970’s interest has been heightened in examining the role of organisations in 
society.  Public awareness of corporations’ actual and potential impacts on society, 
and on their various interests and concerns, has increased.  Kok et al (2001) defined 
corporate social responsibility as ‘the obligation of a firm to use its resources in ways 
to benefit society, through committed participation as a member of society, taking into 
account the society at large, and improving welfare of society at large independent of 
direct gains of the company’.  This definition suggests that business cannot be 
separated from societal issues such as community and environment and leads to the 
basic premise that a company is responsible, not only to maximize profits, but also to 
contribute to the well-being of society.  The traditional view that the role of 
corporations and businesses in society is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders is, 
or has, become too restrictive.  There is evidence to support the notion that 
corporations are considered to be members of society and as such have a social 
responsibility. 
This study investigates senior management of Australian companies’ perceptions of 
which stakeholder groups influence, and what are the major motivations for, social 
information disclosures in organisations in Australia and whether current financial 
reporting practices are sufficient to capture the impact of an organisation’s activities.  
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To investigate this, respondents to a postal survey, supplemented by a number of 
follow-up interviews, were asked to identify stakeholder groups influencing 
reporting and the motivations influencing the decision to report social information, as 
well as the adequacy of traditional reporting systems in capturing the impact of a 
business on society. 
Social information includes all information reported to stakeholders about the social 
and environmental effects of a company’s economic actions.  As such it involves 
extending the accountability of the company beyond the traditional role of providing a 
financial account to the owners of capital, in particular, shareholders.  This 
information could be of a quantitative or qualitative nature or both.  It may be 
reported in the annual report, a specific social report, a media release or other form to 
achieve the company’s objectives.  The reporting of social information and 
responsibility of corporations is adopted for this study as public awareness of the area 
has increased in recent years; it is a relatively new area of reporting that has received 
growing attention from companies, and reporting is largely voluntary.  In addition, it 
is a relatively unexplored area with most studies in the broad area concentrating 
primarily on environmental issues and reporting. 
This study adopted a postal survey utilizing questions reflecting major stakeholder 
groups and motivations underlying social reporting developed from the literature.  
The survey was sent to the top 500 organisations in Australia as per the BRW 1000 
list.  It is believed that management in larger organisations would have considered 
social issues and reporting of this information to stakeholders.  Some researchers 
(Dierkes & Coppock, 1978; Trotman & Bradley, 1981; Cowen et al, 1987) have 
suggested that corporate size is the decisive factor for corporate social responsibility 
disclosures.  In addition to the mail survey, ten follow-up face-to-face unstructured 
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interviews were conducted with mail respondents who indicated that they were 
willing to discuss the issues in an interview.  Statistical analysis was undertaken using 
the SPSS statistical package. 
The analysis has shown that respondents believe that stakeholders should be 
identified and that social information and the reporting of social information to 
stakeholders is important.  The most important stakeholder group identified was that 
of employees. Other identified important stakeholder groups were shareholders, 
regulators, community, consumers and government.  In relation to community it was 
found that local communities around the organisation’s activities were considered 
important rather than the general community.  Respondents identified several reasons 
for reporting social information including a belief that the organisation has a broader 
social responsibility, obligation and accountability as part of society in general.  Of 
particular importance in reporting social information was the need for transparency 
and a belief in the accountability of the organisation to a broader constituency.  It 
was also found that current financial reporting systems are considered insufficient in 
capturing the impact of an organisations activities and social impact.  Financial 
information alone was not considered to provide sufficient insight into the impact of 
an organisation’s activities on stakeholders and the community.  However disclosure 
of social information was not seen as replacing the current financial reporting system 
but as a complementary system of reporting to more fully disclose aspects of the 
organisation’s activities not covered by the financial reporting system.  A broader 
based reporting was found to be required and disciplines or associations suggested 
broaden the current reporting included human capital, environmental science and 
impact and community impact. 
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Chapter One:  Overview of this study 
1.1 Introduction 
Since at least the 1970’s interest has been heightened in examining the role of 
organisations in society.  Public awareness of corporations’ actual and potential 
impacts on society, and on their various interests and concerns, has increased.  
‘Although business continues to justify its legitimacy and relevance to society on the 
basis of traditional criteria, many groups are expressing dissatisfaction with business 
performance in meeting changing social needs and expectations’ (Shocker and Sethi, 
1974, p. 68).  Companies nowadays face increased pressure from their stakeholders 
to address and report their social responsibilities.  In recent years there has been a 
proliferation of corporate social and environmental disclosures.  These disclosures 
have been steadily increasing in both volume and complexity (Deegan and Gordon, 
1996).  Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995) show that voluntary social and 
environmental disclosures significantly increased from the 1980s to the 1990s.  
Corporate Social Reporting (CSR) has been developed to extend the traditional 
model of financial reporting which emphasises a company’s economic prosperity, to 
incorporate social and environmental dimensions (Elkington, 1997).  Hence “social 
accounting is conceived as the universe of all possible accounting” (Gray et al, 1997, 
p. 328).  Compared to the long historical practice of financial reporting, however, the 
development of CSR is still in its infancy and there is much debate on various issues. 
From an organisations viewpoint, Shocker and Sethi (1974) considered that for a 
company to survive and grow, it must demonstrate that society requires its services 
and that the groups benefiting from its rewards have society’s approval.  To 
accomplish that, the corporation may need to establish congruence between the 
social values associated with its activities and the values of the larger social system 
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(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975).  This would entail the employment of a conscious 
strategy by the corporation, with ‘voluntary disclosures of information, both 
qualitative and quantitative, … to inform or influence a range of audiences’ 
(Mathews, 1993, p.64). 
The strict notion that companies operate purely in pursuit of profit maximisation is a 
misnomer in both the practicality of modern business, and the legal framework, 
which affords decision-makers a realistic capacity to make allowance for the interests 
of stakeholders.  Current reporting is dominated by measures of financial outcomes 
but increasing societal expectations around corporate social responsibility are 
applying pressures on business to have a clear strategy in place for managing their 
limited resources and identifying performance indicators to track against their 
objectives.  Financial reporting is too narrow to properly and fully reflect the impact 
and influence of an organisation’s activities.  Modern organisations play an 
important role in society and to be successful must have and demonstrate a broader 
social responsibility.  Social reporting is a means of reporting on this broader social 
responsibility and is a means of overcoming financial reporting deficiencies. 
Statement of Accounting Concepts SAC2 Objective of General Purpose Financial 
Reporting provides that general purpose financial reports shall provide information 
useful to users for making and evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce 
resources.  In establishing this objective it recognizes that corporations control 
resources and influence members of the community through providing goods and 
services, levying prices, charges, rates and taxes, and acquiring and investing 
resources.  The community interest is best served if scarce resources controlled by 
corporations are allocated to those organizations which will use them in the most 
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efficient and effective manner in providing goods and services.  SAC2 goes on to 
state: 
“Efficient allocation of scarce resources will be enhanced if those who 
make resource allocation decisions ……………have the appropriate 
financial information on which to base their decisions.  General purpose 
financial reporting aims to provide this information.” 
 
However, the traditional form of corporate reporting takes a narrow view of 
assessing an organization’s performance and position.  It excludes much information 
about the broader impact of a corporation’s activities, for example, destruction of the 
ozone layer, social cost of involuntary unemployment, etc.   
Kaplan and Norton (2004) state that knowledge based assets, primarily employees 
and information technology, are becoming increasingly important for companies 
competitive success, however, the financial reporting system is deficient in 
recognising these assets as they are typically treated as expenses in the current 
period.  They argue that financial reporting systems provide no foundation for 
measuring and managing the value created by an organisation’s intangible assets.  It 
is widely believed that the annual accounts or financial statements fail substantially 
to represent the correct value of a company and to provide the necessary 
informational elements to this end.  In an economy where many of the organisation’s 
assets consist of human, legal, informational, and similar resources that assist the 
organisation to gain and preserve market share, generally accepted accounting 
principles are inadequate.  They do not measure these resources. 
The goal of business has historically been profit and society has encouraged this 
pursuit of profit.  Profit-seeking by business was seen as of benefit to society as a 
whole and has been the source of business’ legitimacy.  However, broad shifts of 
moral consensus have impacted many traditional views.  Donaldson and Dunfee 
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(1999) state that managers and members of the general public have gradually 
redefined their view of the underlying responsibilities of corporations.  They believe 
the view has shifted from attitudes half a century ago that limited the responsibilities 
of companies largely to that of producing goods and services at reasonable prices, to 
a view today where corporations are held responsible for a variety of fairness and 
quality-of-life issues.   
This study will involve an analysis of the social reporting practices of organizations.  
It will explore how organizations identify the stakeholders to whom they will report 
and the information identified by organizations for reporting purposes.  The current 
chapter provides an overview of this study while the literature is discussed in 
Chapters two, three and four.  Chapter two discusses the philosophical foundations of 
corporate social reporting.  The philosophy of natural humanism extends from 
Aristotle through to Hume and Dewy to more modern adherents such as Grene 
(1985) in evolutionary biology; Capra (1982, 1987, 1995, 2003) in ecology; and Hoy 
(2000) in Philosophy.  It outlines the current limited financial reporting framework 
and the need to consider a broader role of business in modern society in line with 
philosophical arguments presented by Dewey.  This chapter is the genesis for the 
examination of the views of the management of the organisations regarding the 
adequacy of current financial reporting systems to capture the impact of an 
organization.  Chapter three extends this philosophical foundation with a discussion 
of social contract and accountability of business which has a lengthy philosophical 
tradition from Hobbes and Locke, through Rousseau to Rawls and Donaldson (1982).  
From this literature a number of motivations for social reporting are identified for 
examination.  Chapter four discusses legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory that 
are two theoretical perspectives that have been adopted by a number of researchers in 
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recent years. These theories are sometimes referred to as ‘systems-oriented theories’. 
Within a systems-based perspective, the entity is assumed to be influenced and in 
turn to have influence upon, the society in which it operates.  Further motivations for 
social reporting are identified from this literature as well as identification of the 
various stakeholder groups.  The research design and methodology is discussed in 
chapter five.  In chapters six and seven the results of the analysis of the data collected 
from the sampled firms is discussed.  The descriptive results are discussed in chapter 
six to identify whether stakeholders are considered and whether the reporting of 
social information is undertaken.  The responses to the questions underlying each of 
the theoretical perspectives addressing the firm-stakeholder interaction are discussed 
in chapter seven, along with the adequacy of current financial reporting in meeting 
modern business accountability.  It concludes  with a  consideration of future 
research opportunities and the limitations of this study. 
1.2 Overview of corporate social reporting 
Gray et al, (1987) defined corporate social reporting as ‘the process of 
communicating the social and environmental effects of organizations’ economic 
actions to particular interest groups within society and to society at large. As such, it 
involves extending the accountability of organizations (particularly companies), 
beyond the traditional role of providing a financial account to the owners of capital, 
in particular, shareholders. Such an extension is predicated upon the assumption that 
companies do have wider responsibilities than simply to make money for their 
shareholders’. (p. ix). 
Deegan (2001) defines social-responsibility reporting as the provision of information 
about the performance of an organization with regard to its interaction with its 
physical and social environment. This includes such factors as an organization’s: 
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• Interaction with the local community;  
• Level of support for community projects;  
• Level of support for developing countries;  
• Health and safety record;  
• Training, employment and education programs; and  
• Environmental performance.  
He further states that social reporting, which is a component of social responsibility 
reporting, provides information about an organization’s interaction with, and 
associated impacts upon, particular societies. 
In summary, social accounting and reporting involves accounting for and reporting 
an organization’s policies, procedures and impacts with respect to employees, 
communities (local and global), suppliers, customers and the environment. This can 
involve disclosure regarding, inter alia, commitments to workplace conditions, 
fairness and honesty in dealing with suppliers, customer service standards, 
community and charitable involvement, and non-exploitative business practices in 
developing countries. 
The increased scrutiny and debate referred to previously, has been reflected in a 
growing body of literature, both in Australia and elsewhere, examining various 
aspects of corporate social disclosure.  It generally examines self-reporting by 
organisations, and is predominantly concerned with organisation-society interactions 
relating to the natural environment, employees, communities and customers.  The 
literature embraces various theoretical perspectives, employs many different research 
methods, and is motivated by a wide range of research questions (Gray et al, 1995). 
Various studies have found that corporate social, including environmental, reporting 
has increased across time and vary in the subjects to which they give attention (eg. 
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Gray et al, 1995; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Hakston and Milne, 1996).  A demand 
for such disclosures has been found to exist as evidenced in studies by Tilt (1994) 
and Deegan and Rankin (1997).  These latter studies also found that the annual report 
was the most accessible, credible, and preferred medium for disclosure.  Various 
theoretical bases have been used to explain corporate social disclosure (see eg. Abbot 
and Monsen, 1979; Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Roberts, 1992; Guthrie and Parker, 
1990; Deegan and Gordon, 1996), Clarkson et al 2008.  However, legitimacy theory 
is seen as the more ‘insightful’ in explaining such disclosures (Gray et al, 1995), and 
its application is demonstrated, for example, in studies by Abbott and Monsen 
(1979), Patten (1992), Deegan and Rankin (1996), Brown and Deegan (1998) and 
Aerts and Cormier (2009). 
However Australian studies have generally examined the extent and type of social 
disclosure, and the characteristics of the reporting companies, or applied legitimacy 
theory to the issue of environmental reporting rather than the broader scope of social 
reporting. 
1.2.1 Social reporting practices of corporations 
According to Deegan (2001) the practice of social reporting was widely promoted in 
the 1970s but lost prominence in the 1980s.  In the early 1990s attention was devoted 
to environmental reporting from an eco- efficiency perspective.  Social reporting did 
not appear to re-emerge until the mid to late 1990s.  Since the late 1990’s, many 
organisations have made increasing use of the internet to disseminate information 
about their social and environmental policies and performance.  There is little doubt 
that environmental reporting has become more widespread although the accounting 
profession has not been in the forefront of developments.  The accounting profession 
has issued an accounting standard relating in a minor way to environmental matters, 
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this being  AASB1022 Accounting for the Extractive Industries.  However this 
standard, as far as environmental impact is concerned, only addresses the need for 
the accounting and disclosure of restoration costs.  However, AASB1022 is but one 
standard issued by the accounting profession and even this standard is predominantly 
concerned with financial disclosures.   Disappointingly, the broader notion of social 
reporting has not been adopted by the accounting standard setters, although there are 
several examples of such reporting. 
Some of the earliest examples of social reporting were from a number of avowedly 
‘values driven’ organizations such as Traidcraft, Body Shop and the Co-operative 
Bank.  However, there have been prominent corporations recently producing such 
reports including Shell, BP. Amoco, BT, British Airways, WMC, BHP and United 
Utilities. 
Further evidence of the development of social reporting practice is provided by 
developments in the notion of Triple Bottom Line reporting.  Triple Bottom line 
reporting has been defined by Elkington (1997) as reporting which provides 
information about the economic, environmental, and social performance of an entity. 
It represents a departure from previous ‘bottom line’ perspectives which have 
traditionally focused solely on an entity’s financial or economic performance.  
While social reporting may be in its infancy (relative to traditional financial 
reporting) there is little doubt that it is gaining momentum.  This leads us to examine 
why it has re-emerged. 
 12
1.2.2 Motivations behind social reporting 
Despite the fact that there is little regulation in relation to mandatory social reporting, 
as can be seen above, many organizations voluntarily elect to publicly disclose 
information about their social and environmental performance.  O’Dwyer (2000) 
states that the primary corporate motivation for social reporting emanates from a 
perception among company management that corporate reputation now has an 
increasingly large impact on shareholder value. For example, John Browne, Director 
of Reputation Assurance at PwC, perceives reputation as the key competitive 
differentiator for successful companies for the next 50 years and maintains that 
reputation risks have to be managed carefully. He claims that “successful companies 
will be those who embed social, environmental and ethical risk management into 
their core business processes and performance measures” and that “this integrated 
approach is at the heart of managing the 21st century company’s most valuable asset 
– its reputation”.1  According to Browne stakeholders are demanding more 
information, transparency and accountability and companies must respond to this in 
order to protect reputation. Social reporting is therefore viewed as a key means of 
gaining, repairing, or even maintaining reputation as part of a reputation risk 
management strategy aimed at both creating and protecting shareholder value.  
Deegan (2001) lists the motivations for disclosing social and environmental 
information, derived from differing theoretical perspectives, as including: 
• to influence the perceived legitimacy of the organization;  
According to Legitimacy Theory, organizations undertake actions, including 
disclosing information, in an endeavour to appear legitimate to the societies 
                                        
1 As quoted in O’Dwyer, (2000) Social and Ethical, Accountancy Ireland, Vol. 32 No. 6, pp. 13 
– 14. 
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in which they operate.  Legitimacy Theory itself relies upon the theoretical 
notion of a social contract. This notion is very similar to the idea of a 
‘community license to operate’, a phrase that is currently being used by a 
number of Australian mining organizations. 
• to manage particular (and possibly, powerful) stakeholder groups; 
Related theoretical perspective is Stakeholder Theory. Within Stakeholder 
Theory the organization is also considered to be part of the wider social 
system but this theory specifically considers the different stakeholder groups 
within society.  The power of stakeholders such as owners, creditors or 
regulators to influence corporate management is viewed as a function of the 
stakeholder’s degree of control over resources required by the organization 
(Ullmann 1985, as quoted by Deegan (2001)). 
• increase the wealth of the shareholders and the managers of the organization; 
If we were to accept that all people are driven by self interest, then managers 
would decide to make social and environmental disclosures if such 
disclosures ultimately increase the wealth of the managers (perhaps as a result 
of increasing the profitability or value of their organization) 
• a belief by the managers that the entity has an accountability (or a duty) to 
provide particular information;  
• to forestall efforts to introduce more onerous disclosure regulations by 
regulators and government. 
1.3 Motivation for the Study 
The traditional view that the role of corporations and businesses in society is to 
maximize the wealth of its shareholders is, or has, become too restrictive.  There is 
evidence to support the notion that corporations are considered to be a member of 
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society and as such have a social responsibility. Evidence of this is apparent in 
relation to the banking industry where the federal government has imposed certain 
obligations on the sector as a condition of their license to operate.  Further examples 
can be gleaned from the recent Ansett Australia collapse and the government’s 
statements concerning obligations of Qantas.  It can be argued that the right of 
corporations to continue to operate is dependent upon complying with the social 
contract, and that the terms of this ‘contract’ are changing across time with greater 
inclusion of social performance requirements. 
The existence of a social contract to operate, by implication means that not only must 
a reporting process that addresses societal concerns exist, but there should also be a 
process to monitor concerns.  Presently social reporting systems are in their infancy 
and there is a need to develop a sound and rational model for reporting.  Accountants 
are well placed to take a leading role in the development of such a process given 
their expertise and history in the development of a financial reporting system.  The 
accounting profession does recognize the need for the provision of such information, 
even if it is only implicit in the conceptual framework.  This implicit acceptance is 
reflected in SAC2 which provides that financial reports shall provide information 
useful to users for making and evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce 
resources. 
General purpose financial reporting also provides a mechanism to enable 
managements and governing bodies to discharge their accountability.  Managements 
and governing bodies are accountable to those who provide resources to the entity for 
planning and controlling the operations of the entity.  In a broader sense, because of 
the influence reporting entities exert on members of the community at both the 
microeconomic and macroeconomic levels, they are accountable to the public at 
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large.  General purpose financial reporting provides a means by which this 
responsibility can be discharged. 
Presently it could be argued that social reporting lacks credibility.  O’Dwyer (2000) 
states that many stakeholders may on reading these reports dismiss them as typical 
examples of corporate spin or public relations polish.  Other commentators have 
argued that specious gloss as opposed to democratic accountability could be a term 
fairly applied to many social reporting initiatives given that many do not yet 
subscribe to the rigorous procedures advocated by the Institute of Social and Ethical 
Accountability (ISEA) in AA1000 Accountability Principles Standard.  This creates 
a definite credibility problem for companies issuing social reports.  
This concern with credibility has led to the development of a market for external 
social audits.  Social Audit is a systematic and objective accounting procedure which 
enables organizations to measure a range of internal and external factors not covered 
by financial auditing. The method comprises a four stage cycle: a) review statement 
of purpose and confirm or change if required, and measure and evaluate previous 
year’s targets: b) review internal systems; c) review external relationships; d) set 
annual targets and operational criteria. (Spreckley, 1997) 
1.4 Theoretical perspective of the study 
Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder Theory are two theoretical perspectives that 
have been adopted by a number of researchers in recent years. These theories are 
sometimes referred to as ‘systems-oriented theories’. Within a systems-based 
perspective, the entity is assumed to be influenced and in turn to have influence 
upon, the society in which it operates. 
According to Gray, Owen and Adams (1996), Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder 
Theory are both derived from a broader theory which has been called Political 
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Economy Theory.  The ‘political economy’ itself has been defined by Gray, Owen 
and Adams (1996, p. 47) as ‘the social, political and economic framework within 
which human life takes place’.  There are many similarities between Stakeholder 
Theory and Legitimacy Theory.  Gary, Kouhy and Lavers (1995, p. 52) state: 
“It seems to us that the essential problem in the literature arises from 
treating each as competing theories of reporting behaviour, when 
‘stakeholder theory’ and ‘legitimacy theory’ are better seen as two 
(overlapping) perspectives of the issue which are set within a 
framework of assumptions about ‘political economy’.” 
 
As Deegan (2002, p. 295) indicates, both theories conceptualise the organisation as 
part of a broader social system wherein the organisation impacts on, and is affected 
by, other groups within society.  While legitimacy theory discusses the expectations 
of society in general (as encapsulated within the ‘social contract’), stakeholder theory 
provides a more refined resolution by referring to particular groups within society 
(stakeholder groups).  Essentially stakeholder theory accepts that, because different 
stakeholder groups will have different views about how an organisation should 
conduct its operations, there will be various social contracts ‘negotiated’ with 
different stakeholder groups, rather than one contract with society in general.  While 
implied within legitimacy theory, the managerial branch of stakeholder theory 
explicitly refers to issues of stakeholder power, and how stakeholders’ relative power 
affects their ability to ‘coerce’ the organisation into complying with the stakeholders’ 
expectations. 
This study treats stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory as largely overlapping 
theories that provide consistent but slightly different insights into the factors that 
motivate managerial behaviour (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers, 1995; O’Donovan, 2002).  
Differences between the theories largely relate to issues of resolution; stakeholder 
theory focuses on how an organisation interacts with particular stakeholders, while 
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legitimacy theory considers interaction with ‘society’ as a whole.  A consideration of 
both theories is deemed to provide a fuller explanation of management’s actions.  As 
Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995, p.67) state in relation to social disclosure related 
research: 
“The different theoretical perspectives need not be seen as competitors for 
explanation but as sources of interpretation of different factors at different 
levels of resolution.  In this sense, legitimacy theory and stakeholder 
theory enrich, rather than compete for, our understandings of corporate 
social disclosure practices.” 
 
There are two perspectives to stakeholder theory: (1) moral (and normative) 
perspective; and (2) a positive (managerial) perspective.   
The normative (moral) perspective of Stakeholder Theory argues that all 
stakeholders have the right to be treated fairly by an organization, and that issues of 
stakeholder power are not directly relevant. That is, regardless of whether 
stakeholder management leads to improved financial performance, managers should 
manage the organization for the benefit of all stakeholders. (Deegan 2001) 
The positive perspective of stakeholder theory attempts to explain why management 
will meet the expectations of certain stakeholders, typically those in a position of 
power or influence.   
As this study is attempting to explain actions of organizations it utilisises the positive 
perspective of stakeholder theory, which is also known as the managerial 
perspective. It also draws upon legitimacy theory in relation to the determination of a 
social contract.  Legitimacy Theory asserts that organizations continually seek to 
ensure that they operate within the bounds and norms of their respective societies, 
that is, they attempt to ensure that their activities are perceived by outside parties as 
being ‘Legitimate’.  Legitimacy Theory relies upon the notion that there is a ‘social 
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contract’ between the organization in question and the society in which it operates. 
(Deegan, 2001) 
It is assumed that society allows the organization to continue operations to the extent 
that it generally meets their expectations. Legitimacy Theory emphasizes that the 
organization must appear to consider the rights of the public at large, not merely 
those of its investors.  
1.5 Contribution of this study to the literature 
Presently, the accounting profession in Australia has not taken a leading role in the 
development of a social reporting framework or standard.  However, there have been 
developments in other countries by other bodies.  One of the main developments has 
been in the UK.  In late 1999 ISEA launched standard AA1000, which is concerned 
with processes relating to setting up and operating social and ethical accounting and 
auditing systems.  It was developed both as a stand alone system for managing and 
communicating social and ethical performance, and also as a ‘common currency’ to 
underpin the quality of specialized accountability standards (e.g. in the area of labour 
standards) that were, and continue to emerge (AccountAbility ISEA, 2001). 
As discussed earlier, several studies have been undertaken on the broad area of social 
and environmental reporting and accountability.  Whilst there has been increased 
public attention to corporate social responsibility and reporting worldwide, most 
studies conducted to date have been related to environmental responsibilities and 
disclosures and/or have involved content analysis of published reports.  There have 
been relatively few empirical studies on the broader issue of social information and 
disclosures.  Parker (2005) reviewed the research on social and environmental 
accountability that was published between 1988 and 2003 in six leading 
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interdisciplinary journals2.  He found that of the 233 published articles assessing 
social and environmental accountability, 140 (66%) specifically addressed 
environmental issues.  This study provides information and data for furthering the 
social reporting and auditing field in Australia.  This study will contribute to the 
debate as it is directly concerned with the social responsibility of organisations and 
involves surveying of management of organisations.  In this way a better 
understanding of the response by management of organisations to its stakeholders 
will be achieved.  The results of the study will also be of direct relevance to the 
increasing number of entities embarking on social reporting.  Knowledge of how 
management assesses stakeholder expectations and how to report against such 
expectations will be directly relevant to moves towards organizational sustainability. 
1.6 Research design and data analysis 
The major issues analysed in this study are: 
1. Which stakeholder groups do management believe are important in deciding 
on social information disclosures in organisations in Australia? 
2. What are the main motivations perceived by management of Australian 
organisations in influencing decisions to report social information? 
3. Are current financial reporting practices sufficient to capture the impact of an 
organisation’s activities? 
This study applied a survey questionnaire addressed to senior managerial levels in 
the top 500 organisations in Australia to: 
 identify which stakeholder group(s) are perceived most important to the 
organisation in reporting social information; 
                                        
2  The six journals were Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Accounting Forum, 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Social and 
Environmental Accounting Journal, and Journal of the Asia Pacific Centre for Environmnetal 
Accountability. 
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 find what motive(s) an organisation has to disclose social information; 
 gather information as to what disciplines, information and disclosures 
organisations consider important in reporting to stakeholders. 
These questions examine the basic elements of the organisation – stakeholder 
interaction.  The questions seek to establish whether particular stakeholders are 
important to the organisation, motivation for reporting social information to 
stakeholders and the types of information and associations perceived necessary to 
capture an organisations’ accountability and social impacts. 
The methodology involved two phases: 
1. Design of the research instrument and postal survey; and 
2. Follow-up face-to-face interviews with survey respondents. 
1.7 Results of the Study 
The results of the study have shown that respondents believe that stakeholders should 
be identified and that social information and the reporting of social information to 
stakeholders is important.  The identification of stakeholders to the organisation was 
found to be important.  This supports the view of a wider responsibility of business 
beyond its shareholders and creditors who have historically been considered the 
audience for corporate reporting.  In relation to the importance of differing 
stakeholder groups the study found that employees were considered the most 
important stakeholder group with shareholders, regulators, government, consumers 
and the community also considered important.  Respondents were asked to identify 
motivations for reporting social information and were presented with a range of 
statements outlining motivations developed from the literature.  Whilst several 
motivations were identified, the primary motivation was a belief that organisations 
have a wider accountability than just to shareholders.  Stakeholders are seen to have 
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a right to be informed about the activities of an organisation and to be considered in 
the decision making undertaken by organisations.  Transparency and accountability 
to stakeholders was seen as primary reason for the reporting of social information.  
Respondents were asked what social information they believed important to disclose 
using the Global Reporting Initiative as a base reference point.  Generally 
respondents believed that disclosure of policies, procedures and management 
systems were more important than the disclosure of statistical information such as 
breakdown of the workforce, etc.  In addition to the Global Reporting Initiative 
disclosures respondents identified further areas or items for disclosure.  Additional 
areas or items identified by respondents included resource usage or environmental 
footprint, community support including philanthropy and non-compliance with 
relevant laws or regulations. 
Respondents were asked about the adequacy of the current financial reporting 
system.  Overwhelmingly respondents showed that they believe current financial 
reporting systems are insufficient in capturing the impact of an organisations 
activities and social impact and identified a number of other disciplines and 
associations they believed necessary to capture this impact.  Specific disciplines or 
associations they believed should be added to the traditional financial reporting 
system were categorised under the headings of human capital, environmental science 
and impact and community impact.  The responses indicate a belief that the current 
financial reporting system and its emphasis on economic data is not considered broad 
enough to capture or report on an organisation’s activities or social impact.  As one 
respondent commented ‘corporate social reporting helps indicate the value of a 
company’s intangibles – a significant component of enterprise value. 
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Many organisations were found to currently report social information.  The reasons 
for why they engaged in social reporting were found to support the earlier findings 
relating to motivations for social reporting.  The main reasons put forward for social 
reporting were for transparency and accountability to stakeholders, organisation 
reputation and employee recruitment and retention.  Respondents showed that they 
believed the organisation had a distinct and important role in society, part of which 
included acting in a responsible manner on more than a simple financial sense. As a 
respondent from the energy industry stated, the impact of an organisation is greater 
than its economic impact and social reporting offers the opportunity to demonstrate 
involvement in these issues. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This study has shown that respondents believe that stakeholders should be identified 
and that social information and the reporting of social information to stakeholders is 
important.  Respondents identified several reasons for reporting social information 
including a belief that the organisation has a broader social responsibility and 
obligation as part of society.  They also showed that they believe current financial 
reporting systems are insufficient in capturing the impact of an organisation’s 
activities and social impact and identified a number of other disciplines and 
associations they believed necessary to capture this impact. 
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Chapter Two:  Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Social Reporting 
2.1 Introduction 
There is no mandatory requirement to report social and environmental information 
under current Australian accounting standards.  However, Statement of Accounting 
Concepts SAC2 Objective of General Purpose Financial Reporting provides that 
general purpose financial reports shall provide information useful to users for making 
and evaluating decisions about the allocation of scarce resources. 
In establishing this objective it recognizes that corporations control resources and 
influence members of the community through providing goods and services, levying 
prices, charges, rates and taxes, and acquiring and investing resources.  SAC2 
paragraphs 16 to 20 also recognises that users of general purpose financial statements 
are resource providers inclusive of employees, lenders, creditors, suppliers and 
investors, recipients of goods and services and parties performing oversight or 
regulatory functions.  While accounting standards are yet to recognise social and 
environmental reporting, section 299 (1) (f) of the Corporations Act 2001 requires the 
annual directors’ report to detail compliance with environmental regulations.  Frost 
(2007) provides some evidence that the introduction of section 299 (1) (f) of the 
Corporations Act did significantly affect the quantity of information provided by 
Australian companies, with increased disclosure of information relating to 
environmental performance.  The study showed that many companies were not fully 
disclosing performance information under a voluntary reporting regime.  However, 
the study also indicated that for many companies the limited scope of the provision 
did not result in further useful information being reported and that there was 
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considerable variation in the interpretation of the information required (Adams and 
Frost, 2007). 
Bomann-Larsen and Wiggen (2004, p. 3) reported that in 2001, 51 of the 100 largest 
economies in the world were not states but private companies, thus illustrating that the 
private sector is a major actor on the global arena – an actor with considerable impact 
on the societies in which it operates.  They state that with such power comes 
responsibility on the part of companies.  Increased scrutiny of the actions of 
companies has placed the responsibility of companies on the global agenda (Bomann-
Larsen and Wiggen, 2004, p. 3).  Given the major part that companies play in the 
global economy the community interest is best served if scarce resources controlled 
by corporations are allocated to those organizations which will use them in the most 
efficient and effective manner in providing goods and services.  SAC2 supports this 
by stating: 
“Efficient allocation of scarce resources will be enhanced if those who 
make resource allocation decisions ……………have the appropriate 
financial information on which to base their decisions.  General 
purpose financial reporting aims to provide this information.” 
However, the traditional form of corporate reporting takes a narrow view of assessing 
an organization’s performance and position.  It excludes much information about the 
broader impact of a corporation’s activities, for example, destruction of the ozone 
layer, social cost of involuntary unemployment, etc.  Economists refer to these 
impacts as externalities – the consequences of economic activity which are not 
reflected in the costs borne by the individual or organization enjoying the benefits of 
the activity (Gray et al, 1996).  Social accounting and reporting are an attempt to 
provide additional reports which will capture some of these externalities, both in a 
qualitative and quantitative form. 
 25
Accounting practices and reporting have changed and developed over time but it is 
generally agreed that there is a close relationship between the development of 
accounting and of society itself (Mathews, 1993). 
Goldberg (1971, pp 36 – 37) summed the relationship between accounting and society 
as follows:  
 “This evolution has followed the pattern of responses to external 
influences which is present in all organic development and, as in the 
growth of organisms, the essence of later developments has been present 
in earlier stages of existence.  It seems most unlikely that this evolution 
has reached its end; as we work and study new phases of development 
appear to be arising. Thus, economists and statisticians are beginning to 
explore the social implications of the techniques of accounting and the 
economic influences of its concepts and procedures, and the social 
responsibilities of accountants are continually increasing.” 
 
Thus it can be seen that societal changes will bring about change in the accounting 
discipline.  Therefore corporate social reporting or accounting may be considered as 
inevitable because as society changes, demanding greater and different degrees of 
accountability, accounting systems must evolve to satisfy these demands (Mathews, 
1993). 
2.2 What is corporate social reporting? 
Gray et al, (1987) defined corporate social reporting as:   
“. . the process of communicating the social and environmental effects of 
organizations’ economic actions to particular interest groups within 
society and to society at large. As such, it involves extending the 
accountability of organizations (particularly companies), beyond the 
traditional role of providing a financial account to the owners of capital, 
in particular, shareholders. Such an extension is predicated upon the 
assumption that companies do have wider responsibilities than simply to 
make money for their shareholders. (p. ix).“ 
 
And by Mathews (1993, p. 64) as: 
“Voluntary disclosures of information, both qualitative and quantitative 
made by organisations to inform or influence a range of audiences.  The 
quantitative disclosures may be in financial or non-financial terms.” 
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Deegan (2001) defines social-responsibility reporting as the provision of information 
about the performance of an organization with regard to its interaction with its 
physical and social environment. This includes such factors as an organization’s: 
• Interaction with the local community;  
• Level of support for community projects;  
• Level of support for developing countries;  
• Health and safety record;  
• Training, employment and education programs; and  
• Environmental performance.  
 
He further states that social reporting, which is a component of social responsibility 
reporting, provides information about an organisation’s interaction with, and 
associated impacts upon, particular societies. 
 
In summary, social accounting and reporting involves accounting for and reporting an 
organization’s policies, procedures and impacts with respect to employees, 
communities (local and global), suppliers, customers and the environment. This can 
involve disclosure regarding, inter alia, commitments to workplace conditions, 
fairness and honesty in dealing with suppliers, customer service standards, community 
and charitable involvement, and non-exploitative business practices in developing 
countries. 
2.3 Development of corporate social reporting 
One of the ideas emerging from the social activism of the 1960’s and 1970’s was the 
concept of the corporate social audit.  If companies were to be held responsible for 
their societal and environmental impact, then a social audit, similar to the annual 
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financial audit, was seen to be an ideal mechanism to assess corporate responsibility 
in this area (Johnson, 2001). 
The phrase ‘social audit’ was first used in the 1950’s.  Much early work took the form 
of external investigations to assess the impact of large corporations on their 
workforce, consumers and the community.  This investigative strand of social 
auditing has continued, examining the impact of plant closures and of investment or 
relocation decisions and, increasingly, uncovering the ethical behaviour and 
environmental impact of business corporations.  Increasing numbers of corporations 
now accept the notion of ‘corporate responsibility’ and have developed substantial 
community support programs. 
More recently companies have been required to report on their environmental impact 
and few developments can now proceed without an environmental impact audit.  New 
standards for environmental reporting have been introduced, for example BS7750 and 
ISO 14001. 
According to Deegan (2001) the practice of social reporting was widely promoted in 
the 1970’s but lost prominence in the 1980’s.  The collapse of the social audit was 
probably triggered by several factors.  A major factor was a lack of enthusiasm for 
voluntary auditing by the business community itself.  Much of the drive for the audits 
was coming from social activists, academics, and others, with the business 
community being dragged reluctantly into the discussion (Johnson, 2001). 
“The idea was new and quite radical.  Viable models and measurements 
were lacking.  And managers feared that exposing their firms to a social 
audit could open the doors to public criticism and possible government 
interaction (Johnson, 2001, p.29). 
 
In the early 1990s attention was devoted to environmental reporting from an eco- 
efficiency perspective.  Social reporting did not appear to re-emerge until the mid to 
late 1990s.   There is little doubt that environmental reporting has become more 
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widespread although the accounting profession has not been in the forefront of 
developments.  The accounting profession has issued an accounting standard relating 
in a minor way to environmental matters, this being AASB1022 Accounting for the 
Extractive Industries.  However this standard, as far as environmental impact is 
concerned, only addresses the need for the accounting and disclosure of restoration 
costs.  However, AASB1022 is but one standard issued by the accounting profession 
and even this standard is predominantly concerned with financial disclosures.   
Disappointingly, the broader notion of social reporting has not been adopted by the 
accounting standard setters, although there are several examples of such reporting. 
Some of the earliest examples of social reporting were from a number of avowedly 
‘values driven’ organizations such as Traidcraft, Body Shop and the Co-operative 
Bank.  However, there have been prominent corporations recently producing such 
reports including Shell, BP, Amoco, BT, British Airways, WMC, BHP and United 
Utilities. 
Further evidence of the development of social reporting practice is provided by 
developments in the notion of Triple Bottom Line reporting.  Triple Bottom line 
reporting has been defined by Elkington (1997) as reporting which provides 
information about the economic, environmental, and social performance of an entity. 
It represents a departure from previous ‘bottom line’ perspectives which have 
traditionally focused solely on an entity’s financial or economic performance.  
While social reporting may be in its infancy (relative to traditional financial reporting) 
there is little doubt that it is gaining momentum.  This leads us to examine why it has 
re-emerged. 
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2.4 Motivations behind social reporting 
Despite the fact that there is little regulation in relation to mandatory social reporting, 
as can be seen above, many organizations voluntarily elect to publicly disclose 
information about their social and environmental performance.  O’Dwyer (2000) 
states that the primary corporate motivation for social reporting emanates from a 
perception among company management that corporate reputation now has an 
increasingly large impact on shareholder value. For example, John Browne, Director 
of Reputation Assurance at PwC, perceives reputation as the key competitive 
differentiator for successful companies for the next 50 years and maintains that 
reputation risks have to be managed carefully. He claims that “successful companies 
will be those who embed social, environmental and ethical risk management into their 
core business processes and performance measures” and that “this integrated approach 
is at the heart of managing the 21st century company’s most valuable asset – its 
reputation”.3  According to Browne stakeholders are demanding more information, 
transparency and accountability and companies must respond to this in order to 
protect reputation. Social reporting is therefore viewed as a key means of gaining, 
repairing, or even maintaining reputation as part of a reputation risk management 
strategy aimed at both creating and protecting shareholder value.  
Adams and Zutshi (2004, p. 32) stated there are two key drivers for companies to act 
in a socially responsible way and be accountable for their activities and impacts.   
“First, a recognition of the power of companies and acceptance by them 
that they have broader responsibilities than simply earning money for 
shareheolders (ie, a moral justification) and, second, a recognition that it 
is in a business’s interest to report.” 
 
                                        
3 As quoted in O’Dwyer, (2000) Social and Ethical, Accountancy Ireland, Vol. 32 No. 6, pp. 13 
– 14. 
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Deegan (2001) lists the motivations for disclosing social and environmental 
information, derived from differing theoretical perspectives, as including: 
• to influence the perceived legitimacy of the organization;  
 According to Legitimacy Theory, organizations undertake actions including 
disclosing information, in an endeavour to appear legitimate to the societies in 
which they operate.  Legitimacy Theory itself relies upon the theoretical notion of 
a social contract. This notion is very similar to the idea of a ‘community license 
to operate’, a phrase that is currently being used by a number of Australian 
mining organizations. 
• to manage particular (and possibly, powerful) stakeholder groups; 
 Related theoretical perspective is Stakeholder Theory. Within Stakeholder 
Theory the organization is also considered to be part of the wider social system 
but this theory specifically considers the different stakeholder groups within 
society.  The power of stakeholders such as owners, creditors or regulators to 
influence corporate management is viewed as a function of a stakeholder’s degree 
of control over resources required by the organization (Ullmann 1985, as quoted 
by Deegan (2001)). 
• increase the wealth of the shareholders and the managers of the organization; 
 If we were to accept that all people are driven by self interest, then managers 
would decide to make social and environmental disclosures if such disclosures 
ultimately increase the wealth of the managers (perhaps as a result of increasing 
the profitability or value of their organization) 
• a belief by the managers that the entity has an accountability (or a duty) to 
provide particular information;  
 31
• to forestall efforts to introduce more onerous disclosure regulations by regulators 
and governments. 
Whilst the above list is reasonably comprehensive there are a number of broader 
societal factors which can be identified as drivers towards corporate social 
responsibility.  These include: 
• new concerns and expectations from members of society, consumers, public 
authorities and investors in the context of globalisation and large scale industrial 
change; 
• social criteria are increasingly influencing the investment decisions of individuals 
and institutions both as consumers and investors; 
• increasing concern about the damage caused by economic activity to not only the 
environment but the social fabric; and  
• transparency of business activities brought about by the media and modern 
information and communication technologies. 
A further motivation behind the re-emergence of social reporting relates to the major 
changes throughout the 1980’s that have meant a delegation by the State to 
commercial and non-profit organisations in key social and economic spheres.  These 
changes have created a need for accounting practices which assess the social impact 
and ethical behaviour of such organisations, as well as their financial and 
environmental performance (Zadek et al, 1995). 
As a Business Week editorial (2000) stated: 
“…. the new economy has produced a new social contract, whereby the 
general public expects business to adhere to a much higher social 
standard.” 
 
This greater expectation is evidenced in a number of developments such as the 
Goteborg European Council of June 2001 which concluded that in the long-term 
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economic growth, social cohesion and environmental protection go hand-in-hand 
(European Commission, 2002).  Various other international initiatives such as the UN 
Global Compact (2000), the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles covering 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977/2000) and the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (2000) are further evidence of the higher expectations 
on business.  This is further supported by the growth of socially responsible 
investment groups such as: 
• UK Social Investment Group, a UK membership vehicle for socially responsible 
investment. 
• Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index, an index of sustainability driven 
companies provided by Dow Jones in association with SAM Sustainable Asset 
Management. 
• FTSE4Good, an index of ethically responsible companies launched by FTSE in 
association with the Ethical Investment Research Service and the United Nations 
Children’s Fund. 
The new economy can be seen as having several key characteristics: 
• globalised markets, whereby innovation, production and investment are not 
restricted by national boundaries; 
• technology which allows information to be exchanged anywhere in the world, 
almost simultaneously, at little cost. 
However the new economy has also resulted in several concerns (Johnson, 2001): 
• deregulation in many areas has increased costs and decreased service; 
• privacy has emerged as an issue as technology has enabled tracking of data. 
The result of these concerns is: 
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“a neopopulism in which the public is demanding greater social 
responsibility and accountability from the business community”  (Johnson, 
2001, p. 34). 
 
In summary, various societal influences such as the stakeholder debate of the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s, which resulted in greater public engagement in social and 
environmental issues, along with the globalised economy and a rapidly changing 
world, are acting as the driver of corporate attempts to demonstrate accountability and 
transparency. 
2.4.1 Accountability and stakeholder perspectives 
According to Gray at al (1997) there are three dominant ways of theorizing the 
accountability relationship between an entity and its ‘outside world’. 
“We want to conceive of three theoretical perspectives as a series of 
(overlapping) layers which can be synthesized and built up into a rich 
conception of the organization-society interaction” (Gray et al 1997, 
p.333) 
 
The three perspectives are: 
1. a stakeholder perspective 
2. an accountability perspective 
3. a polyvocal citizenship perspective. 
2.4.1.1   Stakeholder Perspective 
Stakeholders can be considered as those individuals or groups to whom the firm 
chooses to report information about the firm’s activities.  The following descriptions 
of stakeholders indicate the different emphasis placed by researchers on the 
interpretation of who stakeholders are.  Broadly these interpretations can be identified 
as positive or normative and underlie the various theories that seek to identify the 
nature of the interaction between the firm and its stakeholders.  Positivist theorists 
seek to explain the reasons for the behaviour of the management in responding to 
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stakeholders.  These theorists focus on dependency relationships where, for example, 
the stakeholder is able to impact on the firm’s survival.  Normative theorists identify 
reasons why firms should report information to stakeholders.  These theorists focus 
on the ideas of the right of stakeholders to information without seeking to identify a 
dependency relationship. 
In 1983 Freeman and Reed (1983) described stakeholders as: 
“those groups who have a stake in the actions of the corporation” (p.89). 
 
They identified two interpretations of this general definition.  The first interpretation 
is wide and is: 
“any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of an 
organisation’s objectives or is affected by the achievement of an 
organisation’s objectives” (p.91) 
 
The second interpretation is narrow and is: 
“any identifiable group or individual on which the organisation is 
dependent for its continued survival” (p. 91)’ 
 
The key words are ‘affect’ in the first interpretation which reflects a normative view, 
and ‘dependent’ in the second interpretation which reflects a positive view.  However, 
Freeman and Reed (1983) noted that the stakeholder: 
“notion is indeed a deceptively simple one” (p. 89), 
 
and did not discuss the distinction between affect and dependency.  This definition 
offers an extremely wide field of possibilities as to who or what constitutes a 
stakeholder. 
Evan and Freeman (1988) defined stakeholders as: 
“those groups who have a stake in or a claim on the firm.  Specifically we 
include suppliers, customers, employees, shareholders and the local 
community, as well as management in its role as agent for these groups” 
 
and secondly, 
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“groups or individuals who benefit from or are harmed by, and whose 
rights are violated or respected by, corporate actions” (p. 79). 
 
In the positive theoretical perspective they replace the general notion of ‘affect’ or 
‘affecting’ with ‘stake or claim’ arguing that ‘stake or claim’ implied the notion of 
share in, or a right to involvement that was stronger than influence implied by ‘affect 
or affecting’.  They argued that the use of terms could tighten what is meant and 
allow for better identification of the constituencies relevant to the identification of 
stakeholders. 
Hill and Jones (1992) adopted a positive emphasis and suggested that stakeholders 
are identified by the legitimacy of their claim evidenced by an exchange relationship. 
“The term stakeholder refers to groups of constituents who have a 
legitimate claim on the firm.  This legitimacy is established through the 
existence of an exchange relationship, that is, an identifiable contract can 
be shown to exist between two parties.  Stakeholders include stockholders, 
creditors, managers, employees, customers, suppliers, local communities 
and the general public.  Each of these groups can be seen as supplying the 
firm with critical resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects 
its interests to be satisfied (by inducements)” (p. 132). 
 
Clarkson (1995) categorises stakeholders into primary stakeholders and secondary 
stakeholders based on their relationship with the firm.  Primary stakeholders are those 
considered critical to the continued existence of the firm while secondary 
stakeholders are groups affected, directly or indirectly, by the firm’s activities.  
Carroll and Nasi (1997) identify categories of stakeholders on the basis of whether 
they are internal or external to the firm, active or passive in their interaction with the 
firm, economic or social in interest and core, strategic, or environmental in nature.  
Mitchell et al (1997) offered a theory of stakeholder identification and salience.  In 
their discussion they suggest: 
That managers’ perceptions of three key stakeholder attributes – power, 
legitimacy, and urgency – affect stakeholder salience – the degree to 
which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims” (Agle et 
al, 1999, p.507). 
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The different theoretical perspectives have led to confusion in identifying 
stakeholders.  Starick (1994) argued that it might be more informative to identify how 
important the stakeholder is to the firm arguing that important stakeholders would be 
attended to first.  Adopting a positive view, he suggested that importance could be 
judged by assessing the potential to influence the profitability of the firm.  A number 
of researchers have offered approaches to identifying ‘important’ stakeholders. 
An ‘important’ stakeholder could be identified as having the potential to threaten or 
to co-operate, or to compete with the firm (Freeman et al 2004, Savage et al 1991, 
Freeman 1984), identifiable by perceived power, or legitimacy, or strategic utility, 
geographic proximity, and management preferences (Carroll 1993). 
Stakeholder theory, Gray et al (1997) argue, is concerned typically with how the 
organisation manages its stakeholders. 
“It defines the influencing/influenced groups for us and typically explicitly 
defines what accountability the organisation itself is willing to recognise 
and discharge ………. This therefore provides our first layer – the 
stakeholder analysis in which the organisation defines the accountability”  
(Gray et al, 1997, p.334). 
2.4.1.2   Accountability Perspective 
Accountability reflects a perceived responsibility to provide information, suggesting 
that one party has a duty to provide an account for his or her actions to another party 
and that that other party has a right to receive this statement of account.  In its 
broadest sense, accountability can be referred to as the giving and demanding of 
reasons for conduct (Roberts and Scapens, 1985).  Gray et al (1996), adopting a 
positive view, defined accountability as: 
The duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial 
account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible” 
(p. 38). 
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They argue that accountability involves two responsibilities or duties.  The first 
responsibility or duty is to undertake certain actions (or forbear from taking actions).  
The second is a responsibility or duty to provide an account for those actions. 
“In the simplest case – that of the shareholders and a company – the 
directors of a company have a responsibility to manage the resources 
(financial and non-financial) entrusted to them by the shareholders and a 
responsibility to provide an account of this management.  We can 
therefore see the annual report and the financial statements as a 
mechanism for discharging accountability  ………  The essential elements 
of this process arise from a relationship between the directors and the 
shareholders, a relationship defined by society (in this case, inter alia, the 
Companies Act) and which provides the shareholders with a right to 
information” (p. 38). 
 
In the context of a normative view a number of researchers have sought to identify 
the nature of accountability firms have to the community.  Gray et al (1997) 
suggested that accountability could be expressed in terms of the expectations of the 
community surrounding the actions and activities of the firm. 
“The nature of the relationships – and the attendant rights to information – 
are contextually determined by the society in which the relationship 
occurs”  (Gray et al 1997, p. 334). 
 
Pallot (1991) argued that accountability could be extended beyond the two-person 
contract to a contract in which one party was the community.  As we saw above with 
stakeholder theory, part of these relationships may be economic in nature and the 
terms determined by the parties themselves, reflecting their relative power in the 
relationships.  The information flowing through the relationship will be determined 
by the power of the parties to demand it.  However, stakeholder theory takes a limited 
view of these relationships in that the parties involved determine them.  An 
accountability perspective widens this view to reflect the relationships based on a 
view of society or community.   
A society can be thought of as a series of individual contracts between members of 
society and society itself. 
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These contracts can be thought of as both legal and non-legal – that is, 
moral or natural contracts, that is some relationships and parts of some 
relationship are governed by law whereas other relationships – and some 
parts of all relationships – are governed by the ruling ethics, values and 
principles of society.  These ‘contracts’ provide the basis for the rights of 
the parties in that relationship – including rights and responsibilities 
relating to information flows”  (Gray et al 1996, p. 39). 
 
The nature of what is considered to be responsibility is constantly changing and 
developing; moral and natural rights in a society exist but are changing and 
developing over time (Tinker et al, 1991).  Natural and moral rights and 
responsibilities will always be of this nature and thus the level of accountability 
needed will be constantly changing (Gray et al 1996).  However, there is a belief that 
a social accounting based on a combination of stakeholder and accountability 
perspectives would be slow in responding to changing needs and this has led to the 
development of the polyvocal citizenship perspective. 
2.4.1.3   Polyvocal Citizenship Perspective 
This approach is based on the views and accounts of all stakeholders, as well as the 
mission statement and wider interests of the organisation concerned.  The approach is 
built around stakeholder dialogue and its essence lies in providing each of the 
stakeholders with a ‘voice’ in the organisation (Gray et al 1997).  The social account 
comprises predominantly (but not exclusively) a reporting of the voices of the 
stakeholders.  Furthermore, the social account does not seek to judge the relative 
relevance of these different ‘voices’, which can offer different accounts and 
judgements of the same set of events.  Rather, it seeks to report these different 
‘voices’, contextualise them with other information, to allow the reader to come to a 
view about the different perspectives.  The following example presented by Zadek et 
al (1995, p. 170) illustrates this point: 
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“In the Traidcraft social audit for 1993, for example, it was reported that a 
significant number of staff considered that the lower paid levels were 
receiving too little in relation to the organisation’s ‘fair trade’ declarations 
(Traidcraft 1994).  At the same time, the quantitative data showed that 
these staff were being paid roughly the same as people working in other 
trading organisations doing similar work.  These two views were 
conflicting but not incompatible.  Tradecraft’s staff considered that 
comparability was an inadequate basis for setting wages for an 
organisation with a declared social policy such as Traidcraft’s”. 
 
The role of the social audit was to present the differing perspectives to enable all of 
the stakeholders to understand the issues raised. 
In this section the issues related to the identification of stakeholders in terms of 
dependency by the firm, the rights of stakeholders to be informed and the 
accountability of the firm to stakeholders have been discussed.  The various 
interpretations of stakeholders indicate there are a number of ways to view those who 
might be stakeholders of a firm.  An understanding of stakeholders is necessary to 
identify how the various theoretical perspectives contribute to understanding how the 
firm interacts with stakeholders in the decisions to provide a social account about the 
activities of the firm. 
2.5 An Overview of the Different Theoretical Perspectives 
A number of theories have been developed to explain corporate social disclosure. 
Mathews (1993) identified three broad groups of arguments which may be used to 
justify the use of scarce resources in making further accounting disclosures. These are 
1. market related arguments, 
2. socially related arguments; and 
3. radically related arguments 
2.5.1 Market related arguments 
The first form of justification is to provide information of value to shareholders and 
capital markets. It is argued that social accounting disclosures contain information 
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content that can affect the prices of securities in the market and thus benefit 
shareholders and others (Mathews 1993, p.9).  
Arguments advanced in support of corporate social disclosure in a market system 
include: 
1. The market will be more efficient if more information is available to participants; 
2. Empirical research has demonstrated that a measure of social responsibility by 
organisations may correlate with higher income; 
3. Empirical research has shown that share prices may be influenced by the social 
responsibility disclosures of corporations. ( Mathews, 1993, p.10) 
2.5.1.1   Market efficiency  
The increased quantity of information sought by those advocating socially responsible 
accounting could serve to make the market more efficient.  The more information that 
is generally available, the more efficient the market should be.  Advocates of social 
disclosure argue for increased financial, non-financial, quantitative and qualitative 
disclosures in respect of employment practices, environmental impact, product safety, 
energy usage and community relations.  All these may be relevant to interested 
parties, such as employees, customers, regulatory bodies, shareholders and 
debtholders.  Externalities create a divergence between the private and social costs of 
production.  Social cost includes all the costs of production of the output of a 
particular good or service.  Market failures attributable to the divergence between 
social and private costs/benefits lead to an inefficient allocation of resources (Discalu 
et al, 2008).   
“The majority of the information that is currently produced relates to 
the internal costs of the firm. There is another class of disclosure called 
externalities, which, although more difficult to measure and value, has 
considerable potential for changing market behaviour” (Mathews, 
1993, p.11) 
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Financial accounting adopts the entity assumption, which requires the organisation to 
be treated as an entity distinct from its owners and other stakeholders.  If a transaction 
or event does not directly impact on the entity, it is ignored for accounting purposes.  
This means that externalities casued by reporting entities will typically be ignored, 
thereby meaning that performance measures are incomplete from a broader societal 
perspective.  Externalities can be internalized and thus included in the total cost by 
reflecting their costs in the market prices of goods and services (Bithos, 2011).   
An example of such an externality is the costs of pollution. Such costs are not 
necessarily included in the total cost of a good or service by the organisation.  As total 
cost usually bears some relationship to the selling price, it is argued that organisations 
with higher pollution costs to society may currently have higher returns to investors 
then if the external costs such as pollution were factored into total cost.  This may not 
matter but does mean the consumer is gaining a lower priced product at the expense 
of the broader society (both consumers and non-consumers).  From this perspective a 
free market for securities cannot function properly in the absence of accounting 
measurements and disclosures of such costs and accordingly resource allocation is 
compromised from a societal perspective.  The capital market is not as efficient 
because externalities are not included. 
2.5.1.2   Effect of corporate social disclosure on corporate financial performance 
Does social involvement of a firm decrease profits to the investor? Research studies 
on this question are contradictory. There is not conclusive evidence that there is a 
clear linkage in any direction between corporate social activities and profitability.  
Bowman and Haire (1975) investigated the association between social responsibility 
disclosures and shareholder benefits in the form of increased income to the 
organisation. They chose a sample of annual reports for the period 1969 – 1973. Of 
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the 82 companies, 31 firms were identified as “ corporately responsible’, as measured 
by discussion of corporate responsibility in their annual reports.  Using the 
proportional measure of social responsibility items reported as an indication of social 
responsibility, they found a statistically significant relationship when associated with 
income. The ‘corporately responsible’ firms had a higher return on equity (14.3%) 
then the 51 non-disclosing firms (9.1%). 
They did not infer a casual relationship, but that corporate social responsibility does 
not result in decreased profits.  
“We are reporting an association of two measures; we are not implying 
a directional causal relationship. It does not follow, simply, from these 
data, that more discussion of corporate responsibility (and, 
inferentially, on the basis of our tests of the measure, more activity in 
this area) causes greater profits. At the same time, it is perfectly clear 
that more corporate social responsibility is not associated with less 
profits.” (Bowman and Haire, 1975, p52). 
Vance (1975) analysed the relation between reputational indexes of corporate social 
involvement derived from ratings of 45 corporations by corporate staffers and 50 
corporations by concerned business students and the percent change in the share price 
in 1974. Both measures indicated a negative relation between corporate social 
involvement and change in share prices, although the inverse relation appears stronger 
for the corporate staffer index than for the student index. 
Whereas Vance reported a negative association between social involvement and 
profitability, studies by Heinze (1976) and Bowman and Haire (1975) report a 
positive association.  
Abbot and Monsen (1979) in a content analysis of the annual reports of the Fortune 
500 companies observed an increase in social responsibility disclosures over the 1971 
to 1975.  Relating social disclosure to return to investors, they found no significant 
difference between high and low social involvement firms.  
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“Being socially involved does not appear to increase investors’ total 
rate of return. Nor does it appear that being socially involved is 
dysfunctional for the investor. (Abbot and Monsen, 1979, p.514) 
2.5.1.3   Market reaction to social disclosures 
While the above studies would indicate that social responsibility and its attendant 
disclosures do not lead to lesser corporate probability, some studies have concentrated 
on market reactions to levels of disclosure.  Belkaoui (1976) found, in a study of 50 
companies which disclosed their pollution control expenditures, a significant change 
centred on the date of disclosure, and the resulting expectations had apparently a 
substantial and temporary effect on the stock market performance. 
“In general, this study refutes the suggestion that the worst offenders in 
the reporting of social costs will be rewarded more in the capital 
market” (Belkaoui, 1976 p.30) 
Shane and Spicer (1983) investigated whether security price movements are 
associated with the release of externally produced information about companies’ 
performances in the pollution-control area. They demonstrated that the use of 
externally produced and publicized environmental data may have an effect on the 
share prices of polluting corporations, when the disclosures are first made. In 
investigating the Bhopal chemical leak, Blacconiere and Patten (1994, p. 357) found 
that: 
“firms with more extensive environmental disclosures in their financial 
report prior to the chemical leak experienced a less negative reaction than 
firms with less extensive disclosures”. 
 
Generally, the results from a number of studies concerning the existence of any 
relationship between social responsibility accounting disclosures and measures of 
market performance are inconclusive and conflicting. However, it may be argued that 
disclosure of such information does have utility for shareholders and the security 
market because of the information content.   
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2.5.2 Socially related arguments  
The second justification for corporate social accounting and reporting is by means of 
a philosophical argument resting on a social contract between business and society.  
“The notion of a social –is used to argue the case for the wider 
disclosure of socially related information to the general public and 
employers, rather than to shareholders and capital markets”. (Mathews, 
1993, p.5)  
The notion of a social contract is not new, having been discussed by several 
philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean- Jacques Rousseau. 
However it is only in recent time that this concept has been embraced within 
accounting research.  Mathews (1993) stated that the notion of a social contract 
originated in political philosophy, where it is argued that society in general accepts an 
overriding control over individual freedoms in order to achieve collective goals.  
The notion of the social contract was discussed by Shocker and Sethi (1973, p. 97) as 
follows: 
“Any social institution – and business is no exception – operates in a society 
via a social contract, expressed or implied, whereby it’s survival and growth 
are based on: 
1) the delivery of some socially desirable ends to society in general, and 
2) the distribution of economic, social, or political benefits to groups from 
which it derives power. 
In a dynamic society, neither the sources of institutional power not the needs 
for its services are permanent.  Therefore, an institution must constantly 
meet the twin tests of legitimacy and relevance by demonstrating that 
society requires its services and that the groups benefiting from its rewards 
have society’s approval.” 
 
Dahl (1997, p. 17) stated that every corporation should be ‘thought of as a social 
enterprise; that is, an entity whose existence and decisions can be justified only 
insofar as they serve public or social purposes’.  He went on to argue that society, 
through governments, grants special rights, powers and privileges to corporations on 
the basis that its activities fulfil societies needs and wants.  ‘Corporations exist 
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because we allow them to do so’ (Dahl, 1997, p. 17).  This social contract provides 
the basis for the additional disclosures. 
This view does not have universal acceptance.  For example, Friedman (1962, p. 107) 
in rejecting any broad notion of a corporate social responsibility, stated: 
“…there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as 
it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and 
free competition, without deception or fraud.  If businessmen do have a 
social responsibility other than making maximum profits for stockholders, 
how are they to know what it is?” 
 
Sethi (1970, p. 12) provided a counter view to that of Friedman stating: 
“..there is a separation between the ownership and the control of 
corporations and that management by and large is self-perpetuating.  The 
extent of self-discretion and its impact on all the members of the overall 
system make it imperative that corporations be subjected to some form of 
social control by stakeholders or the invisible hand of the market 
mechanism.”  
 
Patten (1992) stated that until recently legitimacy was considered in economic terms 
only.  As long as a firm was profitable it was granted legitimacy.  He went on to say 
that: 
“.. during the 1960s and 1970s society’s perceptions of business changed. 
……… Advocacy groups and research organizations concentrating on 
corporate social performance gained prominence, while public confidence in 
business declined.  In short, society began to demand that business address 
the social issues inherently related to the organizations.”   (p. 471 – 472) 
 
Lindblom (1984) argued that the social contract leads logically to the concept of 
organisational legitimacy.  Mathews (1997) stated that organisational legitimacy can 
be seen as the practical expression of the philosophical position involved with the 
theory of social contract.  Dowling and Pfeffer (1975, p. 122) defined organisational 
legitimacy as: 
“Organizations seek to establish congruence between the social values 
associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable 
behaviour in the larger social system of which they are a part.  Insofar as 
these two value systems are congruent we can speak of organizations’ 
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legitimacy.  When an actual or potential disparity exists between the two 
value systems, there will exist a threat to organizational legitimacy.  These 
threats take the form of legal, economic, and other social sanctions.” 
 
Lindblom (1994) presents four strategies which an organization may employ to 
increase their legitimacy when their performance is under question.  These are: 
1. seek to ‘educate’ its shareholders about the organization’s intentions to improve 
that performance; 
2. seek to change the stakeholders’ perceptions of the event (but without changing 
the organization’s actual performance; 
3. distract attention away from the issue of concern (concentrate on some positive 
activity not necessarily related to the issue itself); and 
4. seek to change the external expectations about its performance. 
These strategies involve increased communication to society at large, or to specific 
interest groups.  ‘Frequently many major CSR initiatives can be traced back to one or 
more of Lindblom’s suggested implementation strategies’ (Gray et al, 1996, p. 47). A 
number of studies have been undertaken that examine aspects of organizational 
legitimacy. 
The results in the previously mentioned study of Abbott and Monsen (1979) were 
seen to result from a general decline in the nation’s confidence in American 
institutional leadership.  Maintaining that the decrease in confidence produced 
greater public and state pressure on an organization, they saw the increase in 
social responsibility disclosures as the ‘corporate response of firms striving to 
regain legitimacy in American society’ (p. 510). 
Hogner (1982) examined the annual reports of U.S. Steel for the years 1901 to 
1980, to examine the extent of social reporting and to ascertain if it was 
associated with societal pressures.  He framed his observations in terms of 
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legitimacy theory, arguing that the disclosures constituted a response to societal 
forces and behaviours.  He hypothesized that the year-to-year variations in 
reporting over that period was due to the company’s need to legitimise its 
activities. 
Guthrie and Parker (1989) conducted a longitudinal study of BHP’s annual 
reports for 100 years from 1885, and compared and contrasted it to Hogner’s 
(1982) examination of U.S. Steel.  As in the case of U.S. Steel, BHP’s corporate 
reports were found to exhibit a variable pattern of total social disclosure levels 
over their history.  They also mapped a data bank of major events and issues 
relating to BHP to the disclosures provided in the annual reports.  These ‘events 
and issues’ were identified primarily from historian texts.  ‘A majority of peak 
disclosures associated with relevant events is considered evidence of a 
legitimising explanation for BHP CSR’ (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 347).  The 
evidence examined in this historical case study failed to confirm legitimacy 
theory as an explanation of BHP’s CSR over time. 
“A relationship between legitimacy theory and disclosure was only 
marginally supported for environmental issues, unconfirmed for energy and 
community issues, and subject to contradictory evidence for human resource 
issues.  …………….  Indeed the company’s tendency towards little or no 
reporting at some times is inconsistent with a legitimacy theory of 
management reporting information in an attempt to legitimise its actions in 
the perceptions of employees, government and the public” (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989, p. 351). 
 
However, they noted that they may have failed to accurately capture those events and 
that there may have been unidentified time-lags in their matching process of events 
and eventual disclosure.  In rejecting legitimacy theory as the driver of BHP’s CSR, 
they suggested that political economy theory, which ‘recognises the potential for 
management to tell its own story or refrain from doing so, according to its own self-
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interest’ (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 351), may prove to better explain the pattern of 
disclosure. 
Patten (1992) examined the reporting of North American petroleum companies 
around the Exxon Valdez accident.  He observed significant increases in 
environmental disclosures by the petroleum companies following the accident and 
interpreted this as evidence in support of legitimacy theory. 
“It appears that at least for environmental disclosures, threats to a firm’s 
legitimacy do entice the firm to include more social responsibility 
information in its annual report”  (Patten, 1992, p. 475). 
 
Inciting limitations of the study, he noted that the study related to only one industry 
and one incident stating that the fact that the petroleum industry has been considered 
high profile with respect to environmental issues in the past may be significant with 
respect to the applicability of legitimacy theory. 
Deegan and Rankin (1996) analysed corporate environmental disclosure policies 
around the time of proven environmental prosecutions.  Specifically, they 
investigated whether the firm will provide information in their annual reports to 
legitimise its continued operations within society.  They found that firms only provide 
environmental information that is favourable to their image and that firms that had 
been prosecuted provided significantly more positive environmental disclosures. 
“Such a finding is consistent with a view that those firms which had been 
prosecuted believe that there is a need to counter the negative news of their 
prosecution with positive news about their environmental initiatives.  That 
is, it appears that they believe there is a need to legitimise the existence of 
their operations” (Deegan and Rankin, 1996, p. 59) 
 
Brown and Deegan (1998) analysed annual report environmental disclosures made by 
firms using print media attention as a proxy for society concern.  Their research 
produced results supporting a legitimisation motive by corporate management finding 
that environmental disclosures by management in some industries were correlated 
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with the extent of media attention and that variations in media attention appear to be 
associated with variations in corporate disclosures. 
O’Donovan (2002) conducted a study on the corporate management of three large 
Australian companies, each operating in a different industry.  The aims of the 
research were to ascertain disclosure choices, the reasons for the choices and 
managers’ perceptions about the issues/events that precipitated the choices.  Results 
suggested that ‘environmental disclosure decisions were made on the basis of 
presenting corporations in a positive light’ (O’Donovan, 2002, p. 364).  O’Donovan 
(2002, p. 363) stated that ‘the findings from this investigation continue to support 
legitimacy theory as an explanation for the decision to disclose environmental 
information in the annual report’. 
Organisational legitimacy theory has been widely used in social and environmental 
accounting research.  The strategies put forward by Lindblom, outlined earlier, 
connect the philosophical propositions of the social contract with the need for 
corporate social disclosures through the notion of organisational legitimacy.  
Mathews (1993, p. 31) stated: 
“This problematic justification may be used with managers who do not 
necessarily accept the social contract arguments, but recognise the need to 
influence the general public through additional disclosures.” 
 
2.5.3 Radically related arguments 
The third justification for social accounting development rests upon a radical 
paradigm.  Critical theorists argue the need for radical political and social change 
which may be assisted by developments in social accounting.  The radical paradigm 
rejects market-based solutions and proponents argue that the structure of society 
shapes all that goes on within it through the actions of the governing body. 
“In general, the radical view concludes that accounting has supported, and 
continues to support, a particular view of society.  It is associated with 
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capitalistic production and marginalistic economics, which does not admit to 
problematic relationships between the organisations that accounting serves 
and society and follows a positivist approach.”  (Mathews, 1993, pp 39 – 
40) 
 
The radical paradigm takes a critical look at accounting arguing that it is not neutral 
or unbiased in its representations, nor necessarily in harmony with the needs of 
different stakeholders. 
Baher and Bettner (1997, p. 305) argued that: 
“Critical researchers have convincingly and repeatedly argued that 
accounting does not produce an objective representation of the economic 
‘reality’, but rather provides a highly contested and partisan representation 
of the economic and social world.” 
 
Mathews (1993) identified a number of characteristics from a review of the radical 
literature, including: 
1. The market must be de-emphasised, or even abolished, as a device for allocating 
resources.  The efficiency which is alleged to exist from a market based economy 
benefits only a part of society. 
2. Corporations are owned, organised and operated in a manner that is designed to 
establish and exploit power relationships. 
3. The accounting profession as currently organised maintains the status quo by 
attaching itself to one party to social conflict (capital) to the exclusion of the other 
main party (labour). 
4. Social accounting as presently advocated by most of the literature is deficient for 
a number of reasons, including: 
a. it only considers additional disclosures and perhaps accounting for 
some externalities; 
b. does not envisage a change in the ownership of capital resources; 
 51
c. would regulate the market mechanism rather than dispose of the 
market altogether; 
The conclusion is that social accounting as discussed in the mainstream literature is 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and consequently, when viewed from a radical 
perspective is considered inadequate and obstructionist (Mathews, 1993, p. 51). 
2.6 General systems theory 
The above studies and theories would appear to provide a limited explanation of 
social disclosure, and as noted by Gray et al (1996, p. 45), ‘of more interesting 
descriptive power are the theories which attempt to explain corporate social reporting 
practice within a more systems-orientated view of the organization and society’.  
General systems theory and the systems theory perspective provide us with a way of 
conceiving of the human, non-human, physical, etc systems in which we act.   The 
seventeenth century saw the development of the mechanistic worldview by Galileo, 
Descartes, Newton, Bacon and others.  It was believed that complex phenomena 
could always be understood by reducing them to their basic building blocks and by 
looking for the mechanisms through which they interacted.  Capra (1982) argued that 
this attitude, known as reductionism, has become so deeply ingrained in our culture 
that it has often been identified with the scientific method.  He went on to suggest that 
the other sciences accepted the mechanistic and reductionistic view of classical 
physics as the correct description of reality and modelled their own theories 
accordingly. 
“Whenever psychologists, sociologists or economists wanted to be 
scientific, they naturally turned toward the basic concepts of Newtonian 
physics.”  (Capra, 1982, p. 32) 
 
However, Capra argues that the Cartesian framework is often quite inappropriate for 
the phenomena that social scientists are describing, and consequently their models are 
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unrealistic.  Specifically, Capra (1982, p. 194) suggests that ‘this is now especially 
apparent in economics.” 
Capra (1987, p. 28) claims that a change of paradigms is required to address the 
major problems of our time. 
“The paradigm that is now receding has dominated our culture for 
several hundred years …… … This paradigm consists of a number of 
ideas and values, among them the view of the universe as a mechanical 
system composed of elementary building blocks, the view of the human 
body as a machine, the view of life in society as a competitive struggle 
for existence, the belief in unlimited material progress to be achieved 
through economic and technological growth, and last but not least, the 
belief that a society in which the female is everywhere subsumed under 
the male is one that follows a basic law of nature.  In recent decades, all 
of these assumptions have been found to be severely limited and in need 
of radical revision.” 
 
Capra (1982) claims that the discovery of evolution in biology by Darwin forced 
scientists to abandon the Cartesian conception of the world as a machine.  Instead, the 
universe had to be pictured as an evolving and ever changing system in which 
complex structures developed from simpler forms. 
“It might also be called a systems view, in the sense of general systems 
theory.”  (Capra, 1982, p. 66) 
 
Capra (1987) stresses the more scientific and economic aspects of the shift:  from a 
mechanistic anthropocentric worldview to an organic, ecologically interrelated, 
holistic systems view.   
Specifically in relation to economics, Capra (1982) states that most economists fail to 
recognise that the economy is merely one aspect of a whole ecological and social 
fabric.  He argues that economists tend to dissociate the economy from this fabric, in 
which it is embedded, and to describe it in terms of simplistic and highly unrealistic 
models.  The only values appearing in current economic models are those that can be 
quantified by being assigned monetary weightings.  Capra (1982, p. 198) argues that 
this emphasis on quantification gives economics the appearance of an exact science, 
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whilst at the same time severely restricting the scope of economic theories by 
‘excluding qualitative distinctions that are crucial to understanding the ecological, 
social, and psychological dimensions of economic activity.’  The orientation of these 
economic models, Capra argues, is the pursuit of economic growth which is typically 
defined as purely quantitative in terms of maximisation of production. 
“The assumption is that all growth is good and that more growth is 
always better.  It makes you wonder whether these economists have ever 
heard of cancer.”  (Capra, 1987, p. 29) 
 
He goes on to suggest that contemporary economics is a ‘mixed bag’ of concepts, 
theories and models ‘stemming from various epochs of economic history’.  (Capra, 
1982, p. 222)  He further states that since the conceptual framework of economics is 
ill suited to account for the social and environmental costs generated by all economic 
activity, economists have tended to ignore these costs, labelling them ‘external’ 
variables that do not fit into their theoretical models. 
“What economists need to do most urgently is reevaluate their entire 
conceptual foundation and redesign their basic models and theories 
accordingly.  The current economic crisis will be overcome only if 
economists are willing to participate in the paradigm shift that is now 
occurring in all fields.  As in psychology and medicine, the shift from the 
Cartesian paradigm to a holistic and ecological vision will not make the new 
approaches any less scientific, but on the contrary will make them more 
consistent with recent developments in the natural sciences.”  (Capra, 1982, 
p. 200) 
 
Accounting is often considered in a constrained systems perspective, as part of an 
economic system, but accounting also interacts with social, political and ethical 
systems and is directly related to organisational systems and their interactions with 
individuals, groups, societies and nations.  Gray et al (1996, p. 14) state that 
conventional accounting ignores these interactions and accordingly social accounting 
must attempt to account for these missing elements.  Capra (1982, p. 247) states a 
new theory, or set of models, is likely to involve a systems approach that will 
 54
‘integrate biology, psychology, political philosophy, and several other branches of 
human knowledge, together with economics, into a broad ecological framework.” 
Deep ecology, Capra argues, is the expression of this new paradigm. 
Traditionally there have been two opposing schools of thought relating to corporate 
social reporting:  neoclassical economists and advocates of corporate social 
responsibility.  Neo-classicists such as Milton Friedman and Freidrich von Hayek put 
the view that the economic mission of the corporation is ultimately pre-eminent: ‘the 
business of business is profit’.   Against this view, advocacy for corporate social 
responsibility appeared around the beginning of the twentieth century and resurfaced 
as a mainstream business topic in the 1960s through to the 1990s. 
More recently, a third framework has been added where an enterprise has social goals 
with outcomes that are valuable in their own right, alongside and not subordinate to 
economic outcomes.  The stakeholder view of the firm embodies this approach.  
Socially related arguments are used where additional disclosures would be made to 
establish the moral nature of the enterprise. 
Conventional economics and accounting have attempted to strip the explicitly moral 
from decision-making models.  (Gray et al, 1996, p.21) 
Many of the models are based on a liberal economic democratic conception where 
individuals are assumed to be acting in their own self-interest.  This notion of an 
individual being motivated by self interest was expressed by Hobbes and Locke and 
underpins the Cartesian 17th century mechanistic view of the world.  Conventional 
accounting theory and practice appears to support the view that the purpose of 
financial accounting is to inform the self-interested decision maker in order that they 
may maximise their personal wealth. (Gray et al, 1996, p. 15)  However, this 
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individualistic-utilitarianism premise of classical liberalism is coming under 
increasing criticism.  (Hoy, 2000, p. 1)   
”…the economic structures of capitalism that have enthroned a 
‘Calliclean’ life of endless consumption, growth and bigness; the 
persistence of inequities, and social injustice; environmental degradation 
due to the ascending of market priorities, the loss of genuine human 
community and civic virtues. (Hoy, 2000, p. ix) 
 
Contemporary political theory has been characterised by a renewal of interest in 
philosophers such as Aristotle, Hume and Dewey due to a growing disillusionment 
with the individualistic-utilitarianism premises of classical liberalism.  Aristotle, as 
quoted in Hoy (2000, p. 7) commented that “Every state is a community of some kind 
and every community is established with a view to some good.”   One of the critics of 
the individualism of the classical liberal tradition was the philosopher John Dewey.  
Dewey proposed that traditional liberalism in part rested on a false conception of the 
individual, which was ethically pernicious in its effect on liberal thought.  Classical 
liberalism envisages the individual as an independent entity in competition with other 
individuals, and takes social and political life a s a sphere in which this competitive 
pursuit of self-interest is coordinated.  Dewey, and others, rejected this view of social 
and political life as the aggregation of inherently conflicting private interests.  Instead 
they sought to view individuals relationally: individuality could be sustained only 
where social life was understood as an organism in which the well-being of each part 
was tied to the well-being of the whole.  As Dewy puts it, ‘men are not isolated non-
social atoms, but are men only when in intrinsic relations’ to one another, and the 
state in turn only represents them ‘so far as they have become organically related to 
one another, or are possessed of unity of purpose and interest’.   
Values, Dewey suggested, can be viewed as constructs to solve practical problems. 
Like an outmoded piece of technology, a past value which was once constructed to 
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address a problem in one set of circumstances can outlive its usefulness and become a 
hindrance to the capacity of those in the present to deal with their practical needs and 
worries. This, Dewey believes, is the case with values of classical liberalism. These 
have come to block the capacity to resolve social problems in a way compatible with 
what he takes to be liberalism’s core commitment to individual liberty. 
Dewey emphasises three levels of behaviour and conduct: 1) that which is motivated 
by biological or “non-moral” impulses;  2) behaviour in which the individual accepts 
the standards of his group without critical reflection; and 3) the conduct in which the 
individual develops the capacity for critical reflection. What is involved in the 
process of human growth, Dewey believes, is the process by which man becomes 
more rational, more social, and finally more moral. While our first impulses are a 
concern for immediate biological, economic necessities, man gradually develops the 
capacity for myths; theories of the world, enterprise in commerce and government; a 
family life raised to a higher level by art and Helicon. “He does not live by bread 
alone but builds up gradually a life of reason.” A social process enables greater 
capacity to enter into relations with others, and the development of language is a step 
towards more complete socialization. Cooperation and association for various 
purposes enhances the possibility of building a “social self.” “Conscious egoism and 
altruism become possible. The interests of self and others can be raised to the plane of 
rights and justice.”  (Hoy, 2000, p. 45) 
It is Dewey’s conviction that the crisis of the modern state has been due to the 
development of a concept of the individual isolated from association that has been a 
distortion of democracy; the ascendancy of mechanical forces and impersonal 
organization.  In Dewey’s view the ‘Great Society’ created by steam and electricity 
may be a society, but it is not a community.  “The invasion of the community by the 
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new and relatively impersonal and mechanical modes of combined behaviour is the 
outstanding fact of modern life”.  (Hoy, 2000, p. 59) 
The past several decades have given rise to the concept of a Darwinian political 
theory that is also Aristotelian and Humean: an agreement with Aristotle that human 
beings are by ‘nature social and political animals’; an agreement with Hume that 
‘human beings are by nature endowed with a moral sense’; and an agreement with 
Charles Darwin that ‘human society and morality are rooted in human biology’.  
(Hoy, 2000, p. 69) 
Roger Masters, as outlined by Hoy (2000, p. 70) articulated the political implication 
of evolutionary biology.  What Masters believes it indicates are a balancing of co-
operative with competitive behaviour in human evolution, the basis for a ‘new 
naturalism’ as respect for human individuality, and the duties of virtues entailed by 
social obligation and concern for human justice. 
What needs to be emphasised is the congruence of Darwinian theory with Aristotlean-
Humean implications in his conviction that natural moral sensibility is directed to a 
common good, rather than simply utilitarian self-interest.  Darwin notes that 
“philosophers of the derivative schools of morals” have assumed that the foundation 
of morality lies in a form of “selfishness”, or the “Greatest Happiness Principle”.  
But, in Darwin’s view, social instincts are developed rather for the general good of 
community.  (Hoy, 2000, p. 74)  Ernst Mayr also points out that Darwin is rejecting a 
causal process of nature elaborated in the physics of Gallileo, Descartes and Newton:  
their belief in a rigid determinism, prediction, and causality.  The biological sciences, 
Mayr believes, must be differentiated from the physical sciences.  For biological 
science is opposed to an explanatory reductionism in which phenomena and processes 
at higher hierarchical levels are explained in terms of actions and interactions at the 
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lower level; as well as a theoretical reduction in which laws formulated in biology are 
seen to be special cases of theory and laws in the physical sciences.  Living systems, 
he points out, have more complex organization with the capacity to respond to 
stimuli, to grow, differentiate, and replicate.  Biological organisms also have a 
‘feedback mechanism’ unlike inanimate systems.  Systems at each hierarchical level 
act as wholes and their characteristics cannot be deduced from knowledge of the 
constraints.  (Hoy, 2000, p. 77) 
“It is in the complementary viewpoints of Mayr and Dewey that one finds 
what is most promising as the focus for establishing the credibility of a 
naturalistic political theory.  Mayr provides an effective articulation of the 
developments in evolutionary biology as an emphasis that phenomena and 
processes of living organisms at hierarchical levels are not reducible to 
components at lower levels.  Such a contention is a reinforcement for 
Dewey’s emphasis upon the continuity of lower (less complex) and the 
higher (more complex) activities and forms that precludes reduction of the 
higher to the lower.”  (Hoy, 2000, p. 91) 
 
An extension of this evolutionary biology view is that of deep ecology.  Another 
characteristic of the anthropocentric mechanistic view of the world was an obsession 
with domination and control (Capra, 1982).  What this entails, he believes, is the need 
for greater emphasis upon a proper balance between human rights and freedom and 
the welfare of the natural world.  It is there that the implications of evolutionary 
biology are congruent with contemporary development in deep ecology.   A deep 
ecology, Capra contends, is expressive of a fundamental paradigm shift in Western 
society.  It rejects the anthropocentric domination of nature. 
Deep ecology does not separate humans from the natural environment, nor 
does it separate anything else from it.  It does not see the world as a 
collection of isolated objects, but rather as a network of phenomena that are 
fundamentally interconnected and interdependent.  Deep ecology recognises 
the intrinsic values of all living beings, and views humans as just one 
particular strand in the web of life.”  (Sessions, 1995, p. 20.) 
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2.7 Conclusion 
The reporting issue which can be identified from Dewey’s (1922) conjunction of the 
public and private interest (Kanne, 1988) is that potentially derelict values have 
touched management’s decisions in the past as historical cost.  As practitioners have 
determined, these cannot be replaced by values, market or otherwise, which are not 
convergent with (1) managements’ present intentions given its observance of the 
environment of operations; and (2) community manifestations of standards for 
outcomes generally acceptable under agreed moral and ethical principles of conduct 
(Dewey, 1922; Capra, 1995).  This can provide a professional setting for the periodic 
social audit of business affairs. 
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Chapter Three:  Social Contract and Accountability 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years there has been a proliferation of corporate social and environmental 
disclosures.  These disclosures have been steadily increasing in both volume and 
complexity (Deegan and Gordon, 1996).  Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995) show that 
voluntary social and environmental disclosures significantly increased from the 1980s 
to the 1990s.  The myriad empirical investigations of corporate social reporting and 
environmental practices have produced a very diverse body of academic literature 
which engages many different theoretical perspectives.  In particular, recent times 
have seen a surge in the amount of research informed and influenced by the notion of 
social contracts and organisational legitimacy. 
Gray et al (1988) provided one of the earliest papers where accountability and the 
social contract were investigated as part of a theory for corporate social reporting.  
Since then many researchers have implicitly and explicitly acknowledged the 
existence of a contract between society and business (for example, Heard and Bolce, 
1981).  Social contract arguments have been central to the tradition of social change 
and reform (Donaldson, 1982).  As acknowledged by Deegan (1998) however, many 
researchers use the notion of the social contract as part of other theories, e.g. 
legitimacy theory, where “… there is a ‘social contract’ between the organisation and 
those affected by the organisation’s operations” and which may be revoked if they 
operate outside the terms of the contract (Deegan, 1998, p. 17). 
Social contract theory hypothesises that the cornerstone of morality are uniform social 
accords that best serve the interests of those who make the agreements.  Legitimacy 
theory is closely related to the conception of the social contract.  The theory posits 
that businesses are bound by the social contract in which the firms agree to perform 
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various socially desired actions in return for approval of its objectives and other 
rewards, and this ultimately guarantees the firms continued existence (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989). 
This chapter examines the impact of the notion of the social contract upon corporate 
social reporting. 
3.2 Social contract theory defined 
The idea of the social contract goes back in a recognizably modern form to Thomas 
Hobbes, but is most notably embodied in recent times in the work of John Rawls.  
What makes some particular system of collectively enforced social arrangements 
legitimate is that it is the object of an agreement for the people who are subject to it.  
In the case of a literal contract, for example for an exchange of goods, each of the 
parties has a reason to honour the terms of the contract either in the fact of having 
agreed to its terms or in the fact of its terms being agreeable ones.  Similarly, in the 
case of a social contract in the manner of Hobbes or Rawls, each of the parties has 
reason to honour his or her responsibilities under the terms of the contract, for 
example to pay taxes or to conform to laws, either on account of his or her agreement 
to do so, or perhaps, on account of it being reasonable that he or she do so.  These are 
what Lessnoff (1986) calls the voluntaristic and rationalisitic readings of the contract. 
The earliest elements of the notion of the existence of a social contract can be traced 
to Plato.  In the early Patonic dialogue, Crito, Socrates makes a compelling argument 
as to why he must stay in prison and accept the death penalty, rather than escape and 
go into exile in another Greek city.  He explains that he has acquired an 
overwhelming obligation to obey the Laws of Athens because they have made his 
entire way of life possible.  Socrates’ life and the way in which that life flourished in 
Athens are dependent upon the Laws.  Importantly, however, this relationship 
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between citizens and the Laws of the city are not coerced.  Citizens, once they have 
grown up, and have seen how the city conducts itself, can choose whether to leave, 
taking their property with them, or stay.  Staying implies an agreement to abide by the 
Laws and accept the punishments that they mete out.  Having made an agreement that 
is itself just, Socrates asserts that he must keep to this agreement that he has made and 
obey Laws, in this case by staying and accepting the death penalty.  Importantly, the 
contract described by Socrates is an implicit one: it is implied by his choice to stay in 
Athens even though he is free to leave.  (Heugens et al, 2003) 
3.2.1 Modern Social contract theory 
The first definitive statements on social contract theory only emerged in the 17th 
century though Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan.  Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) lived in 
an era of turbulent economic, political and religious upheaval.  Hobbes conceived of 
government as justified by a social contract: either a hypothetical or an actual 
agreement of individuals to live in peace and to form a confederacy of government to 
yield peace (Palmer, 2001).  According to Hobbes, individuals are naturally self-
interested, yet they are rational, and they will choose to submit to authority in order to 
be able to live in a civil society which is conducive to their own self-interests.  
Government is preferable to the alternative, he suggests, for individuals would 
otherwise be in a hazardous condition that Hobbes calls a State of Nature – “war …… 
of every man against every man: a state of nature rather than a state of society” 
(Palmer, 2001, p. 246).   In the State of Nature, which is purely hypothetical 
according to Hobbes, individuals are naturally and exclusively self-interested, they are 
more or less equal to one another, there are limited resources, and yet there is no 
power to be able to force individuals to cooperate.  Given these conditions in the State 
of Nature, Hobbes concludes that the State of Nature would be unbearably brutal.  
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However, because individuals are reasonable they can see that they can escape the 
State of Nature by creating a civil society. 
“A balance is struck by reason, upon the realisation that ‘there is no man 
can hope by his own strength or wit to defend himself from destruction 
without the help of confederates wherein everyone expects the same 
defence by the confederation that anyone else does…’” (Palmer, 2001, 
p. 246) 
 
Individuals can be expected to construct a social contract that will afford them a life 
other than that available to them in the State of Nature.  This contract is constituted 
by two distinguishable features.  First, individuals must agree to establish society by 
collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had against one another in the 
State of Nature.  Second, individuals must imbue some one person or assembly of 
persons with the authority and power to enforce the initial contract.  In other words, 
to ensure their escape from the State of Nature, individuals must both agree to live 
together under common laws, and create an enforcement mechanism for the social 
contract and the laws that constitute it (Heugens et al, 2003).  Hobbes argued that for 
society to survive absolute authority must be ceded to what he termed the Sovereign.  
Since the Sovereign is invested with the authority and power to mete out punishments 
for breaches of the contract which are worse than not being able to act as one pleases, 
individuals have good, albeit self-interested, reason to adjust themselves to the 
artifice of morality in general, and justice in particular (Heugens et al, 2003). 
Philosophers such as John Locke (1632 – 1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 
1778) later expanded on and developed Hobbes’ work. 
Locke saw the State of Nature as different to that of Hobbes and so his argument 
concerning the social contract and the nature of the individual’s relationship to 
authority are quite different.  According to Locke, the State of Nature, the natural 
condition of mankind, is a state of perfect and complete liberty for an individual to 
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conduct their life as they see fit, free from the interference of others.  The State of 
Nature is pre-political, but it is not pre-moral.  Individuals are assumed to be equal to 
one another and bound by the Law of Nature.  The Law of Nature, which in Locke’s 
view is the basis of morality, and given to us by God, commands that we not harm 
others with regards to their life, health, liberty, or possessions (Locke, 1976).  
However, Locke recognises that the State of Nature can devolve into a state of war.  
A state of war may begin when two or more individuals declare war on each other by 
stealing or trying to make another their slave.  Since in the State of Nature there is no 
civil power to whom the individual can appeal, Locke postulates that individuals will 
contract together to form a civil government.  This is one of the main differences 
between Hobbes and Locke.  Hobbes argued that absolute authority must be vested in 
the ruler (Sovereign) and that the Sovereign is not accountable to, or punishable by, 
the individual citizens it governs (Heugens et al, 2003).  Whereas Locke’s alternative 
to the unconditional surrender of power by the people to a ruler was to see an 
affiliation between the people and government.  He construed the affiliation between 
the government and the people as an agency relationship, whereby the government is 
the representative and the people are the principals (Hampton, 1986).  His argument 
was that persons enjoy certain unalienable rights, such as those to life and liberty.  
Hence, rather than abstaining from these rights for good, rational persons will only 
lend those rights to government on condition that it will not abuse them.  Locke did 
not envision the State of Nature as severely as did Hobbes and therefore could 
imagine conditions under which an individual would be better off rejecting a 
particular civil government and returning to the State of Nature, with the aim of 
constructing a better civil government in its place. 
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The contractarian theories of Hobbes and Locke were developed in the seventeenth 
century at a time when most of Europe was immersed in wars, revolutions and civil 
wars.  According to Heugens et al (2003) by the start of the nineteenth century 
Europe had become so used to social living that stable government was almost taken 
for granted and Jean-Jacques Rousseau transformed social contract theory from an 
approach explaining the stability of societies to a vehicle for institutional redesign. 
According to Rousseau, the State of Nature was a simple, peaceful time where people 
lived uncomplicated lives.  Rousseau also believed persons to be naturally sociable 
however this does not mean that social problems will not occur.  Most importantly 
however, according to Rousseau, was the invention of private property, which 
constituted the pivotal moment in humanity’s evolution out of a simple, pure state 
into one characterised by greed, competition, vanity, inequality, and vice (Heugens et 
al, 2003).   
“The first man who, having enclosed a piece of land, thought of saying 
‘this is mine’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the 
true founder of civil society.  How many crimes, wars, murders; how 
much misery and horror the human race would have been spared if 
someone had pulled up the stakes and filled in the ditch and cried out 
to his fellow men: ‘Beware of listening to this impostor.  You are lost 
if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to everyone and that the 
earth itself belongs to no one!”  (Rousseau as quoted in Heugens et al, 
2003, p. 6) 
Rousseau argued that eventually those who have private property notice that it would 
be in their interests to create a government that would protect private property from 
those who do not have it but can see that they might be able to acquire it by force.  
Government therefore is established through a contract that purports to guarantee 
equality and protection for all, even though its true purpose is to protect the very 
inequalities that private property has produced.  In other words, the contract, which 
claims to be in the interests of everyone equally, is really in the interests of the few 
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who have become stronger and richer as a result of the developments of private 
property.  Rousseau termed this as the naturalised social contract, which he viewed as 
responsible for the conflict and competition from which modern society was 
suffering.  Rousseau then presented his normative theory of the social contract, the 
Social Contract (1762) as the means by which to alleviate the problems produced by 
the development of modern society. 
In his quest for a just society, Rousseau initiated the use of the social contract as a 
tool for social and political redesign that started not from some hypothetical state of 
nature, but from the world as we know it to be (Heugens et al, 2003).  The key 
problem is to: 
“Find a form of association which will defend and protect, with the 
whole of its joint strength, the person and property each associate, and 
under which each of them, uniting himself to all, will obey himself 
alone, and remain as free as before”  (Rousseau, 1994/1762, pp 54-5). 
 
He proposes a social contract on the basis of complete equality and reciprocity, in 
which each person is an essential and inseparable part of the sovereign body 
governing society (Heugens et al, 2003).  For Rousseau, this implies an extremely 
strong and direct form of democracy. 
3.2.2 Contemporary versions of Social contract theory 
Contemporary versions of Social Contract theory attempt to show that individual and 
social group rights and liberties are founded on mutually advantageous agreements 
which are made between members of society (Rawls, 1999).   
John Rawls (1921 – 2002) proposed a contractarian approach that has a decidedly 
Kantian flavour, in a Theory of Justice (1971), whereby rational people in a 
hypothetical “original position”, setting aside their individual preferences and 
capacities under a “veil of ignorance”, would agree to certain general principles of 
justice.  Like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, Rawls belongs to the social contract 
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tradition.  However Rawls’ social contract takes a slightly different form from that of 
the previous philosophers.  Specifically, Rawls develops what he claims are 
principles of justice through the use of an entirely and deliberately artificial device he 
calls the original position, in which everyone decides principles of justice from 
behind a veil of ignorance.  This ‘veil’ is one that essentially blinds people to all facts 
about themselves that might cloud what notion of justice is developed. 
“no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, 
nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.  I shall even 
assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or 
their special psychological propensities.  The principles of justice are 
chosen behind a veil of ignorance.”  (Rawls, 1972, p. 11 ) 
According to Rawls, ignorance of these details about oneself will lead to principles 
which are fair to all – Justice as Fairness.  If an individual does not know how they 
will end up in their own conceived society, they are likely not going to privilege any 
one class of people, but rather develop a scheme of justice that treats all fairly.  In 
particular, Rawls claims that those in the original position would all adopt a risk-
minimising strategy which would maximise the position of the least well-off. 
“They are the principles that rational and free persons concerned to 
further their own interests would accept in an initial position of 
equality as defining the fundamentals of the terms of their association”  
(Rawls, 1972, p. 11) 
Rawls claims that the parties in the original position would adopt two principles of 
justice, which would then govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the 
distribution of social and economic advantages across society. 
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that: 
a. They are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of 
society. 
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b. Offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.  (Rawls, 1972, p. 303) 
Rawls (1972, p. 112) states that: 
The main idea is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually 
advantageous cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their 
liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have 
submitted to these restrictions have a right to a similar acquiescence on the 
part of those who have benefited from their submission.” 
 
The principle of fairness as a ground of political obligation says that people have 
political obligations on the basis of their involvement in a mutually beneficial 
venture.  It is clearly a version of the social contract theory, as it requires participation 
by both parties to the contract. 
Fairness theory suggests that those who benefit more should bear more of the burden.  
As suggested by Pallot (1991) “greater accountability is the quid pro quo for greater 
power or control over resources”.  Hence, organisations that have access to societal 
resources need to become transparent and accountable (Gray, 1992).  Lehman (1995, 
p. 393) asserts that a ‘…moral obligation exists to provide environmental information 
in published accounting reports.  He suggests that inclusion of environmental 
information in annual reports is fair and just and therefore ‘should’ be done.  
Similarly, Donaldson (1982) suggests that if corporations do not fulfill the terms of 
the social contract and enhance the welfare of society, they will receive moral 
condemnation from society.  The theory assumes that corporations are moral agents.  
In law corporations are by and large treated as fictional persons, but unlike ordinary 
persons they are granted an unlimited life.  Corporations, however, are not full 
persons under the law.  It is not clear that we can attribute any responsibilities to 
corporations at all unless we can look upon them as moral agents in some sense.  This 
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leads us to examine the question as to whether corporations can be considered moral 
agents, analogous to individuals. 
3.3 The moral position of the corporation 
A corporation is an association given legal status by a state charter to operate with 
limited liability over an indefinite period of time.  Initially the goals and purposes 
attributed to a newly incorporated business are those of its founders, which are stated 
in its charter and exemplified in its initial business activity.  In the past the charter of 
a corporation had to state the specific purpose for which the corporation was created, 
so that any company wishing to expand its business had to amend its charter.  Today, 
however, most charters incorporate a company ‘for any legitimate business purpose’. 
Corporations also typically have complex and hierarchical decision-making regimes 
which revolve around stated policies and rules.  Certain persons or divisions within a 
corporation have responsibilities for certain kinds of decisions, others for evaluating 
them, and still others may reverse or reject decisions.  The constituent decision-
maker’s place in the hierarchical structure and their job description determine the 
scope and influence of the decisions they contribute to the corporation.   
“Moreover, as a constituent, his decisions often take on a formal or 
anonymous character.  One makes decisions ‘for the corporation’ or 
for the success of some specific project.  The choice often becomes 
impersonal.  It is not ‘my choice’ but rather a decision for the benefit 
of the organization.”  (Werhane, 2002, p. 33) 
Donaldson (1982) states that morally speaking, corporations are unusual entities. 
“A judge once bemoaned that they ‘have no pants to kick or soul to 
damn’, and concluded, ‘by God, they ought to have both’.  Unlike a real 
person, the corporation has no conscience to keep it awake all night, no 
emotions for the psychiatrist to analyse, and nobody to be thrown into 
jail.  It is a persona ficta, and its fictional nature, coupled with 
remarkable down-to-earth power, makes it a thoroughly puzzling object 
of moral understanding.”  (Donaldson, 1992, p. 1) 
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If corporations are found to be moral agents, they consequently will be responsible 
for their actions.  Likewise if corporations are moral agents they should be treated as 
“full-fledged moral persons and hence they can have whatever privileges, rights, and 
duties as are, in the normal course of affairs, accorded to moral persons” (Hoffman 
and Frederick, 1995, p. 176).  However if they are not moral agents but: 
“..resemble complicated machines, they must be directly controlled to 
prevent injury to society.  And this direct control will likely come from 
the only force sufficiently powerful to control corporations, the 
government.”  (Donaldson, 1982, p. 18) 
 
Several contrary positions as to the moral position of the corporation have been 
espoused, two of which are the ‘moral person view’ and the ‘structural-restraint 
view’. 
3.3.1  The corporation as a moral person 
French (1979, p. 210) argues that corporations are “members of the moral 
community”.  They, like their biological counterparts, are moral persons.  According 
to French, a legal person is defined as an eliminatable ‘subject of a right’.  
Eliminatable subjects, ‘cannot dispose of their rights, cannot administer them..’ 
(French, 1979, p. 210).  From this definition, French (1979) suggests that a moral 
person might be defined as a non-eliminatable subject of a right.  A non-eliminatable 
subject is an agent capable of disposing of their rights and administering them, that is, 
a subject to whom one ascribes moral responsibility.  By moral responsibility French 
(1979, p. 210) has in mind accountability ‘relationships which hold reciprocally and 
without prior agreements among moral persons’.   The sources of moral 
responsibility, according to French, are the intentional acts of the agent.  So in order 
to be a moral person, that is, an agent who participates in morally accountable 
relationships for which one is responsible, one must, according to French, be an 
intentional agent.  Thus, French argues, intentionality is a necessary condition for 
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moral agency.  When this analysis is applied to corporations, it can be seen that a 
corporation is a moral person if it is a non-eliminatable subject of a right, if it engages 
in reciprocal responsibility relationships, and it is an intentional agent.  French then 
develops a description of corporate internal decision-making structure which is 
hierarchical and rule-bound, and which demonstrates that corporations are, or can be, 
structured as intentional entities.  French concludes that because corporations act 
intentionally, they are moral persons. 
However it has been argued that the reliance by French on intentional acts to qualify 
as a moral agent is insufficient.  In addition, it has been argued that corporations 
cannot be held to be moral persons as they are not physically persons (Ladd, 1970).  
Donaldson (1982, p. 23) concludes that the: 
“combined weight of such arguments suggests that corporations fail to 
qualify as moral persons.  They may be juristic persons, granted legal 
rights by courts and legislators; they may even be moral agents of some 
other kind; but they do not appear to be ‘moral persons’ in any real sense 
of that term.” 
 
3.3.2  The structural restraint view of the corporation 
The structural restraint view emphasises the fact that corporations are controlled by 
their structures and are thus frequently incapable of exercising moral freedom.  It 
claims that corporations fail to qualify as moral agents because they are members of 
the class of formal organisations, all of which are structurally incapable of 
accommodating moral motives.  Ladd (1970) argues that the corporation can act only 
in accordance with a means-end formula.  He argues that corporations are formal 
organizations, which, by definition, are “planned units, deliberately structured for the 
purpose of attaining specific goals.”  (Ladd, 1970, p. 498)  As a formal organisation, 
the corporation is analogous to a player in a game; acting rationally as a player means 
acting in accordance with the formal rules under which it is considered a participant.  
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It fails to qualify as a moral agent, for it fails to utilize moral considerations as 
fundamental factors in decision-making.  Only information about how to achieve its 
formal ends can be relevant to the corporation’s calculations.  This means that 
corporations are designed to pay attention only to information about how to achieve 
goals such as profit maximisation (Donaldson, 1982). 
The structural restraint view of the corporation has also been criticised on several 
fronts.  First, the argument assumes that because corporations must act primarily to 
achieve a specified set of goals, they cannot act on the basis of moral norms.  
However a corporation might have as one of their goals the goal of adhering to moral 
norms.  Second, the structural restraint view is criticised on the basis of assuming that 
formal organisations cannot undertake moral deliberation.  Formal organisations such 
as nations or governments are considered moral agents yet are also formal 
organisations.  Donaldson (1982) states that corporations, just like nations or 
governments, are said to perform actions which confer moral agency.  
If taken to its logical end, the structural restraint view would mean that the only way 
in which the actions of corporations could be controlled, in any moral sense, would be 
by extensive legislation (Mathews, 1993). 
The above two contrary views, that of corporations as moral persons and the 
structural restraint view, appear to be inadequate in explaining the moral position of 
the corporation.  The moral person view of the corporation tends to exaggerate the 
similarity between corporations and people whilst the structural restraint view 
oversimplifies both the nature of corporations and how they behave. 
Donaldson (1982) states that instead of asking whether all corporations are moral 
agents, or all corporations are not, it would be better to determine whether some 
 73
corporations are moral agents and some are not.  As Mathews (1993) states 
corporations vary considerably in size, type and public stance on many issues.   
The next section examines the conditions needed for any corporation to qualify as a 
moral agent. 
3.3.3  Corporations as moral agents 
Donaldson (1982) states that in order for a corporation to qualify as a moral agent that 
it must embody a process of moral decision-making.  He then outlines the following 
conditions that must be embodied in the process as a minimum: 
1. The capacity to use moral reasons in decision-making. 
2. The capacity of the decision-making process to control not only overt corporate 
acts, but also the structure of policies and rules. (Donaldson, 1982, p. 30) 
For a corporation to be a moral agent it must be able to use moral reasons in its 
decision-making and also must be capable of controlling the structure of its policies 
and rules.  Corporations fulfilling these conditions would qualify as moral agents, but 
not moral persons. 
“It would be a mistake to assume that because a corporation can use 
moral reasons in decision-making, it automatically possesses other moral 
properties identified with persons, such as intentions, pleasures, human 
obligations and human rights…………..Thus the moral agency of a 
corporation is of a special kind.”  (Donaldson, 1982, p. 30) 
 
Donaldson (1982) suggests that one of the conditions for qualifying as a corporation 
should be that an organisation meets the condition of moral agency.  Mathews (1993) 
states that this view is reinforced by the rights and responsibilities which corporations 
possess and which point to conditions of moral agency being associated with 
conditions of corporate status. 
“Corporate rights are granted in most developed industrial countries 
and include unlimited liability for the shareholders, and unlimited life, 
the ability to sue and be sued, and contractural rights for the 
corporation as of a natural person.  In return, the responsibilities owed 
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corporations to the rest of society (including other corporations) 
include a number of direct and indirect moral obligations.”  (Mathews, 
1993, p. 25) 
Direct obligations are those that are specified explicitly and formally through statute, 
case law regulation and contract and involve shareholders, employees, suppliers and 
customers.  Indirect obligations are not formally specified and involve parties with 
whom the corporation has no direct contractual relationship such as competitors, the 
local community and the general public (Donaldson, 1982).  Some parties may be 
included in both direct and indirect obligations.  Direct obligations are usually easily 
identifiable with the obligations specified in the terms of the contract or a legal 
statute.  Indirect obligations are more problematic because they are not readily 
identifiable, may not be agreed between the parties to disputes, and frequently give 
rise to measurement and valuation problems, even where their existence can be 
agreed upon (Donaldson, 1982; Mathews, 1993).  The indirect obligations give rise to 
the notion of a social contract between business and society. 
3.4 The social contract of business with society 
In organisational studies and business ethics the idea of social contract has been 
elaborated on in conceiving the ethical norms that should guide and constrain 
practices in business and organisation (Donaldson, 1982; Donaldson and Dunfee, 
1999).  Traditionally, the obligation of business has been the pursuit of profit and 
profit has been the source of business’ legitimacy. 
“In the past two decades, however, the belief that business makes an 
entirely positive contribution to the general welfare has been 
challenged.  For many, the connection of business to the moral 
foundation that justified it no longer seems clear.”  (Hoffman and 
Frederick, 1995, p. 1) 
In a speech to the Harvard Business School in 1969, Henry Ford II reportedly stated: 
“The terms of the contract between industry and society are changing 
…. Now we are being asked to serve a wider range of human values 
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and to accept an obligation to members of the public with whom we 
have no commercial transactions.”  (Donaldson, 1982, p. 36) 
The ‘contract’ referred to in the quote above concerns corporations indirect 
obligations.   
Social contract theory originated in political philosophy where the contract was 
viewed as a theoretical means for justifying the existence of the state.  As discussed in 
section 3.2 above, philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau argued that 
society in general accepts an overriding control over individual freedoms in order to 
achieve collective goals (Mathews, 1993).  If a state began to abuse its citizens then 
according to such philosophers the state had broken the tenets of the social contract 
and could be overthrown. 
“The political social contract provides a clue for understanding the 
contract for business.  If the political contract serves as a justification 
for the existence of the state, then the business contract by parity 
reasoning should serve as the justification for the existence of the 
corporation.”  (Donaldson, 1982, p. 37) 
Donaldson (1982) argues the social contract exists between productive corporations 
and individual members of society.  Society, as a collection of individuals, provide 
corporations with their legal standing and authority to own and use natural resources 
and to hire employees.  The corporation has no inherent rights to these resources and 
benefits, and in order to allow their existence, society would expect benefits to exceed 
the costs to society (Mathews, 1993).  The social contract theory focuses primarily on 
the status of corporations in society, not on how corporations are constituted.  A 
corporation is sanctioned by society to operate and in return the corporation makes 
implicit commitments to the society.  These commitments form the basis for the 
social contract between corporations and society.  A corporation is allowed to exist 
because it is thought that: 
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“the benefits from authorizing the existence of productive organizations 
outweigh the detriments of doing so …. From the standpoint of society, 
the goal of a productive organization may be said to enhance the welfare 
of society through a satisfaction of consumer and worker interests.  
(emphasis in original) (Donaldson, 1982, p. 49) 
 
Society has expectations for corporations and because they are allowed to exist and 
operate freely, corporations have obligations to achieve these expectations.  A 
corporation that does not meet these societal expectations is not meeting its 
obligations and thus is not upholding its contract with society. 
Corporations often argue that they have rights, in particular the rights to autonomy 
and economic freedom and should be free as possible from governmental regulations 
and legal interferences.  The claiming of these rights requires corporations to also 
accept that they have moral obligations and that they must be accountable to society 
in order to maintain these rights. 
3.5 Accountability and Decision-Usefulness 
A conceptual framework of accounting can be decision based or accountability based.  
The choice critically affects the resulting framework (Ijiri, 1983).    In a decision-
based framework, the objective of accounting is to provide information useful for 
economic decisions.  In an accountability-based framework, the objective of 
accounting is to provide a fair system of information flow between the accountor and 
the accountee.  It is based upon the accountability relationship between the two 
parties.  Traditionally accounting has the role of providing information, 
predominantly of a financial nature, for a notion of business decision-making.  
Pronouncements by practitioners and academic groups avow the importance of 
decision-making to accounting.  For example, the Committee to prepare a Statement 
of Basic Accounting Theory (1966, p. 1) defined accounting “…as the process of 
identifying, measuring, and communicating economic information to permit informed 
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judgements and decisions by users of the information.”  SAC2 Objective of General 
Purpose Financial Reporting states: 
“…the objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide 
information to users that is useful for making and evaluating decisions 
about the allocation of scarce resources.”  (SAC2, para 26) 
 
This decision usefulness approach is concerned primarily with the role of accounting 
in facilitating the actions of various economic agents, such as investors and creditors.  
Gray et al (1996, p. 38) define accountability as: 
“The duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial 
account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held 
responsible.” 
Accountability is therefore seen as a concept different to that of decision usefulness.  
Decision usefulness is ends focused whereas accountability is means focused 
(Williams, 1987).  Decision usefulness can be seen as a technique proceeding with 
market-based solutions to economic an accounting problems whereas accountability 
is based on social and moral obligations that satisfy a broader set of users.  However, 
decision usefulness appears to have subsumed accountability.  SAC2 Objective of 
General Purpose Financial Reporting states: 
“When general purpose financial reports meet this objective they will 
also be the means by which managements and governing bodies 
discharge their accountability to the users of the reports.”  (SAC2, para 
27) 
 
Williams (1987) argues that decision usefulness relies heavily upon the language of 
self-seeking rationality, markets, and economic efficiency to describe accounting 
problems and interpret accounting events.  In so subsuming accountability within the 
definition of decision usefulness, Lehman (1995, p. 394) states that ‘accounting has 
abrogated its moral obligations by deferring to an outside mechanism (the market).”  
He further argues that decision useful information is inadequate as a principle for 
organising accounting practice and research as it fails to recognise that accounting 
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reports do more than just transmit a set of numbers; they transmit information which 
establishes accountability relationships in which legitimate expectations exist that the 
one giving the account is attempting to satisfy the rights of various groups. 
“When accounting is defined in terms of decision usefulness the 
technical role of providing a ‘set of numbers’ is given prominence at the 
expense of accountability”  (Lehman, 1995, p. 394) 
 
Accountability researchers (Gray, 1983; Laughlin, 1990; Williams, 1987) have 
emphasised that ‘fairness’ needs to be given explicit recognition in the language of 
accounting since notions of justice form an important component of peoples’ 
everyday reality (Lehman, 1995).  Lehman (1995, p. 408) concludes that the notion of 
accountability must be explicitly stated as a legitimate accounting criteria because it 
cannot be submerged within the traditional decision-usefulness criteria.  This led to 
the argument that financial reporting must consider what are taken to be 
democratically arbitrated “primary goods” that reflect values and beliefs in society.  
As a moral discourse, accountability requires that accounting evaluates and explains 
its data.  As Lehman (1995, p. 408) states, accountability “transcends decision-
usefulness to satisfy a necessarily larger range of accountability relationships.” 
3.6 Conclusion 
As social contracts change, so too do the challenges for business.  It is difficult to 
deny that the ethical game in business is played by different rules and harbours 
different penalties and benefits, than it did decades ago.  Broad shifts of moral 
consensus have impacted many fronts.  In subtle but far reaching shifts, managers and 
members of the general public have gradually redefined their view of the underlying 
responsibilities of large corporations.  The view has shifted from attitudes half a 
century ago that limited the responsibilities of companies largely to that  of producing 
goods and services at reasonable prices, to a view today where corporations are held 
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responsible for a variety of fairness and quality-of-life issues.  (Donaldson and 
Dunfee, 1999, p. 7) 
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Chapter 4:  Legitimacy theory and organisational legitimacy 
4.1 Introduction 
Legitimacy theory originated in the philosophy of law and politics and since the 
Middle Ages has acted as a yardstick of ‘political morality’: a measure of the right 
and wrong uses of power (Sutton, 1993, p. 1).  Legitimacy is inherent in every 
authority and power relationship, from the family unit to the world political order.  
While ‘legitimate’ can also mean legal, or in accord with an accepted set of rules, the 
legitimacy of power is a notion of political morality that also implies rightness as it is 
defined in a given context by groups or individuals (Sutton, 1993). 
Sutton (1993, p. 2) stated: 
“According to (primarily) Western political ideals, power is legitimate 
when it is granted by the consent of the governed (tacit or open, by 
some process of political selection) or by some contractual agreement.  
In some cases it can be legitimised by both means.” 
The idea that modes of social organisation require a measure of legitimacy to function 
is as old as social studies (Stillman, 1974).  Corporations, as one kind of social 
arrangement, require legitimacy to maintain relationships, particularly long-term 
relationships with the various communities on which they depend. 
Where there is no power, or no access to power, there is no need for a debate on 
legitimacy.  Similarly, when systems of power and authority are generally perceived 
of as valid, there is little stimulus for debate.  Sutton (1993, p. 3) argues that the 
questions of corporate legitimacy have arisen from a set of conflicts sparked not only 
by the fact of corporate power, but to a greater extent by how that power has been 
exercised relative to changing public values. 
Legitimacy has been defined by Lindblom (1994, p. 2) as: 
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“……a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system 
is congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which 
the entity is a part.  When a disparity, actual or potential, exists 
between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s 
legitimacy.” 
As Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) stated a corporation is legitimate when it is judged to 
be ‘just and worthy of support.’  Legitimacy, therefore, is not a characteristic that an 
organisation either does or does not possess but is rather judged and granted by 
perceptions.   
Organisational legitimacy may be assessed from different perspectives.  First, for an 
organisation to be legitimate it need only continue to be economically viable; second, 
legitimacy is based on both economic viability and adherence to laws; and third, an 
organisation can only be truly legitimate when a combination of economic viability, 
adherence to laws and congruence with generally accepted social values and norms in 
place. 
The first perspective implies that for a corporation to be considered legitimate it need 
only account and report on economic transactions between the corporation and its 
direct economic resource providers, such as shareholders.  If a firm continues to make 
profits for its shareholders, it is considered legitimate.  Friedman (1962) proposed 
that an organisation’s sole responsibility, and thus legitimacy, was to maximise 
profits.  Whilst in the past a firm’s profit may have been viewed as an all-inclusive 
measure of legitimacy, there has been a change to this view (Ramanathan, 1976; 
Patten, 1992).  Mathews (1993) indicates that organisational legitimacy does not arise 
from merely making a profit and abiding to legal requirements. 
The second perspective is based on compliance with the laws of the day.  If the 
organisation is obeying all existing laws in relation to its operations then the 
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organisation is acting n a legitimate manner.  However, an organisation acting within 
the bounds of current legal requirements is not necessarily a legitimate organisation.  
The law is reactive to social change and thus a time lag exists between what may be 
acceptable behaviour for an entity and what may be legally allowable.  Epstein and 
Votaw (1978, p. 76) presented the relationship between legality and legitimacy as: 
“Legitimacy is not coextensive with, nor is it defined by legality.  Law 
may be intended to confer legitimacy and may actually do so, but the 
law does not necessarily infer legitimacy and legitimacy does not 
always imply legality.” 
The third perspective is based not only on economic and legal assessments being 
undertaken, but also how the organisation acts relative to prevailing social norms and 
values.  This is consistent with the principles of corporate social responsibility, based 
on the idea of the social contract between business and society (Wood, 1991). 
Most of the 1970’s corporate social responsibility literature supports this third 
perspective and rejects the idea that economic success alone, or in conjunction with 
adherence to prevailing laws, is sufficient for organisational legitimacy to exist 
(Carroll, 1993; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Gray et al, 1988; Lindblom, 1984; Preston 
and Post, 1975; Sethi, 1975).  Mathews (1993) indicates that organisational 
legitimacy does not arise from merely making a profit and abiding to legal 
requirements.  Instead, reference to the prevailing norms and values of society is 
fundamental in ensuring that an organization is bestowed legitimacy.  Organisations 
are bestowed with legitimacy to the extent in which their activities are congruent with 
the goals of the superordinate system (Parsons, 1960).  Societal expectation which 
constitutes the superordinate system may be deemed to encompass economic, 
environmental and social factor relationships (Elkington, 1997). 
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“It is important to stress that society judges the legitimacy of a 
corporation based on the corporation’s image.  Legitimacy is, 
therefore, not a characteristic of a corporation; it is a measure of the 
adequacy of societal perceptions of corporate behaviour compared to 
societal expectations for corporate activity.”  (Nasi et al, 1997, p. 300) 
Society’s expectations of corporate behaviour are both implicit and explicit (Deegan, 
2001).  Deegan (2001, p. 254) describes the implicit terms of the social contract as 
legal requirements, whereas the implicit terms are uncodified community 
expectations.  The reason for the imperfect correlation between the law and societal 
norms and values is threefold (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975).  Even though the law is 
often reflective of societal norms and values, the legal system may be slow in 
adapting to changes in norms and values in society.  Furthermore, the legal system is 
based on consistency whereas norms may be contradictory.  Finally it is suggested 
that society may tolerate certain behaviours but not be willing to codify those 
behaviours in the legal system (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). 
4.2 Types of organisational legitimacy 
Within the existing literature, three broad categories of legitimacy can be discerned, 
these being: 
1. pragmatic legitimacy; 
2. moral legitimacy; and 
3. cognitive legitimacy. 
Each broad type of legitimacy involve a perception concerning an organisation’s 
activities within some socially constructed system of norms, values and beliefs but 
each is based on a different behavioural dynamic (Suchman, 1995).   
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4.2.1 Pragmatic legitimacy 
Suchman (1995, p.578) states that pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-interested 
calculations of an organisation’s most immediate audiences.  This often involves 
direct exchanges between an organisation and its audience, for example suppliers.  
However it can also involve broader political, economic and social interdependencies.  
In either case, audiences are likely to become constituencies, scrutinising 
organisational behaviour to determine the practical consequences, for them, of any 
given activity (Wood, 1991).  Thus at the simplest level, Suchman (1995, p. 578) 
states that pragmatic legitimacy boils down to a sort of exchange legitimacy – support 
for an organisational policy based on that policy’s expected value to a particular set 
of constituents. 
4.2.2 Moral legitimacy 
Moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative evaluations of the organisation and its 
activities.   
“… moral legitimacy is ‘sociotropic’ – it rests not on judgments about 
whether a given activity benefits the evaluator, but rather on judgments 
about whether the activity is ‘the right thing to do’.  These judgments, in 
turn, usually reflects beliefs about whether the activity effectively 
promotes societal welfare, as defined by the audience’s socially 
constructed value system” (Suchman, 1995, p. 579) 
Moral legitimacy takes one of three forms: evaluations of outputs and consequences, 
evaluations of techniques and procedures, and evaluations of categories and 
structures. 
 85
4.2.3 Cognitive legitimacy 
Cognitive legitimacy involves either affirmative backing for an organisation or mere 
acceptance of the organisation as necessary or inevitable based on some taken for 
granted cultural account (Suchman, 1995).   
“To the extent that it is attainable, this kind of taken-for grantedness 
represents both the most subtle and the most powerful source of 
legitimacy identified to date.  If alternatives become unthinkable, 
challenges become impossible, and the legitimated entity becomes 
unassailable by construction.”  (Suchman, 1995, p. 583) 
4.3 The legitimacy gap 
Legitimacy is not static but changes over time.  Both the perceptions of an 
organization and the expectations for the organization can change over time without 
there being any actual change in the activities of the organization.  As Suchman 
(1995, p. 574) states: 
“Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” 
In accordance with the above definition, what might be considered legitimate at one 
point in time might not be considered legitimate at a future point in time because of 
changing community attitudes. 
As community expectations change, legitimacy theory would suggest that 
organisations must also adapt and change or their survival will be threatened.  In 
relation to the dynamics associated with changing expectations, Lindblom (1994, p. 
3) stated: 
“Legitimacy is dynamic in that relevant publics continuously evaluate 
output, methods, and goals against an ever evolving expectation.  The 
legitimacy gap will fluctuate without any changes in action on the part of 
the corporation.  Indeed, as expectations of the relevant publics change 
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the corporation must make changes or the legitimacy gap will grow as 
the level of conflict increases and the levels of positive and passive 
support decreases.” 
The term ‘legitimacy gap’ is a term that has been used to describe a situation where 
there appears to be a lack of correspondence between how society believes an 
organisation should act and how it is perceived that the organisation has acted.  
According to Sethi (1975, 1978), legitimacy problems can arise at any given time 
caused by certain business actions or society’s changing expectations. 
O’Donovan (2002) provides a depiction of the legitimacy gap – refer Figure 1.   
Figure 1:  Diagrammatic representation of the Legitimacy Gap 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  O’Donovan (2002, p. 347) 
 
In explaining figure 1, O’Donovan (2002, p 346/7) states: 
“The area marked X in Figure 1 represents convergence between 
corporate activity and society’s expectations of the corporation and its 
activities, based on social values and norms.  Areas Y and Z represent 
congruence between a corporation’s actions and society’s perceptions of 
what these actions should be.  The areas represent ‘illegitimacy’ or 
legitimacy gaps (Sethi, 1978).  The aim of the corporation is to be 
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legitimate to ensure area X is as large as possible, thereby reducing the 
legitimacy gap.” 
Sethi (1978) suggests that there are two important sources of a legitimacy gap.  First, 
societal expectations can change, resulting in a widening gap between the 
corporation’s image and societal expectations.  An illustration of this was provided by 
Miles and Cameron (1982) in a discussion of American Tobacco companies in the 
1970s.  The tobacco companies had not changed their activities and their image was 
largely unaltered, yet they faced a different evaluation of their role in society; they 
faced a significant and widening legitimacy gap. 
The second source of a legitimacy gap suggested by Sethi (1978) was if new 
information about the activities of the corporation becomes known, particularly if it 
varies dramatically from the corporation’s image.  This may occur through disclosure 
being made within the news media.  Nasi et al (1997, p. 301) state: 
“The potential body of information about the corporation that is 
available to the public – the corporate shadow (Bowles, 1991) – stands 
as a constant potential threat to a corporation’s legitimacy.  When part of 
the organisational shadow is revealed, either accidentally or through the 
activities of an activist group or a journalist, a legitimacy gap may be 
created.” 
Wartick and Mahon (1994) suggest that legitimacy gaps arise for the following 
reasons: 
• corporate performance changes while societal expectations of corporate 
performance remain the same; 
• societal expectations of corporate performance change while corporate 
performance remains the same; and 
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• both corporate performance and societal expectations change, but they either 
move in different directions, or they move in the same direction but with a time 
lag. 
A corporation whose legitimacy is, or may become, under threat may adopt strategies 
to gain, maintain or regain legitimacy.  A number of legitimation tactics and 
disclosure approaches may be adopted to reduce the legitimacy gap.  Central to much 
of the research undertaken relating to legitimacy theory is the role of public 
disclosures of information.  Suchman (1995, p. 586) suggests that legitimacy 
management, like most cultural processes, rests heavily on communication – “in this 
case, communication between the organisation and its various audiences”.  But as 
authors such as Suchman (1995) and O’Donovan (2002) state, legitimation strategies 
can be used to either gain, maintain or repair legitimacy.  According to O’Donovan 
(2002, p. 349): 
“Legitimation techniques/tactics chosen will differ depending on 
whether the organisation is trying to gain or to extend legitimacy, to 
maintain its level of current legitimacy or to repair or to defend its lost or 
threatened legitimacy.” 
Suchman (1995) suggests that most organisations seek several types of legitimacy 
simultaneously and that the legitimation tactics might differ depending upon whether 
the entity is trying to gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy.  Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, 
p. 182) state that the intensity and mix of legitimation practices are likely to vary 
according to whether management is attempting to extend, maintain or defend the 
organisation’s legitimacy. 
4.3.1 Gaining or extending legitimacy 
Attempts to gain or extend legitimacy occur when the organisation is becoming 
established or is entering a new domain of activity or utilising new structures or 
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processes.  In such situations the organisation suffers from the ‘liability of newness’ 
(Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) and it needs to proactively engage in activities to win 
acceptance.  Legitimation activities are apt to be intense and proactive as 
management attempts to win the confidence and support of wary potential 
constituents. 
According to Suchman (1995, p. 587) such legitimacy-building strategies fall into 
three clusters: 
1. efforts to conform to the dictates of pre-existing audiences within the 
organisation’s current environment; 
2. efforts to select among multiple environments in pursuit of an audience that will 
support current practices; and 
3. efforts to manipulate environmental structure by creating new audiences and new 
legitimacy beliefs. 
4.3.2 Maintaining legitimacy 
Attempts to maintain legitimacy occur when the organisation has attained a threshold 
of endorsement sufficient for ongoing activity.  The task of maintaining legitimacy is 
typically considered easier then gaining or repairing legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002; 
Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  According to Suchman (1995, p. 594) strategies for 
maintaining legitimacy fall into two groups – perceiving future changes and 
protecting past accomplishments. 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 183) state that “once conferred, legitimacy tends to be 
taken largely for granted.”  Reassessments of legitimacy may become increasingly 
perfunctory and legitimation practices or activities become increasingly routinized.  
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Over time, this problem can leave the organisation vulnerable to unanticipated 
changes in the mix of constituent demands.  Suchman (1995, p. 595) states: 
“..managers must guard against becoming so enamoured with their own 
legitimating myths that they lose sight of external developments that 
might bring those myths into question.  With advanced warning, 
managers can engage in pre-emptive conformity, selection, or 
manipulation, keeping the organisation and its environment in close 
alignment; without such warning, managers will find themselves 
constantly struggling to regain lost ground.  In general, perceptual 
strategies involve monitoring the cultural environment and assimilating 
elements of that environment into organisational decision processes, 
usually by employing boundary-spanning personnel as bridges across 
which the organisation can learn audience values, beliefs, and reaction.” 
In relation to protecting past accomplishments, Suchman (1995, p. 595) states: 
“In addition to guarding against unforeseen challenges, organisations 
may seek to buttress the legitimacy they have already acquired.  In 
particular, organisations can enhance their security by converting 
legitimacy from episodic to continual forms.  To a large extent this boils 
down to (a) policing internal operations to prevent misuses, (b) curtailing 
highly visible legitimation efforts in favour of more subtle techniques, 
and (c) developing a defensive stockpile of supportive beliefs, attitudes 
and accounts.” 
4.3.3 Repairing or defending legitimacy 
Attempts to repair or defend legitimacy occur when the organisation’s extant 
legitimacy is threatened or challenged.  Ashforth and Gibbs (1990, p. 183) suggest 
that legitimation activities tend to be intense and reactive as management attempts to 
counter the threat.  Suchman (1995, p. 597) states that legitimacy repair generally 
represents a reactive response to unforeseen circumstances:  
“such crises usually befall managers who have become enmeshed in 
their own legitimating myths and have failed to notice a decline in 
cultural support, until some cognitively salient rip wire (such as resource 
interruption) sets off alarms.  By the time these reactive managers begin 
to address their problems, familiar legitimation strategies and familiar 
legitimacy claims may already be discredited.” 
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4.4 Legitimisation strategies 
According to Neu et al (1998) organisational legitimacy is precarious.  Corporations 
whose legitimacy is, or may become, elusive can only successfully manage 
legitimacy by identifying important manageable issues or events at the same time as 
identifying groups of shareholders who have the necessary attributes to be able to 
confer or withdraw legitimacy on the corporation in respect of those issues or events 
(O’Donovan, 2002) 
Neu et al (1998, p. 265) state: 
“Contradictions invariably exist between the organisational activities 
used to generate profits in a competitive global economy and other social 
values (Gorz, 1989; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992).  The interests and values 
of people living in peripheral countries (Amin, 1990; Tinker, 1980), 
aboriginals (Wright, 1993), workers (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Robson, 
1993) and environmentalists (Gray, 1992; Rubenstein, 1992) often differ 
from those of the organisation and its managers.  Further, the emergence 
of well-organised and vocal interest groups such as the anti-apartheid 
movement, Greenpeace, Earthfirst! and others have called attention to 
the in congruency of organizational actions and the values of other 
publics (Arnold & Hammond, 1994).  The intersection of fractionalized 
social values, well-organised and vocal interest groups, and the necessity 
to operate in a competitive global economy has made organisational 
legitimacy increasingly important yet more difficult to attain.” 
 
Once legitimacy is threatened, a corporation will embark on a process of legitimation 
targeting primarily those groups who it perceives may confer or withdraw legitimacy.  
One of the earliest sets of legitimation responses was considered by Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975).  They claimed that an organisation, when faced with legitimacy 
threats, may legitimate its activities through any or all of three factors.  First the 
organisation can adapt its output, goals and methods of operation to conform to 
prevailing definitions of legitimacy; second, it can attempt, through communication, 
to alter the definition of social legitimacy so that it conforms to the organisation’s 
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present practices; and/or third, it can attempt, through communication, to become 
identified with symbols, values or institutions which have a strong base of legitimacy.  
However, they posited that it is often easier for an organisation to manage its image 
through communication rather than through changing the organisation’s output, goals 
and methods of operation. 
Sethi (1978. p. 58) identified four possible business strategies an organisation may 
adopt to narrow any legitimacy gap, these being: 
1. Do not change performance, but change public perception of business 
performance through education and information. 
2. If changes in public perception are not possible, change the symbols used to 
describe business performance, thereby making it congruent with public 
perception. 
3. Attempt to change societal expectations of business performance through 
education and information. 
4. When strategies 1 to 3 are ineffective, bring about changes in business 
performance, thereby closely matching it with society’s expectations. 
The management of legitimacy involves choosing and implementing one of the above 
strategies.  Managers have options, depending on their preference for changing 
behaviour, changing perceptions, or changing expectations. In choosing between 
strategies Sethi (1978) suggested that historically business has favoured the strategy 
of education to counteract public antagonism “since it is the least painful and easiest 
to undertake” (p. 58), but that there is evidence that such media campaigns have been 
singularly unsuccessful. 
“As early as 1952, William H. Whyte, Jr., noted that the billion-dollar 
attempt of the two earlier decades to ‘sell business to America’ had 
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failed utterly.  More recently, such authors as Irving Kristol have 
criticised this approach, contending that it is absurd to think that 
institutional advertising can serve any educational purpose.”  (Sethi, 
1978. p. 58) 
Whereas Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) focus on the ‘general public’ (p. 131), more 
recent work distinguishes between different ‘publics’.  Lindblom (1994) refers to 
‘relevant publics’ as being the audience for corporate social responsibility 
disclosures, thereby acknowledging the differential power of the various external 
parties.  Similarly, Oliver (1991, p. 162) proposes that organisational responses to the 
demands of external parties are influenced by the number of external publics, the 
convergence or divergence of their interests, and the influence that the external 
publics can exert on the organisation. 
Besides distinguishing between different publics, Lindblom (1994) proposes that an 
organisation can adopt a number of strategies when it perceives that its legitimacy is 
in question.  The strategies proposed by Lindblom are consistent with Dowling and 
Pfeffer’s strategy of communication.  Lindblom (1994) identifies four courses of 
action that an organisation can take to obtain or maintain legitimacy, these being: 
1. seek to educate and inform its ‘relevant publics’ about changes in the 
organisation’s performance and activities which bring the activities and 
performance more into line with society’s values and expectations; 
2. seek to change the perceptions that ‘relevant publics’ have of the organisation’s 
performance and activities, but do not change the organisation’s actual behaviour; 
3. seek to manipulate perception by deflecting attention from the issue of concern 
onto other related issues through an appeal to, for example, emotive symbols, thus 
seeking to demonstrate how the organisation has fulfilled societal expectations in 
other areas of its activities; or 
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4. seek to change external expectations of its performance, possibly by 
demonstrating that specific societal expectations are unreasonable. 
According to Dowling and Pfeffer and Lindblom, the public disclosure of information 
in annual reports can be used by an organisation to implement each of the above 
strategies.   According to Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) managers seek to legitimate the 
means and ends of the organisation through an array of substantive and symbolic 
practices.  The intensity and mix of these practices vary according to whether 
management is attempting to extend, maintain, or defend the organisation’s 
legitimacy.  Whichever one of the above strategies is adopted the organisation will 
rely upon disclosure if they are to be successful. 
4.5 Communicating legitimation tactics 
Literature on managing legitimacy states that controlling and communicating 
information is one of the main means of managing legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 
1975; Sethi, 1978; Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995).  According to Anderson and 
Epstein (1995) the annual report has long been considered a significant 
communications medium that has a major influence on the way financial markets and 
the general public perceives and reacts to a company.  They also found that both 
sophisticated and unsophisticated shareholders would like to see additional 
disclosures in annual reports in terms of both quality and quantity including 
disclosures concerning social and environmental information.  According to 
Lindblom (1994) and Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), public disclosure via annual 
reports can be used by an organisation to implement each of the above strategies.   
“For example, a firm may provide information to counter or offset 
negative news which may be publicly available through the news media, 
or it may simply provide information to inform the interested parties 
about attributes of the organisation that were previously unknown.  In 
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addition, organisations may draw attention to strengths, for instance 
environmental awards won, or safety initiatives that have been 
implemented, while sometimes neglecting, or down-playing, information 
concerning negative implications of their activities, such as pollution or 
workplace accidents.”  (Deegan, (2002, p. 297). 
According to legitimacy theory corporate social reporting is aimed at providing 
information that legitimises company’s behaviour by intending to influence 
stakeholders’ and eventually society’s perceptions about the company (Neu et al, 
1998) in such a way that the company is regarded as a ‘good corporate citizen’ and its 
actions justify its continued existence (Guthrie and Parker, 1989).  In this respect, 
corporate social reporting is seen as a public relations vehicle aimed at influencing 
people’s perceptions about the company.  To do so management is willing to report 
good news but reluctant to disclose bad news, implying that social and environmental 
disclosures are largely self-laudatory (Deegan et al, 1996, 1998, 2000).  Elkington 
(1997, p. 171) stated that “a large part of companies engaging in corporate social 
reporting view their reports as public relations vehicles, designed to offer reassurance 
and to help with “feel good” image building’. 
The annual report has been the major communication medium and data source for 
researchers investigating motivations for environmental and other disclosures (Gray 
et al, 1995).  It has been argued that the inclusion of voluntary information in the 
annual report can be, and is, used by managers to send specific signals and messages 
to the public (Salancik and Meindl, 1984).  It has also been emphasised that the 
inclusion of information in the corporate annual report is used to persuade readers to 
accept management’s view of society (Amernic, 1992) and that annual reports are 
both reflective and constitutive of a wider set of societal values (Dyball, 1998).  
These views are consistent with management using the annual report for legitimation 
purposes. 
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Van Riel (1995, p. 26) takes a broader view of corporate communication defining it 
as: 
“…an instrument of management by means of which all consciously 
used forms of internal and external communication are harmonised as 
effectively and efficiently as possible, so as to create a favourable basis 
for relationships with groups upon which the company is dependent.” 
Central to corporate communication are the concepts of ‘corporate identity’ and 
‘corporate image’. 
4.5.1 Corporate identity 
Birkigt and Stadler (1986) as quoted in Van Riel (1995, p. 30) describe corporate 
identity as ‘the strategically planned and operationally applied internal and external 
self-presentation and behaviour of a company”.  Albert and Whetton (1985) employ a 
similar definition seeing corporate identity as what organisational members believe to 
be the organisation’s central, enduring, and distinctive character, which filters and 
moulds an organisation’s interpretation of and action on an issue (Dutton and 
Dukerich, 1991).  Essentially, corporate identity refers to the way the organisation 
presents itself to an audience.  Following Birkigt and Stadler (1986, as cited in Van 
Riel, 1995) this self-presentation of companies may be developed in three ways, 
namely: behaviour, communication, and symbolism.  According to them a company’s 
behaviour is the most effective medium to create or to harm a corporate identity.  
After all, target groups will judge the company by its actions although providing 
information on the actions is also considered important (Deegan et al, 2000).  Hence 
it is also possible to emphasise particular aspects of company behaviour by means of 
communication and/or symbols.  Concerning communication both Birkigt and Stadler 
(1986) and Van Riel (1995) comment that it is the most flexible medium and that it 
can be used tactically, so that it may ‘help to manage an organisation’s relationship 
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with relevant publics through the shaping of external perceptions – by echoing, 
enlisting and harmonising with other discourses’ (Neu et al, 1998, p. 266). 
4.5.2 Corporate image 
Van Riel (1995, p. 23) defines corporate image as:  
‘a set of meanings by which an object is known and through which 
people describe, remember and relate to it.  That is the result of the 
interaction of a person’s beliefs, ideas, feelings and impressions about 
an object”. 
Dutton and Dukerich (1991) in a similar way define an organisation’s image as the 
way organisational members believe others see the organisation.  Hence, corporate 
image involves other people’s perceptions of the organisation which is the result of 
information transmitted via mass media and through interpersonal communication 
(Dowling, 1986).  Therefore it is suggested that a company’s image or reputation 
depends on ‘what people think is true and feel is important’ (Zadek et al, 1997, p. 29). 
Corporate image or reputation can form a competitive advantage for firms.  It seems 
that a firm’s image or reputation is affected by, among others, the quality of 
management, company’s financial soundness and its demonstration of social concerns 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000).  Therefore firms can try and influence their image and 
reputation by engaging in corporate social reporting. 
4.6 Empirical studies regarding legitimacy 
Organisational legitimacy is something that is both conferred upon the corporation by 
society and something that is desired or sought by the corporation from society.  As 
such, it has been argued that legitimacy may be seen as a potential benefit or resource 
to the organization (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; O’Donovan, 2002). 
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The literature on research into organisational legitimacy divides into two parts – one 
strategic and the other institutional (Suchman, 1995).  Strategic-legitimacy studies 
depict legitimacy as an operational resource and generally assume a high level of 
managerial control over the legitimation process. 
“Strategic-legitimacy theorists predict recurrent conflicts between 
management and constituents over the form of legitimation activities, 
with management favouring the flexibility and economy of symbolism, 
whereas constituents prefer more substantive responses.  Legitimation, 
according to this view is purposive, calculated, and frequently 
oppositional.”  (Suchman, 1995, p. 576) 
Institutional researchers depict legitimacy not as an operational resource but as a set 
of constitutive beliefs.  Organisations do not simply obtain legitimacy by managerial 
actions undertaken but rather rely on institutional constructs and cultural definitions 
of society as a whole.  For example, capitalism and the role of corporations within 
this system have gained acceptance from society at large. 
“Cultural definitions determine how the organization is built, how it is 
run, and, simultaneously, how it is understood and evaluated.  Within 
this tradition, legitimacy and institutionalisation are virtually 
synonymous.  Both phenomena empower organizations primarily by 
making them seem natural and meaningful; access to resources is 
largely a by-product.”  (Suchman, 1995, p. 576)   
A number of corporate social responsibility studies have employed the framework of 
legitimacy theory in order to examine possible motivations for corporate social and 
environmental disclosures.  An early study was conducted by Hogner (1982) who 
examined annual reports of U.S. Steel for the years 1901 to 1980 and documented 
corporate social reporting in terms of general comment, statistical record, statistical 
yearly comparison and nature of activity.  The data was then analysed for year to year 
variation over the eight decades studied.  Hogner (1982) found that what U.S. Steel 
regarded as reportable corporate social activity varied over time.  While particular 
social activities might be ongoing, inclusion in the annual report was observed to be 
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selective.  The subjects of disclosure were concentrated upon the areas of human 
resources and community involvement.  Some environmental disclosures appeared 
post-1960.  In addition, Hogner found that not all reported information was ‘good 
news’.  Some disclosures represented ‘bad news’ about U.S. Steel social activities, 
even when considered from the viewpoint of the social norms and expectations of the 
period.  Hogner formed two major conclusions from his study.  First, U.S. Steel 
annual reports provide evidence of a rich and extended history of corporate social 
reporting, but with disclosure frequency, particularly with respect to specific 
information types, fluctuating over time.  Thus Hogner (1982, p. 248) concludes that 
‘corporate social reporting is an old idea with a practical base’.  Second, he frames his 
observations of U.S. Steel’s reporting in terms of legitimacy theory, arguing that 
social disclosures constituted a response to societal forces and behaviours.  Thus he 
hypothesized that such disclosures were both motivated by an indicative of corporate 
needs for legitimacy. 
Guthrie and Parker (1989), in a study similar to that of Hogners, examined the social 
disclosure practices of BHP through the annual report to shareholders over the period 
1885 – 1985.  The objectives of their study were, firstly, to determine whether a 
similar history of corporate social reporting was apparent in the Australian steel 
industry; and, second, to discover whether the pursuit of corporate legitimacy appears 
to have been a primary rationale for disclosures.  Guthrie and Parker sought to match 
the disclosure practices of BHP across the period with a historical account of major 
events relating to the company.  It was hypothesised that a majority of peak 
disclosures associated with relevant major events would be considered evidence of a 
legitimisation explanation for BHP corporate social reporting.  As in the case of U.S. 
Steel, BHP’s corporate reports were found to exhibit a variable pattern of total social 
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disclosure levels over their history – ‘the results of this study tend to support 
Hogner’s (1982) contention that CSR is a long established practice’  (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989, p. 351).  However, unlike Hogner, they concluded that the analysis 
failed to confirm legitimacy theory as the primary explanation for CSR in this 
particular corporate case.  They argued that a relationship between legitimacy theory 
and disclosure was only marginally supported for environmental issues but that a 
richer more robust theory is required to explain the observed historical pattern of 
CSR. (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 351). 
Many later papers have linked corporate social disclosures to legitimacy theory, but 
have found varying degrees of explanatory power in the theory.   
Patten (1991) examined whether the voluntary disclosures included by corporations 
in their annual reports were related to either public pressure and/or firm profitability. 
“.. it is suggested that the social legitimacy of business is monitored 
through the public-policy arena rather than the marketplace and, as 
such, the extent of social disclosure should be more closely related to 
the public pressure variables than the profitability measures.”  (Patten, 
1991, p. 297) 
Patten analysed the social disclosures in the annual reports of 156 companies drawn 
from eight industry classifications in the 1985 Fortune 500 listing.  Results indicated 
that both size and industry classification are significantly associated with the level of 
social disclosure.  In contrast, none of the profitability variables were significant.  
Patten (1991, p. 305) concluded that: 
“Results, therefore, are consistent with the argument that social 
disclosure is related to public pressure as opposed to profitability.” 
Roberts (1992) found that levels of social disclosure were related to stakeholder 
power and in particular an overall corporate strategy for managing government 
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stakeholders (as measured by political action committee contributions) and meeting 
creditor expectations (as measured by the debt/equity ratio). 
Patten (1992) examined the effect of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on the annual report 
environmental disclosures of petroleum firms other than Exxon.  The study consisted 
of 21 of the 23 publicly traded companies other than Exxon included in the petroleum 
segment of the 1989 Fortune 500.  Annual reports for the 1988 and 1989 years were 
analysed for environmental disclosures.  Total disclosures were measured as the 
amount of pages included in the annual report.  It was concluded that: 
“The increased environmental disclosures of the petroleum companies 
..…….. can be interpreted as evidence in support of legitimacy theory.  
It appears that at least for environmental disclosures, threats to a firm’s 
legitimacy do entice the firm to include more social responsibility 
information in its annual report.”  (Patten, 1992, p. 475) 
Walden and Schwartz (1997) found that increases in environmental disclosures were 
not simply limited to the oil industry after such incidents and concluded that 
companies report disclosures in response to public pressure following such events. 
In a study of the pressure of community pressure groups upon corporate social 
disclosure practices, Tilt (1994) identified such groups in Australia and sought to 
identify their potential influence on corporate social disclosures.  The study 
considered a variety of corporate social disclosure media, contrasting previous studies 
that considered predominantly annual reports.  The study showed that pressure groups 
have definite viewpoints about corporate social disclosure.  They find it to be 
insufficient and low in credibility, although the use of the annual report as the main 
medium for corporate social disclosures was supported (Tilt, 1994). 
“The main conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that 
pressure groups are one of the key user groups of CSD (corporate 
social disclosure).  The study also supports the contention made by 
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some researchers in social accounting that legislation, or at least 
standards, are needed to ensure that companies are disclosing 
information about their activities that affect society.  There is also 
support for the view that external audits are the most appropriate way 
of enforcing such regulations.”  (Tilt, 1994, p. 64) 
Deegan and Rankin (1996), utilising legitimacy theory, investigated whether at a time 
when the social performance and integrity of the firm may be under scrutiny, the firm 
will provide information to the users of the accounts to justify, or legitimise, the 
firm’s continued operation within that society.  The annual reports of 20 companies 
that had been successfully prosecuted by the Environmental Protection Agencies of 
NSW and Victoria were analysed to determine the extent of environmental 
disclosures.  It was found that those firms that had been prosecuted provided 
significantly more positive environmental disclosures than their counterparts that had 
not been prosecuted.  Deegan and Rankin (1996, p. 59) concluded that: 
“.. it appears that they believe there is a need to legitimize the 
existence of their operations, the legitimation endeavour taking the 
form of increased disclosure of positive, or ‘good’ environmental 
news.” 
Brown and Deegan (1998) examined the relationship between the print media’s 
attention to an industry’s environmental performance and the annual report 
environmental disclosures made by the firms within that industry.  Annual report 
environmental disclosures, and print media data were collected for five individual 
industries between the years 1981 – 1994.  The extent of corporate annual report 
environmental disclosures were measured by words and classified into positive or 
negative disclosures to give an average measure by industry.  Print media articles 
relating to the environment were classified by industry and by whether the articles 
provided a favourable, neutral or unfavourable view of the industries’ activities.  The 
print media environmental articles were used as a measure of public concern 
regarding the environmental implications of the industries.  According to legitimacy 
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theory, used within the context of this study, corporate management will react by 
increasing the level of corporate environmental disclosures if they perceive that the 
legitimacy of their organisation/industry is threatened because of public concern over 
the environmental implications of the organisation/industry. 
The results showed:  
“… that the environmental disclosure strategies of management within 
some industries is associated with the extent of media attention.  More 
specifically, variations in media attention appears to be associated with 
variations in corporate disclosures.”  (Brown and Deegan, 1998, p. 34) 
 
Campbell (2000) examined the published annual corporate reports of the British 
retailer Marks and Spencer Plc over the period 1960 – 1997 inclusive with a view to 
providing insight into the causes of variability in the volume of social disclosure.  He 
found that the aggregate social reporting increased over the period in question but that 
the increase was not consistent – fluctuations were found within the overall upward 
trend.  In attempting to synthesize an explanation for corporate social reporting 
changes in his longitudinal study of Marks and Spencer Plc, Campbell made two 
observations.  First, the overall upward linear trend over the period from the mid 
1970s to the late 1990s was ostensibly consistent with a legitimacy understanding of 
corporate social reporting assuming that the items addressed in the disclosures were 
of increasing concern to the public over the period (Campbell, 2000, p. 96).  Second, 
whilst noting the expected upward trend in corporate social reporting disclosures over 
time, he stated the more interesting feature of the longitudinal analysis was the 
variability in disclosure between chairmen’s terms in office.  He argued the marginal 
variability of disclosure can be explained by the varying perceptions of reality of the 
successive chairmen (Campbell, 2000, p. 80). 
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“This paper does not reject the hypothesis that social disclosure in the 
‘M & S’ corporate reports may be, at least in part, consistent with a 
legitimacy understanding of CSR.  It does, however, suggest that in the 
case of this company (and this observation is not necessarily 
generalizable), another explanation is a rather more plausible one. 
Over the thirty-year period of the survey, ‘M & S’ had four chairmen, 
all of whom were promoted from within and each of whom had 
previously served for several years as executive officers.  It is shown 
by this paper that the key switch points in the aggregate volume of 
social disclosure coincide closely with the points of succession of 
consecutive chairmen.”  (Campbell, 2000, p. 94) 
 
Campbell’s overall conclusion was that the study suggested that contractarian 
theories may not be totally adequate as explicators for changes in corporate social 
reporting. 
Generally the corporate social reporting literature focuses on corporate disclosures.  
Since social and environmental disclosures are made mostly voluntarily, much of the 
literature seeks to explain and predict why and how much is/will be published under 
varying conditions (de Villiers and van Staden, 2006).  Communication or disclosure 
of corporate changes or adaptations are considered necessary to address legitimacy 
threats.  Without communication or disclosure of the changes to the legitimacy 
conferring stakeholder groups, organisations may still face legitimacy threats.  
Newson and Deegan (2002, p. 185), contend that “legitimacy is assumed to be 
influenced by disclosures of information and not simply by (undisclosed) changes in 
corporate actions”.   
Deegan, Rankin and Voght (2000) also confirm this notion that legitimacy is about 
disclosure.  They examined the reaction of Australian firms, in terms of annual report 
disclosure, to major social incidents.  These incidents had significant implications for 
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either the environment, or the safety of both employees and community members.  In 
concluding on the results of the study they stated: 
“The results of this study are consistent with legitimacy theory and 
show that companies do appear to change their disclosure policies 
around the time of major company and industry related social events.  
The disclosure reaction appears to be of a nature that relates to the 
incident, rather than to social issues generally.  These results highlight 
the strategic nature of voluntary social disclosures and are consistent 
with a view that management considers that annual report social 
disclosures are a useful device to reduce the effects upon a corporation 
of events that are perceived to be unfavourable to a corporation’s 
image.”  (Deegan, et al, 2000, p. 127) 
Although most studies that use legitimacy theory assume implicitly that disclosure 
levels will be maintained or increased, many studies comment on changes and/or 
reductions in reporting.  For example, Deegan (2002, p. 298) contends that 
‘information might only be released by an organisation when suspicions or concerns 
are aroused.’  Deegan et al (2002, p. 333) in a study of BHP’s social and 
environmental disclosure practices during the period 1983 – 1997 found evidence that 
managers disclose information to legitimise their organisation’s place within society 
and that greater media attention stimulates greater corporate disclosure. 
“More specifically, when there is perceived to be adverse public 
opinion, reporting media such as the annual report are used in an 
endeavour to bring public opinion back in support of the company.”  
(Deegan et al, 2002, p. 334) 
 
Deegan et al (2002, p. 335) go on to indicate that ‘where there is limited concern , 
there will be limited disclosure’.  Lindblom (1994) suggests at possible changes in the 
direction and quantity of disclosure when she states that legitimacy is a dynamic 
concept, because societal expectations change over time. 
Aerts and Cormier (2009) explored the impact of annual report environmental 
disclosure and environmental press releases as legitimation tools.  The results showed 
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that environmental legitimacy is significantly and positively affected by the quality of 
the economic-based segments of annual report environmental disclosures and by 
reactive environmental press releases, but not by proactive press releases. 
Neu at al (1998, p. 272) maintain that environmental disclosures are directed at 
important and supportive publics, not at peripheral and critical publics.  Less 
powerful stakeholders may, in fact, be ignored or appeased with low-effort symbolic 
gestures (Neu et al, 1998, p. 272).  Environmental disclosures are always partial and 
selective, because they are used to manage public perceptions.  Thus they will 
‘emphasise environmental successes, reframe challenges raised by important publics 
and ignore challenges raised by marginal publics’ (Neu et al, 1998, p. 274). 
Oliver (1991, p. 164) comments specifically on organisations in certain industries: 
“When an organisation’s performance and survival are only 
moderately dependent upon the good opinion of the public (e.g. arms 
manufacturers), avoidance tactics, such as ceremonial conformity, 
symbolic gestures of compliance, and restricted access to information 
on the company’s practices (i.e. concealment), may be the extent of an 
organisation’s responsiveness.” 
 
This suggests that companies in certain industries may disclose less to avoid further 
scrutiny. 
O’Dwyer (2002) put forward another explanation for reductions in social disclosures 
in a study of in-depth semi-structured interviews with 29 senior managers in 27 Irish 
public limited companies.  The interview evidence related to the managers’ 
perceptions of the motivations for corporate social disclosure presence and absence.  
The managers stated that reacting to particular social or environmental concerns by 
disclosures can act to legitimise the concerns, and refraining can assist in making the 
concerns disappear.  He further found that managers desisted with some forms of 
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environmental disclosures, because they were perceived to be useless as a 
legitimation strategy. 
Solomon and Lewis (2002) found that the most important reason given by companies 
for not disclosing environmental information is a reluctance to report sensitive 
information. 
This notion is consistent with legitimacy theory, as disclosing sensitive information 
can itself become a legitimacy threat. 
Legitimacy theory suggests that companies with poorer environmental performance 
would be expected to provide more extensive off-setting or positive environmental 
disclosures in their annual reports.  Findings from a study by Cho and Patten (2007) 
provide, in general, support for the argument that companies use disclosure as a 
legitimizing tool.  Clarkson et al (2008) using a sample of 191 firms from the five 
most polluting industries in the US, found a positive association between 
environmental performance and the level of discretionary environmental disclosures.  
In a similar study of Australian firms, Clarkson et al (2011) examined how both the 
level and the nature of environmental information voluntarily disclosed by Australian 
firms related to their underlying environmental performance.  The sample consisted 
of 51 firms that reported to the National Pollutant Inventory in both 2002 and 2006. 
They found that while there was a modest improvement in disclosure between 2002 
and 2006, the highest disclosure score obtained was just slightly in excess of 50% of 
the maximum available based on the GRI Guidelines.  
Most empirical research regarding social reporting has focused on the influence of 
corporate characteristics such as size and industry grouping and general contextual 
factors such as social, political and economic context.  Adams (2002) examined the 
 108
internal contextual factors and their impact on social reporting.  In this study 
interviews were conducted with seven large multinational companies in the chemical 
and pharmaceutical sectors of the UK and Germany in order to identify any internal 
contextual factors influencing the nature and extent of reporting. 
“A key finding of this study is that there are significant internal contextual 
variables which are likely to impact on the extensiveness, quality, quantity 
and completeness of reporting.  The internal contextual variables 
considered here include aspects of the reporting process and attitudes to 
reporting, its impacts, legislation and audit. 
The study finds that the process of reporting and decision making appears 
to depend on country of origin, corporate size and corporate culture.  
Aspects of process which appear to be influenced by these variables are 
the degree of formality versus informality, the departments involved and 
the extent of encouragement of stakeholders”  (Adams, 2002, p. 244) 
 
Adams (2002) presented a model which summarises the various influences on social, 
ethical and environmental reporting – refer Figure 2.  The model highlights the 
influential factors on social, ethical and environmental reporting and the relationships 
between them.  In discussing the model Adams (2002, p. 245) states that the power of 
the various variables to influence the reporting appears to differ across countries, 
industries and companies.  She also states that ‘this model suffers the same failings 
……… in not being able to predict which will be the most important under different 
circumstances.”  (Adams, 2002, p. 246) 
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Figure 2: Diagrammatic portrayal of the influences on corporate social reporting 
 
 
(source: Adams (2002, p. 246) 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Much of the extant research into why companies disclose social and environmental 
information in the annual report indicates that legitimacy theory is one of the more 
probable explanations.  Legitimacy theory is based on the notion that in order to 
continue operating successfully, corporations must act within the bounds of what 
society identifies as socially acceptable behaviour.  In order to remain legitimate, 
organisations may conform with or attempt to alter social perceptions, expectations, 
or values as part of a legitimation process (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 
1994).  It is generally agreed that if a corporation changes its activities or attempts to 
alter the perceptions of its activities, this must be accompanied by disclosures 
(Deegan et al, 2000) to ensure the conferring publics are aware of what the company 
is doing.  If not, legitimacy will remain problematic. 
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The corporate social reporting literature focuses on corporate disclosure as a means of 
acquiring, maintaining or repairing legitimacy.  Since social and environmental 
reporting is predominantly voluntary, the literature attempts to explain and predict 
why and how much disclosure will be made under varying conditions.  Legitimacy is 
mostly used in the literature to support the idea that social disclosures will be 
maintained at present levels or increased over time to avert legitimacy threats.  
Threats to legitimacy that have been examined in the literature include the impact of 
evolving social awareness (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992); regulatory and institutional  
pressures (Deegan and Rankin, 1996); media influences (Brown and Deegan, 1998); 
interest pressure groups (Tilt, 1994) and corporate crises (Patten, 1992; Deegan, 
Rankin and Voght, 2000). 
However, legitimacy is still an under-developed theory, and it fails to provide precise 
predictions (Deegan, 2002, p. 298). 
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Chapter Five:  Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The broad aim of this chapter is to outline the methodology used in this thesis and 
provide the rationale for it.  In this chapter the process for developing an appropriate 
research methodology is described which includes the design of the survey 
instrument.  The research questions are linked to specific sections and questions in the 
survey instrument.  Survey administration is explained and a discussion on the use 
and limitations of surveys is provided. 
Social reporting can be defined as ‘the obligation of a firm to use its resources in ways 
to benefit society, through committed participation as a member of society, taking into 
account the society at large and improving welfare of a society at large independent of 
direct gains of the company’ (Kok et al, 2001).  This definition raises two issues: first, 
an organisation should conduct its business in a manner which is socially responsible 
to society as an integral part of its on-going strategy; and second, a business cannot be 
separated from societal issues such as community and environment.  Consequently, 
these two points lead to the basic premise that an organisation is responsible not only 
to maximise profits but also to contribute to the well-being of society. 
Whilst there has been increased public attention to corporate social responsibility and 
reporting worldwide, most studies conducted to date have been related to 
environmental responsibilities and disclosures.  There have been relatively few 
empirical studies on the broader issue of social information and disclosures.  The 
major issues to be analysed in this study are: 
1. Which stakeholder groups does management of Australian organisations 
believe are important in deciding on social information disclosures in 
organisations in Australia? 
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2. What are the main motivations perceived by management of Australian 
organisations in influencing decisions to report social information? 
3. Are current financial reporting practices sufficient to capture the impact of an 
organisation’s activities? 
This study applied a survey questionnaire addressed to senior managerial levels in the 
top 500 organisations in Australia to: 
 identify which stakeholder group(s) are perceived most important to the 
organisation in reporting social information; 
 find what motive(s) an organisation has to disclose social information; 
 gather information as to what disciplines, information and disclosures 
organisations consider important in reporting to stakeholders. 
The questionnaire was addressed and sent to senior management positions within the 
top 500 organisations in Australia with identified responsibility for sustainability of 
operations.  Organisations were contacted to gain the name and title of the responsible 
person to ensure the questionnaire was sent to the correct person.  The senior 
management identified with the various organisations typically were identified with 
the following titles: Managing Director, Chief Executive Officer, Corporate Social 
responsibility Manager, Chief Financial Officer, Company Secretary, Group 
Sustainability Manager and Executive Director Corporate Services. 
The questions examine the basic elements of the organisation – stakeholder 
relationship from the perspective of senior management of Australian organisations..  
The questions seek to establish whether particular stakeholders are important to the 
organisation, motivation for reporting social information to stakeholders and the types 
of information and associations perceived necessary to capture an organisation’s 
accountability and social impacts. 
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The methodology involved two phases: 
1. Design of the research instrument and postal survey; and 
2. Follow-up face-to-face interviews with survey respondents. 
5.2 Research instrument design 
The questionnaire was structured to obtain information about the organisation’s 
background, importance of particular stakeholder groups, motivations for reporting 
social information and the types of information perceived important.  Follow-up 
interviews were also conducted with several organisations to provide a contextual 
aspect, to provide a more reliable perspective and to obtain other relevant information.  
Interviews were based around the questionnaire; however, no specific questions were 
purposely developed for the interviews.  Refer to Appendix One for a copy of the 
questionnaire and covering letter. 
Questions 1 – 3 of the questionnaire sought background information of the respondent 
organisation.  Respondents were asked to identify their organisation in relation to 
three characteristics: type of industry, annual revenue and number of employees.  
These characteristics were selected as prior literature suggests that differences in 
disclosure practices may exist based on organisation size and type of industry.  This 
will be discussed further in the section on sample design. 
Question 4 was designed to discover if organisations consider the identification of 
stakeholders important, whilst question 5 attempts to ascertain the motivation of 
organisations in a decision to report social information.  Twelve statements 
summarising the most common motivations for companies to disclose social 
information were presented as representative from the literature (Tilt, 1994; O’Dwyer, 
2000; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). 
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Question 6 is designed to discover the most influential or important stakeholders for 
organisations in reporting social information.  Eleven stakeholder groups were 
presented, summarised from previous studies (Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995; Tilt, 
2004).  These groups are the most cited stakeholder groups, classified both as primary 
and secondary stakeholders.  The stakeholder groups listed were: 
Consumers 
Consumer satisfaction is fundamental to an organisation.  Consumers buy the goods 
or services produced or provided by an organisation.  They may be individuals or 
other organisations.  Firms must understand and meet the needs of their consumers, 
otherwise they will fail to make a profit and survive.  Product safety and quality may 
be perceived as most important information for customers to enable them to ascertain 
that they consume ‘secure’ products (Clarkson, 1995).  Thus the pressure from 
consumers to declare product information may be a reason for organisations in 
disclosing social information. 
Employees 
Employees play a significant role in any organisation.  An organisation needs staff or 
employees to carry out its activities.  Employees agree to work a specified number of 
hours in return for a wage or salary.  To recruit and retain employees organisations 
may place a high premium on the working environment, including issues such as 
health and safety of working conditions, employee benefits and training, and 
productivity levels to create job security and satisfaction (Cooper, 2004). 
Suppliers 
Organisations get the resources they need to produce goods and services from 
suppliers.  Organisations need effective relationships with their suppliers in order to 
get quality resources at reasonable prices.  This is a reciprocal relationship as 
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suppliers depend on the organisations they supply. Suppliers are concerned with 
gaining fair value in exchange for goods and services (Post et al, 1996).  Dissatisfied 
suppliers can withhold supplies if organisations fail to meet payments. 
Shareholders 
Shareholders as owners of a company have long been considered the major 
stakeholder of an organisation.  Shareholders normally invest in shares in order to 
maximise returns and are interested in sustainability of an organisation. 
Regulators 
Accounting regulators universally have tended to fixate on the information interests of 
shareholders. There are extensive protection measures in place to ensure that 
shareholders receive true and fair or unbiased information about the financial 
performance of an organisation (Deegan, 2004).  There is little in the way of 
compulsory disclosures regarding social performance, however, there is growing 
evidence that regulators are considering this area.  In November 2005, the 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee issued a discussion paper titled 
Corporate Social Responsibility after a referral from the Australian Treasurer 
requiring investigation of issues concerning the social responsibility of corporations.  
The Advisory Committee was asked to consider the whether directors’ duties should 
take account of certain classes of stakeholders other than shareholders; whether, or 
how, corporations should report on their social and environmental impact and whether 
further initiatives are needed to encourage companies to adopt socially and 
environmentally responsible business practices (Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee, 2005). 
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Government 
Haigh and Jones (2006) identified that pressure from government is one of the key 
drivers for social information disclosure.  Economic policies affect organisation’s 
costs, for example, through taxation and interest rates.  In addition, legislation 
regulates what business can do in areas such as the environment and occupational 
health and safety.  In return governments want successful firms as they help to create 
wealth and employment.  Currently, there is little or no regulation relating to broad 
corporate social disclosures.  Current disclosure by organisations of social 
information is largely voluntary.  
Professional Organisations 
Many professional accounting bodies throughout the world are actively sponsoring 
research that looks at various social and environmental reporting issues.  For example, 
in 2004 the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales produced a 
report entitled Sustainability: The Role of Accountants (ICAEW, 2004).  In Australia, 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia has produced discussion papers 
and reporting toolkits around Broad Based Business reporting as a response to 
‘demand for greater accountability and insight into sustainability performance from 
the Government and the public in general (The Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia, 2008, p. 3).  In addition, a number of professional organisations have 
evolved in recent years as voluntary partnerships involving elements of business, 
governments, labour and other organisations that have looked at corporate 
responsibility and reporting.  Examples include the Global reporting Initiative, 
AccountAbility 1000, ILO Conventions and the UN Global Compact.   
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Community 
Organisations and the communities they exist in are in a two-way relationship.  
Organisations contribute to their communities, especially to local communities, by 
providing jobs, wages and benefits, and tax revenues.  On the other hand, 
organisations depend on the health, stability and prosperity of the communities in 
which they operate (European Commission, 2002).  For example, they recruit the 
majority of their employees from the local labour markets and therefore have a direct 
interest in the local availability of the skills they need.  Clarkson (1995) identified 
community as a stakeholder group concerned with issues such as public health, safety 
and protection, conservation of energy, environmental assessment, community 
relations, product safety and philanthropy.  Organisations may consider that 
community pressure is significant in social disclosures.  The reputation of an 
organisation at its location, its image as an employer and producer, but also as an 
actor in the local scene, certainly influences its competitiveness (European 
Commission, 2002). 
Lobby Groups 
Lobby groups or pressure groups have been cited as a source of influence on an 
organisation’s social disclosure practices.  The environmental movement in particular 
has been cited as placing pressure on organisations to disclose their activities (Tilt, 
1994).  Parker (1986, p. 70) states explicitly that “pressure for social accounting has 
come from lobby groups…”. 
Media 
Media attention is often viewed as a critical stakeholder for an organisation to manage 
for the good of the company image (Deegan and Rankin, 1996).  Organisations in 
sensitive industries tend to provide greater social disclosures as they may attract more 
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public attention regarding their business operations, for example chemical and 
petroleum (Hackston and Milne, 1996).  The pressure of media groups upon these 
kind of organisations may have a significant impact upon their image, so they will 
place a high concern on meeting or managing media demands. 
 
Identifying each stakeholder’s involvement in social disclosure leads to an 
understanding that organisations must disclose relevant information to fulfill its 
needs.  Which stakeholder group or groups are perceived as the most influential is a 
question to be addressed. 
 
Question 7 contained a list of disclosures that was developed by the Global Reporting 
Initiative’s (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Framework. 
The Sustainability Reporting Framework – of which the Sustainability reporting 
Guidelines are the cornerstone – provides guidance for organisations about their 
sustainability performance and also provides stakeholders a universally-
applicable, comparable framework in which to understand disclosed 
information. (GRI, 2008) 
The reporting framework is designed to facilitate transparency and accountability by 
organisations.  The GRI framework lists 25 items for disclosure under the following 
headings: 
 Labour 
 Human Rights 
 Society 
 Product responsibility 
The question sought respondents’ views as to the importance of the proposed 
disclosures.  In addition respondents were asked for any further disclosures they 
believed should be included in a social report. 
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Question 8 sought to establish whether respondents believed that current financial 
reporting, which is predominantly of economic data, is sufficiently broad to capture 
the impact of an organisations activities and social impact.  Current financial 
reporting has been criticised on the basis that it ignores many of the social and 
environmental externalities caused by organisations (Gray et al, 1995).  It has been 
argued that financial reporting is too narrow to properly and fully reflect the impact 
and influence of an organisation’s activities.  In addition, financial reporting with its 
emphasis on ‘fair values’ which requires organisations to peg some of their assets, 
such as derivatives, and other financial instruments, to market prices has been 
criticised as providing meaningless information.     
Respondents who disagreed with question 8 and believed that current financial 
reporting is too narrow were asked in question 9 to discuss the other disciplines and 
associations they believed necessary to capture managements’ accountability for 
periodic performance and social impacts.  This question was designed to gather 
information about the type of disciplines and information that are considered 
important in reporting information about an organisation and its performance. 
To obtain an understanding of the current level of social reporting, three questions 
were designed: 
 question 10 asked respondents if they currently prepared a report on social 
information; 
 question 11 asked them to explain why they engaged in social reporting; and 
 question 12 asked if the social report is audited. 
5.3 Survey methodology and administration 
In this section the rationale and application of the survey is discussed. 
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5.3.1 Use of surveys and postal questionnaire 
A survey method was chosen as it was considered the most effective method of 
research for a large population and ‘is one of the most common approaches used in 
the social sciences to empirically study the characteristics and interrelations of 
sociological and psychological variables” (Roberts, 1999, p. 53).  There are a number 
of criticisms of surveys which de Vaus (2002, pp 7 – 9) classifies as philosophical, 
technique-based and political.  The philosophical criticism is based on the assertion 
that surveys cannot adequately identify causal relationships, responses can be taken 
out of context, surveys are empiricist and some things are not measurable.  But the 
survey in this research is used to explore, identify and describe company practices.  It 
does not seek to establish actual relationships and is necessarily empirical.  The 
concerns about measurement and context are noted, and must be kept in mind whilst 
designing, using and analysing the survey instrument.   
Technique-based criticisms include the inappropriate use of statistics while the 
political aspect involves the motives of the researcher.  Proponents of survey research 
such as Babbie (1990), de Vaus (2002) and Roberts (1999) have established a strong 
justification for the survey method based on adherence to proper design and 
administration.  Roberts (1999) has defended the survey methodology with a specific 
focus on collection of data using the mail questionnaire method, providing a 
framework based on the work of Andrews (1984) to overcome many of the 
shortcomings of questionnaires.  This framework was used in preparation of the 
questionnaire. 
5.3.2 Pilot Testing 
The questionnaire was pre-tested to check question design, clarity of instructions and 
the time taken to complete.  Pre-testing is designed to improve the reliability and 
 121
validity of the data collected and the final response rate (Roberts 1999).  According to 
Zikmund (2000, p. 257) two pre-test procedures can be used: screening the 
questionnaire with other research professionals; and to have a trial run.  
Three pre-test procedures were utilized in developing the questionnaire.  First, both 
supervisors of this thesis initially reviewed several drafts of the questionnaire 
resulting in some changes to the design of the instrument, specifically wording and 
sequencing but not the focus of the questions.  Second, the questionnaire was given to 
five fellow researchers at RMIT University who commented on the design and clarity 
of the instrument as well as the time taken to complete the survey. 
Finally, a participating pre-test was then conducted with ten participants from the on-
line Graduate Diploma in Corporate Governance subject Corporate Financial 
Management conducted by Chartered Secretaries Australia.  Permission for the pre-
test was obtained from the Director of Education at Chartered Secretaries Australia.  
This pre-test sample was chosen as the researcher had access to this group through 
conducting the on-line module and the participants being present or future company 
secretaries were considered reflective of the population to be surveyed.  The ten 
participants were sent the questionnaire with accompanying covering letter and asked 
to complete and return the questionnaire. 
Respondents who participated in the pre-test were also asked to complete a pre-test 
questionnaire, commenting on issues of timing, clarity of instructions, purpose, 
definitions, interest and attention, reliability, flow and formatting of questions 
(Converse and Presser, 1986; Zikmund, 2000; de Vaus, 1995).  In addition, 
respondents were asked to identify specific questions that troubled them or caused 
concern and to suggest any additional questions that they believed could have been 
included in the questionnaire. 
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Respondents were asked the following questions: Do you understand the purpose of 
the research? and Does the research instrument reflect the purpose of the research?  
All respondents indicated ‘yes’ to both questions. 
Analysis of the responses from the pre-test instrument resulted in some minor changes 
to wording of the questions.  The opportunity provided in the pre-test instrument for 
respondents to indicate specific questions that caused them concern was of particular 
value.  Several respondents indicated concern with respect to one particular question.  
Appropriate changes were made to the questionnaire to improve the reliability and 
validity of responses.  Refer to Appendix Two for a copy of the Pre-test instrument. 
5.3.3 Ethical issues 
Ethical clearance is provided to secure and ensure respondent well-being (Converse 
and Presser, 1986).  A requirement of PhD candidature is that all research involving 
human participants receives ethical clearance prior to collection of data.  The covering 
letter and questionnaire were submitted to the University’s Ethics Committee for 
approval.  The level of risk to subjects participating in this research was classified as 
‘No Risk’.   
Of particular importance in obtaining approval for data collection is the ‘plain 
language statement’ – a letter that accompanies the questionnaire (Refer Appendix 
One).  Approval from the Ethics committee was granted before the survey was 
administered. 
5.3.4 Sample design 
The survey was sent to the top 500 organisations in Australia identified from the 
Business Review Weekly list of the one thousand largest organisations (BRW 1000) 
as at December 2006.  Four measures to determine size are given in the BRW 1000 
list, these being: 
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o Total revenue 
o Net profit after tax 
o Shareholders’ funds 
o Total assets 
Large companies are generally considered more ideally to disclose social and 
environmental information than smaller organisations (Tilt, 1997, p.374). However, 
some studies have shown differences between companies’ disclosure practices based 
on size and according to the industry to which they belong (Abbott & Monsen, 1979; 
Trotman & Bradley, 1981; Cowen et al., 1987; Tilt, 1997). 
 
Some researchers (Dieikes & Coppock, 1978; Trotman & Bradley, 1981; Cowen et al, 
1987) have suggested that corporate size is the decisive factor for corporate social 
responsibility disclosures. They note that larger companies tend to receive more 
attention from the general public and therefore, to be under greater pressure to exhibit 
social responsibility. Furthermore, larger companies have more shareholders who 
might also be concerned with social programs undertaken by the company. Smaller 
corporations might not receive the same level of public pressure and, with fewer 
shareholders, might tend to communicate information about social programs through 
more informal channels than the annual report. 
 
The most appropriate measure of the size of an organisation is difficult to determine. 
Prior studies have utilised a variety of measures with the most commonly used being: 
Sales (Zimmerman, 1983; Tilt, 1997), profitability (Cowen et al, 1987); value of total 
assets (Trotman & Bradley, 1981) and number of employees (Abbot & Monsen, 
1979). 
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In this study, the measure used to determine size was total revenue with surveys sent 
to the top 500 organisations. In addition to the total revenue measure, respondents 
were also asked to identify the size of their organisation according to the measure 
number of employees. 
 
Three mail-outs were undertaken at intervals of approximately four weeks between 
each mail-out.  It was judged that a fourth mail out would have little impact on the 
overall response rate. 
5.3.5 Follow-up face-to-face interviews 
In addition to the mail survey, ten follow-up face-to-face unstructured interviews 
were conducted with mail respondents who indicated that they were willing to discuss 
the issues in an interview – in this way the interviewees were self-selected.  The 
interviews were held with the identified senior management of the organisations to 
whom the postal survey was addressed.  Each interview was of approximately one 
hour duration.  The interviews were conducted with organisations in the following 
industries: 
Table 1:  Number of face-to-face interviews by industry 
Industry Number of interviews 
Manufacturing 2 
Financial 1 
Industrial 2 
Transport 1 
Food/Household 2 
Other 2 
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Discussions were based around the questionnaire, however, no specific questions 
were purposely developed for the interviews.  The interview process explored the 
answers from respondents by asking questions like: ‘Why do you think this is 
important?’; ‘What other reasons’; ‘could you elaborate on’; ‘please describe’ and 
‘any other information you would like to add’.  The use of these phrases encouraged 
more detailed answers (De Vaus, 2002).  The interviews were recorded, with 
participant approval, and then transcribed.  The relevant results from these interviews 
are accommodated in the next chapter. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter the approach to be taken to the collection of data has been discussed.  
The aim of the study is to investigate stakeholders influence and motivation for 
organisations in Australia in reporting social information and to establish what 
disclosures and other disciplines or associations are perceived necessary to capture 
managements’ accountability for periodic performance and social impacts.  In the 
next chapter the data collected is analysed. 
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Chapter Six: Descriptive Results 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the descriptive results of the questionnaire are discussed.  One hundred 
and nine responses were received from the sample of five hundred, giving a response 
rate of 22%.  The results are summarised in Table 2: 
Table 2: Respondents and Response Rate 
Organisations Sample Respondents Percentage response 
Total (usable response) 500 109 22% 
Return to Sender (note 1)  4  
Declined to participate (note 2)  16  
Total (actual response) 500 129 26% 
 
6.2 The Issue of Non Response 
Since only the top 500 organisations in Australia were identified to survey there is, as 
with all surveys, an issue relating to the representativeness of the sample.  This is the 
problem of non response, i.e. those observations or responses that are not available to 
 
Note 1:  
Four letters were returned with a message that the company was no longer at this 
address. 
Note 2: 
Sixteen organisations replied in writing that they would not participate in the survey, 
citing the following reasons: 
o Two organisations stated that they currently do not report on corporate 
responsibility and therefore are not in a position to participate in the survey; 
o Two organisations stated that it is company policy not to participate in 
surveys; 
o Four organisations declined to participate due to time constraints and work 
commitments; 
o One organisation declined to participate as they were in the process of 
relocating their offices; and 
o Seven organisations replied that they declined to participate in the survey 
without further explanation.  
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“non researchers because of a failure to return questionnaires or failure to answer one 
or more questions” (Wallace and Mellor, 1988, p. 132).  Epstein and Freedman (1994, 
p. 103) noted that there may be a difference between those who respond to a postal 
survey and those who do not while de Vaus (1992, p. 73) noted that “often non 
responders are different in crucial respects to responders”.  It may be that those who 
respond may be more interested in the topic, or may be more affected by the issues 
involved, or the issue may be too sensitive or controversial.  It may also be that 
particular industry groups are more likely to respond.  The response rate is a guide to 
the sample’s potential representativeness though what is an adequate response rate has 
no statistical basis.  The issue is related to the extent of bias reflected in the 
respondent sample rather than the actual response rate (Babbie, 1989).  In order to test 
for non-response bias in the survey responses, the early-late hypothesis test was used. 
This suggests that late returns are often similar to non responses (Buzby & Falk, 
1979; Oppenheim, 1992). As three mailings were conducted, tests were performed to 
compare the responses from the first mailing to those from the second and third 
mailings. Analysis of variance tests conducted on questions 4, 5 and 6 showed no 
significant differences between respondents to the three mail outs. 
A Cronbach’s Alpha test was performed to test the internal consistency of the survey 
instrument.  The alpha coefficient for the twenty-four items in questions 4 to 6 is 
0.797, suggesting that the items have relatively high internal consistency, as generally  
a reliability coefficient of 0.70 or higher is considered  acceptable in most social 
science research situations.   
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6.3 Respondent profile 
Of the 109 responses to the survey, 62 were received from the original mail-out; 27 
from the second mail-out request and 20 responses from the third mail-out request.  
Respondents were requested to provide three indicators of their organisation’s profile: 
Industry classification, annual revenue and number of employees.  Industry 
classification was requested as it is hypothesized that certain industry types will be 
more sensitive to social reporting than other industry types, for example Mining 
industry.  Annual revenue and number of employees are considered important as 
descriptors of organisation size.  It is considered that the larger the organisation in 
terms of revenue and employees the more likely the organisation is to consider a 
wider group of stakeholders and report social information. 
 
Figure three provides a breakdown of the industry types of each of the respondents:  
 
There is a good spread of representation across industries.  No single industry 
dominates the sample. 
 
Figure Three: Breakdown by Industry of firms surveyed
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 129
Table 3 provides a breakdown of the respondents by annual revenue.  Two 
respondents did not answer this question giving the total usable response for this 
question as 107. 
Table 3: Sample by Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue Number Percentage of respondents 
Less than $1bn 53 49.5 
$1bn - $2bn 18 16.8 
$2bn - $3bn 6 5.6 
$3bn - $4bn 5 4.7 
$4bn - $5bn 6 5.6 
More then $5bn 19 17.8 
Total 107 100.0% 
 
Figure four provides a breakdown of the respondents by number of employees: 
 
84% of respondents had less than 10,000 employees with 4% having in excess of 
50,000 employees. 
 
6.4 Identification of stakeholders 
Question four of the survey instrument asked respondents how important the 
identification of stakeholders is for their organisation.  A five point Likert scale from 
Figure Four: Number of employees of firms
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Less than 10k
10k - 20k
20k - 30k
30k - 40k
40k - 50k
More then 50k
Employees
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Very Unimportant to Very Important was utilised.  The majority of respondents (87%) 
indicated that the identification of stakeholders was either important or very important 
to their organisation – refer Graph One.  The mean score for this question was 4.2 
with a median and mode of 5, and a standard deviation of 1.17.  As the identification 
of stakeholders is considered important it indicates that organisations wish to manage 
their relationship and reporting to stakeholders. 
 
Organisations irrespective of industry classification or size, as measured by annual 
turnover or employees, consider the identification of stakeholders to be important to 
their organisation.  The mean score for two industry classifications, that of Oil/Gas 
and Transport, whilst still indicating that stakeholder identification was important 
were well below other industries – refer Table 4: 
Table 4: Stakeholder Groups Importance: By Industry 
Industry Mean Standard Deviation 
Food/Household 4.60 0.699 
Industrial 4.60 0.507 
Mining 3.88 1.808 
Oil/Gas 3.33 2.082 
Graph 1 
The Importance of Identification of Stakeholders to the Organisation
Very Important
55%
Important
32%
Neutral
4% 
Unimportant
0% 
Very Unimportant
9% 
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Transport  3.14 2.035 
Manufacturing 4.00 1.275 
Financial 4.33 1.029 
Utilities 4.29 0.756 
 
Statistical analysis (Analysis of variance) was conducted to see if there were any 
significant differences on importance of stakeholder identification according to the 
three descriptors, i.e. Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences were found at the 0.01 level of significance.  
The 0.01 level of significance was chosen due to the many tests of significance 
conducted in this chapter, so as to minimise false positives. 
Table 5: Analysis of variance results 
Dependent Variable: importance of Identification of Stakeholders 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.484 .021 
Revenue 5 .523 .758 
Employees 4 .056 .994 
Residual df = 60 
 
6.5 Importance of differing stakeholder groups 
Question six asked respondents to identify the importance of various stakeholder 
groups to their organisation.  The stakeholder group that was ranked highest for 
importance was that of employees with a mean of 4.5 and a standard deviation of 
0.603.  Other stakeholder groups identified as important with a mean greater than 4 
were Shareholders, Regulators, Government, Consumers and the Community – refer 
Table 6. 
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Table 6: Stakeholder Groups Importance ranked by Mean 
Stakeholder Group Mean Median Mode Standard 
Deviation 
Employees 4.48 5 5 0.603 
Shareholders 4.21 4 4 0.870 
Regulators 4.16 4 4 0.822 
Community 4.15 4 4 0.795 
Consumers 4.15 4 4 0.822 
Government  4.14 4 4 0.818 
Media 3.83 4 4 0.826 
Suppliers 3.77 4 4 0.871 
Lobby Groups 3.66 4 4 0.909 
Finance Providers 3.57 4 4 0.959 
Professional Groups 3.48 4 4 0.848 
 
Graph 2 shows that whilst respondents indicated that most stakeholder groups were 
important, employees were identified by the vast majority of organisations as either 
very important or important with only 5% identifying employees as neutral and no-
one responding they were unimportant.  This was also the stakeholder group with the 
lowest standard deviation indicating a high level of agreement among respondents. 
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Graph 2: Importance of Stakeholder Groups 
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Statistical analysis was conducted to determine if there were any significant 
differences on question 6 Importance of differing stakeholders according to the three 
descriptors of Industry, Annual Revenue and Employees.  Tests of significance were 
conducted on the eleven identified stakeholder groups and the results are shown in 
Appendix 4 – refer Tables 15 to 26 (d) (Appendix Four).  Of the analysis of variance 
tests conducted only one significant difference was found relating to the importance 
of stakeholder groups between the three descriptors at the 0.01 level.  Oil/Gas 
industry respondents showed significant difference by industry (F = 3.238, df = 8, 
sig. = 0.004)and revenue (F = 3.841, df = 5, sig. = 0.004).  Respondents were more 
widely spread on their ranking of the importance of Community in regard to social 
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reporting with 50% of respondents’ ranking the Community as Unimportant or Very 
Unimportant.  Two possible explanations are presented for this difference: 
1. Respondents and follow-up interviews highlighted the importance of local 
communities rather than the community in general.  Respondents highlighted the 
need to have close relationships with the local community that is most directly 
affected by the organisations operations.  The Oil/Gas industry typically has its 
major operations in remote areas and the impact on their operations is therefore 
not as directly felt by local communities. 
2. The number of respondents for the Oil/Gas industry was low with only 4 
responses from this group.  The small number of responses calls into question 
the significance of the difference.  Of the four responses, 2 ranked community as 
important/very important whilst two ranked community as unimportant/very 
unimportant. 
6.6 Why report social information to stakeholder groups 
In question five respondents were asked how important motivations identified from 
the literature are in a decision to report social information to stakeholders.  Twelve 
statements were presented in the survey and respondents were asked to identify their 
agreement to the statement in a decision to report social information using a 5-point 
Likert scale - refer Table 7.   
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Table 7: Percentage agreement: Importance of statement in a decision to report social information 
 
In a decision to report social information to stakeholder 
groups, indicate whether you agree or disagree with the 
following statements: S t
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Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
1. Stakeholder groups have a right to be informed 
about the activities undertaken by the firm. 
0% 1% 7% 66% 26% 108 4.17 0.588 
2. Social reporting enhances accountability to 
stakeholders. 
1% 0% 11% 64% 24% 108 4.10 0.655 
3. Social reporting helps ensure an informal license to 
operate by which business survival is dictated. 
1% 10% 31% 45% 14% 103 3.60 0.878 
4. Corporations should take into account concerns of 
stakeholders, other than shareholders, when making 
decisions. 
0% 0% 9% 66% 25% 107 4.16 0.569 
5. The long-term commercial viability of a corporation 
is dependent upon consideration of all stakeholder 
interests. 
0% 3% 21% 54% 23% 106 3.96 0.742 
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6. Social reporting is required to help overcome 
deficiencies in the current financial reporting 
framework. 
1% 22% 41% 31% 5% 105 3.13 0.902 
7. Better management and reporting of a company’s 
social issues benefits shareholders. 
2% 3% 20% 64% 12% 107 3.81 0.754 
8. Financial performance is more important than social 
concerns. 
3% 19% 44% 28% 6% 108 3.17 0.902 
9. The interests of the shareholders and other 
stakeholders should be of equal importance to the 
company. 
0% 32% 21% 41% 7% 107 3.22 0.974 
10. A company would be more sensitive to its social 
impacts if it was required to report on them. 
0% 11% 14% 59% 16% 108 3.80 0.840 
11. A company’s social information is only worthwhile 
if it is subject to independent audit. 2% 33% 31% 27% 7% 107 3.06 0.989 
12. Social reporting by a company is important as 
investors making investment decisions consider 
such information. 
1% 12% 33% 44% 10% 108 3.50 0.870 
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Statements 1, 2 and 4 all had means greater than 4, together with the lowest standard 
deviations, and indicate that organisations believe that they have a wider 
accountability than just to shareholders.  Stakeholders are seen to have a right to be 
informed about the activities of an organisation and to be considered in the decision 
making undertaken by organisations.  Ninety-two per cent of respondents indicated 
that stakeholders have a right to be informed about the organisation’s activities.  In 
addition, ninety-one per cent of respondents indicated that organisations should 
consider the concerns of stakeholders when making decisions.  Social reporting was 
considered by eighty-eight per cent of respondents to enhance accountability to 
stakeholders. 
On the issue of the importance of shareholders as compared to other stakeholders, 
fifty-eight per cent of respondents agreed that the interests of shareholders and other 
stakeholders are of equal importance.  In addition, seventy-six per cent of respondents 
agreed that better management and reporting of social issues brings benefits to 
shareholders.  However, thirty-two per cent disagreed, indicating that there is a large 
proportion of organisations that believe that shareholders are of greater importance 
than other stakeholders.   
Social reporting was not seen as of major importance in overcoming deficiencies in 
financial reporting, with just thirty-five per cent of respondents identifying this as 
important in a decision to provide a social report.  Indeed social reporting appears to 
be seen as complementary to financial reporting – whilst thirty-four per cent of 
respondents indicated that financial reporting was more important than social 
concerns, twenty-one per cent disagreed with this contention with a further forty-four 
per cent being neutral to this proposition.  However, seventy-five per cent of 
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respondents indicated that a requirement to report social information would make 
organisations more sensitive to its social impacts. 
In relation to the audit of social information, respondents indicated that this was not 
of major importance unlike the generally accepted need for audit of financial 
information – thirty-four per cent of respondents indicated that audit of social 
information was not an important factor with a further thirty-one per cent neutral to 
the proposition. 
 
Statistical analysis was conducted to determine if there were any significant 
differences on question 5 according to the three descriptors of Industry, Annual 
Revenue and Employees.  Tests of significance were conducted on the twelve 
statements and the results are shown in Appendix 5 – refer Tables 27 (a) to 38 (d) 
(Appendix Five).  Of all the tests conducted only three significant differences were 
found relating to the twelve statements between the three descriptors at the 0.01 
level.  These were: 
1. Stakeholder Groups have a right to be informed about the activities of the 
firm:  Significant difference by Number of Employees (F = 3.79, df = 4, sig. 
= 0.008) with larger employers tending to consider that stakeholder groups 
have the right to be informed about the activities of the firm more.   
2. Social reporting enhances accountability to stakeholders: 
Significant difference by Annual Revenue (F = 3.842, df = 5, sig. = 0.004) 
with larger employers tending to consider that social reporting enhances 
accountability to stakeholders. 
3. Better management and reporting of a company's social issues benefits 
shareholders:  Significant difference by Number of Employees (F = 0.912, df 
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= 4, sig. = 0.007) with larger employers tending to consider better 
management and reporting of a company’s social issues benefits 
shareholders. 
The above results were expected on the basis of previous literature which showed 
that corporate size is a decisive factor in relation to corporate social disclosures 
(Dieikes & Coppock, 1978; Trotman & Bradley, 1981; Cowen et al, 1987).  Over the 
past few decades companies have been expanding in size and are operating in more 
and more countries.  This growth has increased the power of companies and the 
impacts they have on the social, political and ecological environments of the 
countries in which they operate.  This brings an increasing expectation from society 
for companies to act responsibly and be accountable for those impacts (Adams and 
Zutshi, 2004).  Larger companies tend to receive greater attention from the general 
public, media and regulators and therefore are under greater pressure to exhibit social 
responsibility.  Management of larger organisations appear to have recognised that 
their companies have a greater accountability to society and hence a responsibility to 
report to a broader range of stakeholders. 
6.7 Disclosures of social information 
Question 7 asked respondents’ to indicate their agreement with a list of proposed 
social disclosures around four general categories: 1. Labour; 2. Human Rights; 3. 
Society; and 4. Product responsibility.  Respondents’ were asked to identify their 
agreement to the proposed disclosure using a 5-point Likert scale - refer Table 8. 
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Table 8:  Percentage Agreement: Importance of proposed disclosures 
In a company social report to stakeholders, please indicate your 
agreement or disagreement with each of the proposed disclosures for 
your organisation: S t
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Size 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Labour: Employment 
1. Breakdown of workforce 
2. Net employment creation 
3. Average employment turnover segmented by country/region 
 
2% 
1% 
4% 
 
12% 
9% 
22% 
 
22% 
28% 
35% 
 
56% 
52% 
33% 
 
9% 
10% 
7% 
 
104 
103 
104 
 
3.58 
3.61 
3.00 
 
0.878 
0.819 
0.977 
Labour: Labour/management relations 
4. Percentage represented by trade unions 
5. Policy and procedures relating to changes like restructuring 
 
8% 
1% 
 
25% 
22% 
 
43% 
28% 
 
21% 
41% 
 
4% 
8% 
 
102 
102 
 
2.88 
3.33 
 
0.957 
0.937 
Labour: Health and safety 
6. Practices on recording and notification of accidents and diseases 
7. Description of formal joint health and safety committees 
8. Standard injury, lost days, absence rates and number of fatalities 
9. Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS 
 
--- 
--- 
--- 
3% 
 
3% 
5% 
9% 
27% 
 
14% 
22% 
14% 
41% 
 
54% 
54% 
54% 
20% 
 
29% 
19% 
23% 
9% 
 
105 
105 
105 
104 
 
4.09 
3.88 
3.91 
3.05 
 
0.735 
0.768 
0.845 
0.964 
Labour: Training and education 
10. Hours of training per year per employee, by category of employee 
 
--- 
 
16% 
 
37% 
 
38% 
 
9% 
 
104 
 
3.39 
 
0.864 
Labour: Diversity and opportunity 
11. Description of equal opportunity policies and programmes 
12. Composition of senior management and corporate governance 
bodies, including male/female ratio 
 
--- 
--- 
 
3% 
7% 
 
17% 
25% 
 
61% 
53% 
 
19% 
15% 
 
105 
105 
 
3.96 
3.77 
 
0.692 
0.788 
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Human Rights: Strategy and management 
13. Description of policies, guidelines, corporate structure, and 
procedures to deal with all aspects of human rights 
14. Evidence of consideration of human rights impacts as part of 
investment and procurement decisions 
15. Description of policies and procedures to evaluate and address 
human rights performance within the supply chain and contractors 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
1% 
 
8% 
 
10% 
 
10% 
 
32% 
 
39% 
 
41% 
 
50% 
 
41% 
 
43% 
 
10% 
 
9% 
 
6% 
 
105 
 
105 
 
105 
 
3.59 
 
3.46 
 
3.43 
 
0.805 
 
0.832 
 
0.783 
Human rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
16. Discrimination 
17. Freedom of association 
18. Child labour 
19. Forced and compulsory labour 
 
1% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
 
4% 
6% 
10% 
9% 
 
18% 
24% 
26% 
22% 
 
56% 
52% 
43% 
46% 
 
21% 
17% 
20% 
22% 
 
105 
104 
104 
104 
 
3.92 
3.79 
3.72 
3.80 
 
0.793 
0.832 
0.929 
0.918 
Society: Policies, procedures and management systems 
20. Impacts of operations on communities 
21. Bribery and corruption 
22. Political lobbying and contributions 
 
1% 
1% 
1% 
 
--- 
3% 
4% 
 
12% 
14% 
20% 
 
63% 
59% 
62% 
 
24% 
23% 
13% 
 
105 
104 
105 
 
4.09 
4.00 
3.83 
 
0.667 
0.763 
0.740 
Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management 
systems 
23. Customer health and safety 
24. Product information and labeling 
25. Consumer privacy 
 
 
2% 
1% 
1% 
 
 
1% 
1% 
1% 
 
 
13% 
17% 
20% 
 
 
54% 
56% 
59% 
 
 
30% 
25% 
19% 
 
 
105 
105 
104 
 
 
4.09 
4.03 
3.94 
 
 
0.798 
0.740 
0.722 
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The GRI recommended disclosures are broken into 4 general categories and 9 sub-
categories.  The disclosure categories were rated by respondents as shown in Table 9: 
Table 9: Ratings by respondents of disclosure categories 
Area Disclosure Mean 
Product Responsibility Policies, procedures and management systems 4.02 
Society Policies, procedures and management systems 3.97 
Labour Diversity and opportunity 3.87 
Human Rights Policies, procedures and management systems 3.81 
Labour Health and safety 3.73 
Human Rights Strategy and management 3.49 
Labour Employment 3.41 
Labour Training and Education 3.39 
Labour Labour/Management relations 3.11 
 
This suggests that respondents believe that disclosure of policies, procedures and 
management systems are more important than the disclosure of statistical information 
such as breakdown of the labour force.  This was supported by an analysis of the 
individual disclosures that were considered important.  Of the 25 listed disclosures, 
five items had means of greater or equal to 4, as shown in Table 10: 
Table 10: Highest ranked disclosures by mean 
Area Disclosure Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Labour: Health and Safety Practices on recording and 
notification of accidents and diseases 
4.09 0.735 
Society: Policies, 
procedures and management 
systems 
Impacts of operations on 
communities 
4.09 0.667 
Product responsibility: 
Policies, procedures and 
management systems 
Customer health and safety 4.09 0.798 
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Product responsibility: 
Policies, procedures and 
management systems 
Product information and labelling 4.03 0.740 
Society: Policies, 
procedures and management 
systems 
Bribery and corruption 4.00 0.763 
 
The above disclosures also had lower standard deviations of the listed disclosures 
indicating a higher level of agreement among respondents. 
The disclosures with the lowest means relating to agreement for disclosure, along with the 
highest standard deviations, are shown in Table 11: 
Table 11: Lowest ranked disclosures by mean: 
Area Disclosure Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Labour: Labour/Management 
relations 
Percentage represented by trade 
unions 
2.88 0.957 
Labour: Employment Average employment turnover 
segmented by country/region 
3.00 0.977 
Labour: Health and safety Policies and programmes for 
HIV/AIDS 
3.05 0.964 
 
Statistical analysis was conducted to determine if there were any significant 
differences on question 7 according to the three descriptors of Industry, Annual 
Revenue and Employees.  Tests of significance were conducted on the twenty-five 
listed recommended disclosures and the results are shown in Appendix 6 – refer 
Tables 38 (a) to 62 (d) (Appendix Six).  Of all the tests conducted only one significant 
difference was found relating to the twenty-five disclosures between the three 
descriptors at the 0.01 level.  A significant difference relating to disclosure of Health 
and Safety: - Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS by Industry (F = 3.933,  
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df = 8, sig. = 0.001) with the Food/Household industry ranking this recommended 
disclosure higher than other industries.  This result is not surprising and is probably 
reflective of the sensitivity of this industry to health issues, particularly in the food 
segment of the industry.  Organisations in the Food/Household industry, particularly 
the food segment of the industry, would be very cognizant of their reputation as 
regards hygiene and health issues relating to food preparation and packaging.  
Disclosure of policies and programmes would be seen as a significant way in which 
the industry could demonstrate to stakeholders their concerns and care in this area. 
6.7.1 Further disclosures 
Respondents were asked to list any further disclosures they felt should be included in a 
social report.  Two general points were raised by respondents relating to disclosures in 
a social report.   
First, a comment made by one respondent involved in the property industry relating to 
the GRI recommended disclosures was that they “are relevant for organisations that; a) 
are global, b) manufacture consumer products, c) operate by exploiting cheap labour.”  
Relevant social issues to the organisation needed to be disclosed in a social report.  As 
another respondent from the property industry stated, “challenge here is the ‘one size 
fits all”.  They went on to also state that reports needed to be relevant to the 
organisation  and “not padded out with stuff that’s clearly irrelevant  e.g. human rights 
for companies operating exclusively in Australia under Australian Law.” 
Second, a view was expressed that social reporting should revolve around principles 
and systems.  As a respondent from a relatively smaller company in the 
telecommunications industry  stated: 
“If social reporting is based on prescriptive standards (such as Accounting 
Standards) then you will only get what you ask for.  Reporting based on a 
statement of concepts may be better or a optional ranking system.” 
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One-third of all respondents listed further items for disclosure.  Items listed by 
respondents for disclosure could be categorised under three general headings: 
1. Resources usage or environmental footprint  
2. Community Support, including philanthropy  
3. Non-compliance with relevant laws/regulations 
6.7.1.1   Resource usage/environmental footprint 
Twenty-four respondents identified disclosures relating to resource usage/consumption 
by the organisation as important.  The footprint of the organisation was identified as a 
matter that should be disclosed.  Resource usage could be considered on two levels: 
1. Usage by the organisation of basic resources such as energy, water and other 
resources such as paper, iron, etc.  Eleven respondents considered that the 
organisation should disclose usage of basic resources. 
2. Disclosure of information concerning the emissions of the organisation such as 
green house gases.  Twelve respondents believed that emissions by the 
organisation should be disclosed. 
Three respondents felt that the organisation should also disclose the above information 
split between new and recycled resources. 
The impact of the organisation on the environment was identified as a issue for 
disclosure.  As one respondent in the information technology industry stated “I think it 
is important to not split social and environmental reporting.” 
6.7.1.2   Community support, including philanthropy 
Eleven respondents stated that community investment activities, especially at the local 
community level, was important and should be disclosed.  Additional disclosures 
suggested included level of community support, including donations, sponsorship, 
employee volunteering and employee salary sacrifice donations.  One respondent from 
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a relatively small organisation in the Food and Household industry stated that the 
organisation’s overall investment in community should be disclosed under various 
headings such as taxes, salaries, dividends, research and development, etc.  A number 
of respondents specifically identified that organisational philanthropy should be 
disclosed. Philanthropy or support for non-profit organisations such as charities, 
whether financially or in kind, should be disclosed. 
6.7.1.3   Non-compliance with laws/regulations 
Five respondents highlighted that organisations should disclose any non-compliance 
with relevant laws and regulations with details of any prosecutions or fines being 
disclosed. 
6.8 Adequacy of current financial reporting 
Question eight asked respondents if they believed that current financial reporting of 
predominantly economic data is sufficiently broad enough to capture the impact of a 
company’s activities and social impact.  Seventy-five percent of respondents disagreed 
that financial reporting was sufficient.  Graph 3 shows the results: 
 
Graph 3: Current financial reporting is sufficiently broad enough  
 to capture the impact of a company’s activities 
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Whilst the overwhelming majority of respondents believed that current financial is 
insufficient to capture the impact of an organisation’s activities and social impact, one 
respondent from the Industrial sector replied that “firms tend to only report on CSR 
when it suits their case, i.e. when it is used as a marketing tool.”  They also stated that 
“any enforcement of CSR would be costly to implement for an organisation that did 
not have a formal system.”  However there was overwhelming support for a broader 
system of reporting, although one respondent from the industrial sector involved with 
wholesale agricultural machinery, whilst supporting social reporting, did not believe it 
should be compulsory, stating: 
“I don’t believe social reporting should be a required disclosure.  Those 
companies who are doing a good job and disclosing social impacts will do better 
in the market place than those that don’t and therefore social reporting will 
become necessary for companies to compete.” 
 
Comments by respondents in support of the question generally believed that social 
reporting would add to the value of the financial report.  As one respondent involved 
in the investment industry stated: 
“Financial reporting is currently adequate for the company’s financial activities – 
but gives very little on overall activities and social impact.” 
 
This was supported by another respondent involved in the services industry who stated 
that “financial information alone doesn’t provide an insight to the effects the 
company’s activities has on the community, stakeholders, etc”.  
Social reporting was seen to add value and be complementary to the traditional 
financial report by a number of respondents.  As one respondent from a large 
employer in the mining industry stated: 
“We publish both an annual report – predominantly financial and economic 
information plus an annual sustainability report – both are appropriate.” 
 
This was supported by another respondent form an organisation in the utilities 
industry:” 
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“Our annual report includes social and environmental performance information, 
in addition to statutory and financial reporting (i.e. a combined sustainability and 
annual report).  We are continually communicating with stakeholders and 
communities in which we operate, through a range of channels including media, 
community forums, public consultation processes, and direct formal and 
informal communications to particular individual stakeholders.” 
 
Another respondent from the tourism industry believed that social reporting was 
important but should complement the traditional financial report stating that “a 
separate annual social responsibility should be issued with the annual report and freely 
available to all stakeholders.” 
Question nine asked those who believed that financial reporting was inadequate to 
capture the impact of an organisation’s activities and social impact to list what other 
disciplines or associations they believed was necessary to capture management’s 
accountability for periodic performance and social impacts.  Some respondents 
addressed this in a general manner, for example, a respondent in the manufacturing 
industry from a large employer stated “whatever disciplines are necessary for the 
management of the organisation and to increase sustainable performance”.  A further 
respondent from the government sector stated that Information about what the 
company is doing to build or replace social capital that may have been removed or 
reduced due to business activities.” 
However, a number of respondents listed specific disciplines or associations they 
believed should be added to the traditional financial reporting system.  These specific 
responses could be categorised under three general headings: 
1. Human capital 
Twenty-two respondents stated that associations with human capital or labour 
are important to capture management’s accountability for periodic performance 
and social impacts.  Associations listed included job creation, worker safety, 
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traineeships and cadetships offered, employee satisfaction and turnover, staff 
diversity and employee training programs. 
2. Environmental science/impact 
Twenty-two respondents believed that environmental science and 
environmental management experts were a necessary discipline to capture 
management’s accountability for periodic performance and social impacts.  
The environmental impact and environmental performance needed to be 
measured and reported on in terms of carbon footprint, eco efficiency, etc. 
3. Community impact 
Seventeen respondents stated that community impact, involvement and 
associations are important to capture management’s accountability for periodic 
performance and social impacts.  Specific items mentioned related to 
community and government consultation and level of community involvement 
and engagement.  Disciplines related to community involvement were listed as 
sociology. 
The responses indicate a belief that the current financial reporting system and its 
emphasis on economic data is not considered broad enough to capture or report on an 
organisation’s activities or social impact.  As one respondent from the property 
industry commented: 
“Corporate social reporting helps indicate the value of a company’s intangibles – 
a significant component of enterprise value.” 
 
6.9 Current practice of reporting of social reporting 
Question 10 asked respondents if their organisation currently reports social 
information.  Seventy percent of organisations do report social information as shown 
in the Chart Four.   
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6.9.1 Reasons for engaging in social reporting 
Respondents were also asked to explain why their organisation engages in social 
reporting.  Generally, responses fell into the categories as shown in Table 12: 
Table 12: Why the organisation engages in social reporting: 
Reason Number of responses 
Transparency and accountability to stakeholders 18 
Reputation – Good Corporate Citizen 13 
Right thing to do – social responsibility 10 
Employee recruitment and retention 10 
Social license to operate 6 
Longer-term value/sustainability 3 
Public relations 3 
 
6.9.1.1   Transparency and accountability 
Transparency and accountability to stakeholders was an issue identified by a number 
of respondents as a reason for why their organisation produced a social report.  Several 
respondents stated that social reporting was undertaken to be more broadly 
accountable and that transparency was a vital part of accountability.  As one 
respondent from the Food and Household industry stated: 
“To be open, transparent and fully accountable.  To meet the needs set out in 
our mission in a sustainable way.  To educate our stakeholders about the broad 
Graph 4: Does your firm currently report social information? 
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range of activities our business is engaged in and the initiatives it is 
undertaking.” 
 
This was built upon by another respondent from the Industrial sector who stated that 
they produced a social report: 
“… as a vehicle to collate a broad spectrum of company activities, priorities 
and actions into an information brief for key stakeholders.  Our stakeholders 
are a diverse group from local residents to shareholders, government, and 
customers, suppliers and employees.  The AR Sustainability is directed at them 
and to complement other reports.” 
 
It was recognised by respondents that transparency improves performance and social 
performance is important to business health.    One respondent in the transport 
industry pointed out that “transparency builds trust with stakeholders whilst another 
respondent from the mining industry stated that it builds support, trust and 
transparency amongst our stakeholders.”   
6.9.1.2   Reputation - Good corporate citizen 
A number of respondents stated that a prime reason for producing a social report was a 
commitment to being a good corporate citizen.  As a respondent involved with 
wholesale manufacturing machinery stated “We are a good corporate citizen and we 
want our stakeholders to know that” whilst another stated that it is “part of our values 
and commitment to being a good corporate citizen”.  A further respondent in the 
electricity utility sector stated that the organisation has a desire to be well respected 
within community and this was a driver for engaging in social reporting. 
Another respondent involved in the defence sector went further and stated that 
companies have a responsibility to be a good corporate citizen and social reporting 
demonstrated they were meeting this responsibility.  As one respondent in the tourism 
industry stated: 
“It believes it has a responsibility to all stakeholders to take a more direct 
involvement and definite involvement in improving the various aspects of the 
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communities in which the company operates. i.e. gives back to the 
community.” 
 
Several respondents also stated that they reported social information to strengthen 
their corporate reputation and therefore their standing as a good corporate citizen. 
”It is part of our overall performance.  It is an effective vehicle for 
communication with many stakeholders.  It is part of our reputation which is 
most important to us.” (Respondent from the Mining sector) 
 
As another respondent replied a social report is produced to enhance the positive 
image of the company and hence its reputation. 
6.9.13   Social responsibility– Right thing to do 
A number of respondents stated that a driver behind the decision to report social 
information was that the organisation was a member of society and it had an obligation 
to act responsibly. As one respondent from a large employer in the gambling and 
entertainment sector stated: 
“…a part of doing the right thing and looking after the well-being of our 
customers, employees and the communities in which we operate.” 
Respondents showed that they believed the organisation had a distinct and important 
role in society, part of which included acting in a responsible manner on more than 
just a financial sense. As one respondent from the energy industry stated the impact of 
an organisation is greater than its economic impact and social reporting offers the 
opportunity to demonstrate involvement in these issues. Finally, as one respondent 
from a large employer in the food and household industry stated “it is ethically and 
morally the right thing to do.” 
6.9.1.4   Employee recruitment and retention 
Employee, recruitment and retention, was listed by several respondents as a factor in 
the organisation engaging in social reporting.  Organisations are increasingly 
reorganising the importance of staff because intellectual capital is becoming an 
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increasingly important component of the value of a company, and the quality of an 
organisation’s human resources is paramount (Ernst & Young, 2002). Social reporting 
was seen as important in building employee belief in the business and in the 
organisation’s ability to attract talent as recognized by a respondent from the 
information and communication technology industry: 
“…as the workforce changes ..with move to Gen Y and Gen Millennium, 
social factors will be vital in attracting employees to a brand.  We believe it is 
important to build now for the future.” 
 
Another respondent from a public utility employer stated that “we are also seeing 
more interest in our social responsibility performance from perspective employees.”  
Yet another respondent from the financial services industry stated that they engaged in 
social reporting as it was a “good way of reporting to our employees and engaging and 
motivating them in our community initiatives.” 
“An organisation’s ability to attract and retain talented people is now crucial. 
High quality staff are seen to tend towards choosing organisations that have 
similar values and ethics to themselves.” 
 
6.9.1.5   Social license to operate 
Several respondents recognised that the organisation’s continued viability was 
dependent on societal acceptance of their business and stated that a prime driver for 
social reporting was to demonstrate values that would ensure continuation of their 
license to operate.  As one respondent from a water utility employer stated: “to build 
and maintain social license and mandate”.  Another respondent from the Industrial 
sector elaborated on this issue stating: 
“Social reporting makes good business sense.  Our ‘social license’ to operate 
comes from the communities in which we operate, government, regulators, 
NGOs, JVPs, customers and employees.  Social reporting demonstrates our 
efforts in identifying and managing social issues and impacts of our operations, 
provides the appropriate information to stakeholders to grant our social license 
to operate and grow.  It also signals to investors/shareholders that all business 
risks (including social and environmental) are being identified, measured and 
reported.” 
 154
 
Respondents showed that they believed that wider social reporting was necessary to 
demonstrate to shareholders and to broader stakeholder groups that the organisation is 
responsible.  As one respondent from the gambling and entertainment industry stated: 
“We have a government license to operate but what we require to be successful 
is a social license.  Consumers and non-consumers need to trust our product 
mix, approve of our methods and see us participating in their community in a 
positive way.” 
 
This was supported by another respondent from a large employer in the mining 
industry who saw that a large and diverse stakeholder group needed to be provided 
with information to ensure the on-going operations of the organisation. 
“We have a large and diverse stakeholder base with a strong interest in 
company performance, social and environmental impact.  Social reporting 
assists us in developing and maintaining our license to operate, particularly in 
developing countries.” 
  
6.9.1.6   Longer term value/sustainability 
Social reporting was seen by some respondents as a strategy or requirement for longer 
term financial performance. Social performance and reporting was seen as important 
to business wealth. 
  
6.9.1.7   Public relations 
Only a small number of respondents stated public relations was a driver for social 
reporting. One respondent in the transport industry identified the social report was 
used to enhance the positive image of the company. 
 
In summary, respondents recognised that their organisations’ impacts on society is 
broad and they are a vital part of society with one respondent in the energy industry 
stating that their organisation engaged in social reporting because “we understand our 
impacts are greater than economic impacts and sustainability reporting offers us an 
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opportunity to show that we understand issues and respond to these issues”.  Another 
respondent from a large organisation from the food and household industry also 
recognised the impact of their organisation on society and the need to participate in 
social issues, stating: 
“Being a world-wide operation, the company is faced with a myriad of social 
issues.  Social reporting enables the company to balance much of the debate.” 
 
Social reporting was engaged in as organisations believed it was important for the 
longer-term viability of the organisation.  It was seen by a respondent from the 
property industry as part of “a sustainability platform which existed to drive long term 
financial performance. 
“We have a genuine commitment to social responsibility, acknowledging that we 
are reliant on our neighbouring communities facilitating and resourcing our 
business plus ultimately providing our markets.  Reporting provides the 
opportunity to show case our values.”  (Respondent from the agriculture 
business) 
 
However it was also stated by several respondents that their social reporting was in its 
infancy and was an area that they were currently investigating further to refine their 
social reporting.  One respondent stated that 2007 was the first year that they had 
provided a section in their annual report on corporate social responsibility.  Another 
respondent from the financial services industry stated: 
“We are only just starting to engage more strategically in this arena now, i.e. we 
have always operated responsibly (and tick most boxes) but have not reported on 
this as such.  The non-financial section of our annual report is larger this year 
and should plans proceed grow in the future.  We are in a research and planning 
phase and need to improve our data collection techniques for future reporting.” 
 
6.10 Qualitative comments from Face-to-face Interviews 
Ten face-to-face interviews were held with respondents to the mail survey who 
indicated they were willing to elaborate on the issues covered in the postal survey.  
The interviewees emphasised the following issues: 
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6.10.1 Importance of social responsibility to employee retention and recruitment  
Interviewees raised the issue that employees today have higher expectations about the 
social responsibility of the organisation for which they are working.  They want to be 
working for an organisation that is demonstrably a good corporate citizen.  As one 
interviewee stated: 
“The business is no more than a collection of the individuals (employees) that 
make up the business and if those people aren’t the right people or aren’t 
motivated to do the right thing then you don’t have a business do you?  Or you 
don’t have a very successful business.” 
 
This was reflected in a number of the organisations emphasising that social 
responsibility and reporting was a part of a motivation system for staff and was often a 
response from the staff themselves.  Interviewees gave numerous examples of 
community or social programs that their organisations were involved in, the genesis of 
which came from the employees. 
Social responsibility was particularly seen as important in attracting new younger 
staff, particularly given the current skills crisis, particularly among highly trained staff.  
As one interviewee stated: 
“Generation Y and later generations demand to work for a responsible 
organisation.  We are in the battle now for the heart and minds of future 
workers.” 
 
6.10.2   Importance of local communities 
In discussing the relevant stakeholders for their organisations, interviewees 
emphasised the importance of the different local communities with which they are 
involved.   They stated that rather than general community as a stakeholder, local 
communities were of most importance.   
6.10.3   Need for transparent reporting 
The interviewees emphasised the need for transparent and consistent reporting of 
social information. 
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“There’s an inherent competitive advantage to us being as transparent as we 
can and as complete as we can and as robust as we can and to have as many 
external measures of assurance and verification to make us preferred in the 
marketplace.” 
 
Interviewees expressed the view that whilst social reporting is growing in importance 
and robustness that it is still in the development stage. 
 
6.11 Conclusion 
The descriptive statistics have shown that respondents believe that stakeholders should 
be identified, that social information and the reporting of social information to 
stakeholders is important.  Respondents identified a number of reasons for reporting 
social information.  They also showed that they believe current financial reporting 
systems are insufficient in capturing the impact of an organisations activities and 
social impact and identified a number of other disciplines and associations they 
believed necessary to capture this impact. 
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Chapter Seven:  Discussion and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the responses to the questionnaire were presented using 
descriptive statistics.  This chapter discusses further the firm-stakeholder interaction 
and the issue of whether management of organisations believe the identification of 
stakeholders in relation to social reporting is important as well as what groups of 
stakeholders are considered important..  It was found that management believe the 
identification of stakeholders is important to the organisation and that employees are 
considered the most important stakeholder group.  In addition, the motivations 
underlying a decision by management to report social information to stakeholders is 
investigated.  The motivations were derived from the literature that explain or identify 
how management does or should respond to stakeholder information needs.  Support 
was found for the motivations derived from the literature in decisions by management 
to report social information.  Finally, it was found that management believe that 
current financial reporting is too limited to fully capture the organisation’s activities 
and social impact and further disciplines or associations relating to human capital, 
environmental science and impact and community impact are required.  This chapter 
discusses each of these issues in turn. 
7.2 Stakeholder importance and identification 
Traditionally it has been held that shareholders are the owners of the business and the 
role of business in society is to maximise the wealth of its shareholders.  This view 
was espoused by people such as Milton Freidman (1962) but has become to be 
considered too restrictive.  There is some evidence to support the notion that 
corporations are considered to be a member of society and as such have a social 
responsibility to a broader range of parties or stakeholders. 
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The initial research question addressed in this study is to establish whether managers 
of organisations believe the identification of stakeholders to the organisation is 
important, and if so, identify which stakeholder or stakeholder group(s) are perceived 
most important to the organisation in reporting social information 
Stakeholders can include a wide range of people and interest groups with some kind of 
involvement with the organisation.  Specifically, a stakeholder can be identified as 
“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organisation’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p.46).  Previous research has identified a 
range of different stakeholders groups including shareholders, customers, suppliers, 
employees, community, government, creditors and others (Freeman, 1984; Tilt, 2004, 
Bakan and Burke, 2005).   
However, the degree of stakeholder influence varies.  Not all stakeholders or 
stakeholder groups are considered equal.  Clarkson (1995) categorised stakeholders 
into two types: primary and secondary.  Primary stakeholders are those that participate 
in progressing the survival of an organistion and include shareholders, investors, 
employees, customers, suppliers and communities.  Secondary stakeholders are 
classified as people who affect the organisation and are affected by it, but are not as 
important as the primary stakeholders and include groups such as the media and 
special interest groups. 
There are two perspectives to stakeholder theory: (1) a moral (normative perspective; 
and (2) a positive (managerial) perspective.  The moral (normative) perspective argues 
that all stakeholders have a right to be treated fairly by an organisation, and that issues 
of stakeholder power are not directly relevant.  That is, regardless of whether 
stakeholder management leads to improved financial performance, managers should 
manage the organisation for the benefit of all stakeholders (Deegan, 2009).  The 
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positive perspective of stakeholder theory attempts to explain why management will 
meet the expectations of certain stakeholders, typically those in a position of power 
and influence.   
Respondents were initially asked if the identification of stakeholders was important to 
the organisation.  A descriptive analysis showed that eighty-seven per cent of 
respondents considered stakeholder identification important with a mean score of 4.2.  
This provides support for the notion that an organisation is considered to play an 
important role in society and has a broader responsibility to society.  This leads to the 
issue of which stakeholders are considered by management of the organisation to be 
important in reporting of social information. 
In this study, and derived from the literature, eleven stakeholder or stakeholder groups 
were identified and respondents were asked to identify the importance each 
stakeholder or stakeholder group.  The eleven stakeholder and stakeholder groups 
identified were Consumers, Employees, Suppliers, Finance Providers, Shareholders, 
Regulators, Government, Professional Groups, Community, Lobby Groups and Media.  
Which stakeholder or stakeholder groups are perceived by management of an 
organisation as important will lead to better understanding of what information is 
relevant and requires disclosure.  
Respondents were asked to identify the importance of the eleven stakeholder groups to 
the organisation and Table 13 presents the descriptive analysis of percentage 
agreement and mean. 
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Table 13: Stakeholder Group Importance – ranked by mean 
 
Stakeholder Group 
 
Percentage 
Agreement 
 
Mean 
 
Standard  
Deviation 
Employees 94.4% 4.48 0.603 
Shareholders 85.0% 4.21 0.870 
Regulators 85.2% 4.16 0.822 
Community 83.3% 4.15 0.795 
Consumers 84.9% 4.15 0.822 
Government 81.4% 4.14 0.818 
Media 69.5% 3.83 0.826 
Suppliers 65.7% 3.77 0.871 
Lobby Groups 62.0% 3.66 0.909 
Finance Providers 54.7% 3.57 0.959 
Professional Groups 52.7% 3.48 0.848 
 
The key stakeholders recognised by the management of organisations were employees, 
shareholders, regulators, community, consumers and government.  This lends support 
to the typology of classification of primary and secondary stakeholders as developed 
by Clarkson (1995). 
Statistical analysis was conducted to determine if there were any significant differences 
on question 6 Importance of differing stakeholders according to the three descriptors of 
Industry, Annual Revenue and Employees.  Oil/Gas industry respondents showed 
significant difference by industry.  Respondents were more widely spread on their ranking 
of the importance of Community in regard to social reporting with 50% of respondents’ 
ranking the Community as Unimportant or Very Unimportant.  Whilst there were only a 
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small number of respondents from this industry the difference may be due to the issue of 
local community versus general community identified by respondents.  Respondents and 
follow-up interviews highlighted the importance of local communities rather than the 
community in general.  It was felt that local communities were more important as it is 
local communities that are more directly impacted by an organisation’s operations.  Good 
relationships with the local community were seen to be important.  The Oil/Gas industry 
typically has its major operations in remote areas and the impact on their operations is 
therefore not as directly felt by local communities.  Therefore this industry may not 
consider community to be as important as other stakeholder groups. 
Employees were considered to be the most important stakeholder with approximately 
ninety-five per cent agreement and a mean of 4.48.  Employees also had the lowest 
standard deviation at 0.603 indicating a higher level of agreement among all 
respondents then for the other stakeholder groups identified. 
Two reasons are put forward as to why employees were considered a key stakeholder.   
First, in-line with arguments presented by Kaplan and Norton (2004), intellectual 
capital is an important component of the value of a company and the quality of an 
organisation’s employees or human resources is a critical element of this.  An 
organisation’s ability to attract, recruit and retain talented staff is crucial.  During 
interviews with management of organisations it was stated by several respondents that 
to attract staff their organisation must be, and be seen to be, socially responsible.  High 
quality personnel are seen to have the luxury of choosing which organisation they will 
work for and are perceived to choose organisations that have similar values and ethics 
to themselves (Ernst & Young, 2002).   
Second, ranking of employees as the key stakeholder could relate to a reported labour 
shortage in Australia.  Research by the Department of Education, Employment and 
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Workplace Relations (DEEWR) has found there to be a skill shortage in Australia.  
The report states: 
“Skill shortages were widespread prior to the global recession in mid to late 
2008, and were evident across a range of professions and technical and trades 
occupations.  ……. Shortages in a number of occupations have persisted for 
much of the past decade.  ……. 
Over the nine months to June 2010 there were strong signs of a recovery in 
demand for skills and shortages became more widespread.”  (DEEWR, 2010, 
p.7) 
 
Identifying employees as a key stakeholder to be addressed in reporting would appear 
to explicitly recognise that the value of the organisation is dependent on the 
relationship of the organisation with its staff. 
Whilst employees were ranked the highest key stakeholder, five other stakeholder 
groups were also ranked highly, these being: shareholders, regulators, community, 
consumers and government.  Ullmann (1985) proposed that a stakeholder’s power in 
relation to the organisation is a factor influencing their perceived importance and 
disclosure.  The five other stakeholders ranked highly by respondents may all be 
considered to fit the definition of stakeholder power.  Shareholders are the owners of 
the organisation and the primary provider of capital.  Regulators and government have 
the ability to intervene via legislation and penalise organisations that act 
inappropriately.  Consumers are directly relevant to the on-going viability of the 
organisation’s activities or business.   
Community also was highly ranked when compared to other groups suggesting that it 
had influence on social reporting practices.  This outcome was similar to other studies 
where community was seen as a central focus for companies to secure their business 
operations (see Adams 2002, Wilmhurst 2002).  This finding was also supported by 
respondents in face-to-face interviews.  In discussing community, interviewees 
emphasised the importance of the different local communities with which they are 
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involved rather then a general community stakeholder.  They stated that rather then 
general community as a stakeholder, local communities were of most importance.  A 
particular focus of the organisations was on serving their surrounding communities, to 
respond to the local community demands and to ensure on-going perceived 
legitimation of their business operations. 
In contrast to important stakeholder groups, Professional Groups, Finance providers 
and Suppliers were considered to be of lower importance.  This result indicates that in 
the area of social disclosures, the role of suppliers and finance providers is not 
considered critical.  Suppliers and finance providers are typically considered to be 
among the group of primary stakeholders (Cooper, 2004) and therefore important.  
These findings suggest that suppliers and finance providers, along with professional 
groups, are not perceived by respondents as important to the organisation as other 
specified stakeholder groups. 
7.3 Organisational motivations for social reporting 
Respondents were asked if their organisation currently reports social information and, 
if so, what were the reasons.  Over seventy percent of respondents stated they do 
report social information.  In question five respondents were asked how important 
motivations identified from the literature are in a decision to report social information 
to stakeholders.   
The main reason for reporting social information was stated to be transparency and 
accountability to stakeholders.  Accountability reflects a perceived responsibility to 
provide information, suggesting that one party has a duty to provide an account for his 
or her actions to another party and that that other party has a right to receive this 
statement of account.  In its broadest sense, accountability can be referred to as the 
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giving and demanding of reasons for conduct (Roberts and Scapens, 1985).  As one 
respondent from the food and household industry stated: 
“To be open, transparent and fully accountable.  To meet the needs set out 
in our mission is a sustainable way.  To educate our stakeholders about the 
broad range of activities our business is engaged in and the initiatives it is 
undertaking.” 
 
This finding was supported by responses to question five where the most important 
motivations in a decision to report social information were found to be as follows: 
Table 14: Motivations for reporting social reporting: Top ranked responses 
Motivation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Stakeholder groups have a right to be informed about the 
activities undertaken by the firm. 
4.17 0.588 
Corporations should take into account concerns of 
stakeholders, other than shareholders, when making 
decisions. 
4.16 0.569 
Social reporting enhances accountability to stakeholders. 4.10 0.655 
 
In addition, interviews with respondents identified a need for transparent and 
consistent reporting of social information. 
Two other leading reasons in a decision to report social information were reputation or 
being a good corporate citizen and social responsibility or the ‘right thing to do’.  
Respondents showed that they believed the organisation had a distinct and important 
role in society, part of which included acting in a responsible manner on more than 
just a financial sense. As one respondent stated the impact of an organisation is greater 
than economic impact and social reporting offers the opportunity to demonstrate 
involvement in these issues.  As one respondent from the tourism industry stated: 
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“It believes it has a responsibility to all stakeholders to take a more direct 
involvement and definite involvement in improving the various aspects of 
the communities in which the company operates. i.e. gives back to the 
community.” 
 
Several respondents also stated that they reported social information to strengthen 
their corporate reputation and therefore their standing as a good corporate citizen. 
From the above findings, it seems that both legitimacy and stakeholder theory play a 
role in social reporting practices in Australia, although this still needs further 
refinement.  Both theories can be used to explain the practice, but other possibilities 
for other theories should not be neglected.  Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995) emphasise 
that social reporting is a complex activity that cannot be fully explained from a single 
theoretical perspective or from a single level of resolution. 
One further reason identified by respondents in producing social information reports 
was employee recruitment and retention.  Social reporting was seen as important in 
building employee belief in the business and in the organisation’s ability to attract 
talent.  This supports the ranking of employees as the most important stakeholder 
group. 
Tests of significance found differences relating to three statements – refer to page 139.  
Results found that larger employers showed stronger support for the following: 
• That stakeholder groups have a right to be informed about the activities of the 
firm; 
• That social reporting enhances accountability to stakeholders; and 
• That better management and reporting of a company’s social issues benefits 
shareholders. 
The above results were expected on the basis of previous literature which showed that 
corporate size is a decisive factor in relation to corporate social disclosures (Dieikes & 
Coppock, 1978; Trotman & Bradley, 1981; Cowen et al, 1987).  Larger companies tend to 
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receive greater attention from the general public, media and regulators and therefore are 
under greater pressure to exhibit social responsibility.  Management of larger 
organisations appear to have recognised that their companies have a greater accountability 
to society and hence a responsibility to report to a broader range of stakeholders. 
7.4 Social report disclosure rankings 
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with a list of proposed social 
disclosures as developed by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).  The GRI began in 
1997-1998 as the creation of the Coalition for Environmentally Friendly Economies 
(CERES) organisation.  A Steering Committee was formed to develop the GRI 
concept.  The GRI has been an ongoing development since 1999 with two 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines published in 2002 and 2006.  The GRI’s vision is 
that reporting on economic, environmental, and social performance by all 
organisations is as routine and comparable as financial reporting (GRI, 2002).  Over 
the period 1997-2006, the number of organisations using the guidelines to produce 
sustainability reports has increased from 20 (1999), 50 (2000), 80 (2001), 150 (2002), 
325 (2003), 500 (2004), 750 (2005), to 850+ (2006).  Although an exponential 
increase on a worldwide basis this is only scratching the surface of the total potential 
for disclosures based on the GRI system. 
A study commissioned by the Australian Council of Super Investors Inc and 
conducted by Responsible Investment Consulting produced a report entitled ‘The 
Sustainability Reporting Journey’ in June 2008 (Noble and Kotevski, 2008). Noble 
and Kotevski (2008) have identified GRI as “the most useful framework for reporting” 
and “best practice” because: 
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• The GRI framework has achieved international support and acceptance, and is 
already recognised as the most appropriate reporting framework by leading ASX 
100 companies. 
• The GRI enables investors to compare information across companies, both 
domestically and internationally.  The investor community is also involved in the 
ongoing process to develop and refine the GRI guidelines.  This means that the 
GRI framework can respond to the needs of stakeholders, including investors 
(Noble and Kotevski, 2008). 
Noble and Kotevski (2008) conclude with a number of general observations.  Most 
companies report on sustainability in some way, but performance between companies 
varies considerably; Australia is lagging behind world-wide performance with only 
16% of companies using the G3 compared to 38% of the S & P 100 index.  There are 
opportunities for improvement because 83% report at some level but only 16% use 
G3.  Of the 83 companies reporting on sustainability only 30 made clear the 
boundaries of their reporting and only 15 covered all of their activities. 
Official social disclosure standards do not exist, although the globally recognised de 
facto standards are the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines.  These deliver a framework for the principles and indicators that 
organisations can use to measure and report their economic, environmental and social 
performance (Tarrant, 2008).  The GRI is recognised as a leading format to influence 
disclosures in annual reports, however, Noble and Kotevski (2008) state there have 
been relatively few examples of analysis or critical comment in the accounting 
literature. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with a list of proposed social 
disclosures based on the GRI guidelines.  The proposed social disclosures were 
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divided into four groups, labour practices, human rights, society and product 
responsibility.  
In relation to the importance of the four broad social disclosure categories, disclosure 
of policies, procedures and management systems relating to product responsibility was 
ranked the most important of the areas with a mean of 4.02.  This was followed by 
disclosure of policies, procedures and management systems relating to society with a 
mean of 3.97.  In general respondents ranked disclosure of policies, procedures and 
management systems higher then disclosure of statistical or performance data.  The 
following sections analyse the listed disclosures under each category. 
7.4.1 Labour Disclosures 
The Labour practices group of disclsoures was divided into Employment (three 
disclosures), labour/management relations (two disclosures), health and safety (four 
disclosures), training and education (one disclosure), and diversity and opportunity 
(two disclosures).  Employment disclosures were details of the workforce, 
employment creation and employee turnover by country and region.  
Labour/Management relations listed two disclosures detailing the percentage of 
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements and policy and procedures 
relating to changes like restructuring.  Health and safety listed four disclosures relating 
to rates of injury, occupational disease and lost days and fatalities by region.  A further 
disclosure listed related to a description of formal joint health and safety committees.  
Training and education listed one disclosure relating to the hours of training per year 
per employee by employment category.  Diversity and opportunity listed two 
disclosures being a description of equal opportunity policies and programmes and 
composition of senior management and governance bodies, including male/female 
ratio. 
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Labour disclosures were not generally ranked highly by respondents indicating that 
this area was not seen as of major importance.  Only one of the twelve listed labour 
disclosures had a mean greater then 4.0, that being practices on recording and 
notification of accidents and diseases, which may be in recognition of legislative 
requirements in relation to occupational health and safety.  Three of the labour 
disclosures were not ranked important ranked by respondents with means of 3.05 or 
less and were ranked the lowest of all listed disclosures.  These three disclosures were 
percentage represented by trade unions, average employment turnover segmented by 
country/region and policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS.  One exception to this 
ranking was the Food/Household industry which ranked disclosure of policies and 
programmes for HIV/AIDS higher then other industries.  This is probably reflective of 
the sensitivity of this industry to health issues, particularly the food segment of the 
industry. 
In summary, respondents did not rank labour disclosures particularly high with the 
exception of a health and safety disclosure related to practices on recording and 
notification of accidents and diseases. 
7.4.2 Human Rights 
Human Rights disclosures were divided into two categories; strategy and management 
as well as policies procedures and management systems.  Under the strategy and 
management sub-heading were listed three disclosures, one being a description of 
policies and procedures to deal with all aspect of human rights and two related to 
investment and procurement decisions.  Within the policies, procedures and 
management systems sub-heading were listed four disclosures covering non 
discrimination, freedom of association, child labour and forced and compulsory 
labour.   
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Human rights disclosures were not ranked by respondents as very important with none 
of the listed disclosures having a mean grater then 4.00.  The majority of respondents 
were either neutral or agreed with the seven proposed disclosures, with means ranging 
from 3.43 for disclosures concerning human rights performance within the supply 
chain process to 3.92 for disclosures relating to non-discrimination.  Human rights 
disclosures were not ranked as highly as disclosures from the other three categories.  
An explanation for this result may relate to the nature of society in Australia.  Listed 
disclosures under this category such as freedom of association, child labour and forced 
and compulsory labour are not considered to be problematic or issues in Australian 
society.  Whilst respondents generally agreed with the listed seven disclosures with on 
average 67% of respondents either neutral or agreeing with the disclosures, it was not 
seen of particular importance. 
7.4.3 Society 
Three social performance indicators relating to disclosure of policies, procedures and 
management systems to society were listed, divided into impacts of operations on 
communities, bribery and corruption and political lobbying and contributions.   
Society disclosures in general were ranked second to product responsibility by 
respondents.  Disclosure of the organisation’s impact of operations on local 
communities was ranked as the most important of the listed disclosures with a mean of 
4.09.  This was reinforced in interviews with respondents where interviewees 
highlighted the importance of local communities to the organisation.  This also 
supports the finding in question five where community was ranked as one of the 
important stakeholder groups.   
The disclosure of policies, procedures and management systems relating to bribery and 
corruption was also considered to be important to very important to respondents with a 
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mean of 4.00.  This probably reflects that corporate bribery has been an issue for 
businesses worldwide as well as Australia in recent years with scandals such as 
Lockheed, BAE Systems, Siemens AG, Kellogg Brown & Root, Lucent Technologies 
and AWB.  This would also be in line with expectations under legitimacy theory. 
7.4.4 Product responsibility 
Three disclosures relating to product responsibility divided between customer health 
and safety, product information and labelling and consumer privacy.  Respondents 
considered the product responsibility disclosures to be the most important of the three 
disclosures areas with a mean of 4.02.  This could well be a reflection that product 
responsibility, in particular health and safety, is the subject of legislation in most 
developed economies including Australia.  The presence of such legislation would 
highlight the importance of such disclosures to organisations. 
Two of the three disclosures, customer health and safety and product information and 
labelling, were ranked by respondents as of equal greatest importance in the ranking of 
the twenty-five listed disclosures with means of 4.09.  Eighty-four percent of 
respondents considered the disclosure of customer health and safety to be either 
important or very important; whilst eighty-one percent considered product information 
and labelling to be either important or very important. 
In the last few years, a small number of Australian companies and various levels of 
government authorities have begun to include GRI-influenced information in their 
formal annual reporting. As at September 2008 there are eight Australian 
organizations which are members of GRI and provided a separate GRI report using G3 
disclosures. Three have been checked by GRI, two have been self declared compliant, 
two are undeclared and one has been checked by a third party. Six of these eight have 
used all relevant GRI disclosures in their reports (Mathews et al, 2010). 
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When it comes to the different GRI categories, there has been significant use of the 
GRI templates on the environmental impact of a firm’s activities, but much less take-
up of reporting for the GRI categories of Labour, Human Rights, Society, and Product 
Responsibility.  However, respondents to this study have indicated that disclosure of 
social information is important and this was found to be the case across all industry 
types.  Five of the twenty-five listed disclosures were considered to be either important 
or very important with means greater then 4.00.  The disclosures considered of 
greatest importance were: 
• Labour Health and Safety: Practices on recording and notification of labour 
accidents and disesases; 
• Society: Impact of operations on local communities; 
• Product Responsibility: Customer health and safety; 
• Product Responsibility: Product information and labeling; and 
• Society: Bribery and corruption. 
Four of the above types of disclosures are all the subject of specific legislative 
requirements, the exception being impact of operations on local communities.  This 
lends support to the notion that such disclosures are considered necessary in 
demonstrating compliance and thus contributing to the organisational legitimacy.   
7.4.5 Further disclosures 
Respondents were asked to list any further social disclosures they felt should be 
included in a social report.  Whilst there was support for a number of the disclosures 
as above, one-third of all respondents listed further items for disclosure.  This 
indicates a high level of interest in such disclosures, supports the views expressed that 
identification of stakeholders and their needs is important but also there are limitations 
with the sort of disclosures required by the GRI guidelines.  As one respondent  from 
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the property industry stated the GRI disclosures “are relevant for organisations that; 
(a) are global, (b) manufacture consumer products, and /or (c) operate by exploiting 
cheap labour.  These issues are all justifiable but are general in nature.”  Relevant 
social issues to the organisation needed to be disclosed in a social report.  As another 
respondent from the property industry stated the “challenge here is the ‘one size fits 
all”.  Reports needed to be relevant to the organisation and “not padded out with stuff 
that’s clearly irrelevant e.g. human rights for companies operating exclusively in 
Australia under Australian Law.” 
The items listed for further disclosure by respondents were categorised under the 
following three headings: 
1. Resource usage or environmental footprint 
2. Community support, including philanthropy 
3. Non-compliance with relevant laws/regulation. 
Resource usage or usage footprint is an extension of environmental reporting and is 
reflective of the increased societal expectations and discussion around carbon 
emissions and energy usage.  In recent years issues around using energy more 
efficiently, pollution control, waste minimisation, recycling and generally protecting 
and improving the environment have been prominent and calls for greater disclosure 
of information on these issues have been made.  Respondents recognition of disclosure 
of this type of information is probably a response to societal expectations and lends 
support to the notion of legitimacy theory. 
Community support, including philanthropy included donations to community 
activities, charities and other institutions.  Interestingly, respondents considered that 
local communities were the most important to identify.  General community support 
was considered important, however, local communities were seen as more critical then 
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a general community involvement or support.  Such support was seen as important in 
order to maintain legitimacy or the social contract with society. 
Non compliance with laws was listed as an issue that should be disclosed including 
details of any prosecutions or fines.  Such aspects were seen as evidence of the 
organisation’s compliance, or non-compliance, with its role as a member of society.  
Existence of such disclosures would highlight an organisations non-compliance with 
its contract with society. 
The GRI approach while having basic support from respondents would appear to need 
further strengthening by the development of standards and a cohesive framework that 
focuses on principles and systems. rather then a checklist disclosure approach. 
The need for standards has been accepted by the Chief Executive of the GRI who 
recently stated that: 
“Without standardised information, investors and the financial markets 
will be unable to integrate environmental factors into their decision 
making” (O’Connor, J., 2008). 
 
However, to date GRI has not produced standards of an accounting type.  The current 
president of CPA Australia supports the development of standards for non-financial 
disclosures: 
 
“Environmental impact, community building and the like, are all issues 
that businesses will increasingly have to factor in as key components of 
their overall performance. 
 
How best to do this is a question the corporate world is still grappling 
with.  It is absolutely critical that the accounting profession is intimately 
engaged in the development of rigorous non-financial reporting standards 
if they’re to be successfully implemented.” (Malley, 2008). 
 
A cohesive and comprehensive set of disclosures or standards is required to ensure 
that social reporting by organisations is capable of comparison both over time and 
between organisations.  The development of a conceptual framework for social 
 176
reporting is required.  The GRI disclosures are an attempt in part to achieve this but 
further development and refinement is required. 
7.5 Adequacy of current financial reporting 
Current financial reporting has a long tradition and has been one of the main means by 
which organisations interact with their external stakeholders.  However, the current 
system has a number of limitations in reflecting the totality of the organisation’s 
operations and impact.  Financial reporting is focussed on financial measures which 
provide a limited picture of the total business operations and impacts.  Kaplan and 
Norton (2004) identify a significant limitation of financial reporting as relating to 
intangibles, arguing that when nearly eighty percent of business assets consist of 
intellectual capital and where financial reports focus only on the twenty percent 
tangible assets, that the accuracy and efficacy of these reports are called into question.   
Respondents were asked if they believed that current financial reporting of 
predominantly economic data is sufficiently broad enough to capture the impact of a 
company’s activities and social impact.  Seventy-five percent of respondents disagreed 
that financial reporting was sufficient.  As one respondent stated: 
“Financial reporting is currently adequate for the company’s financial 
activities – but gives very little on overall activities and social impact.” 
 
This was supported by another respondent who stated that “financial information alone 
doesn’t provide an insight into the effects the company’s activities has on the 
community, stakeholders, etc”.  
Disclosure of social information was not seen as replacing the current financial 
reporting system but as complementary.  As one respondent stated: 
“We publish both an annual report – predominantly financial and economic 
information plus an annual sustainability report – both are appropriate.” 
 
 177
Social reporting was also seen to add support or value to financial reporting.  Current 
financial reporting is dominated by measures of financial outcomes but increasing 
societal expectations around environmental and social responsibilities are applying 
pressure on organisations to report clearer information on a wider range of business 
activities (ICAA, 2008).    Public awareness of the importance of environmental and 
social information is evident.  Graduates are enquiring about an organisation’s social 
policies in interviews, employee retention is becoming increasingly important for 
many organisations, and consumers are taking greater interest in the goods and 
services provided by organisations as to their impacts on society  (ICAA, 2008).  
These factors have been recognised by respondents as factors that need addressing.  
Social reports are seen to respond to these pressures in a manner in which financial 
reporting cannot. 
Annual financial reports are regulated by legislation which is highly prescriptive and 
therefore has limited ability to inform on social impacts of organisations.  Therefore, 
the social disclosures in annual reports are considered limited when compared with the 
social responsibility activities that the organisations have undertaken. 
Wilmhurst and Frost (2000, p. 17) reflected a similar view stating that “… annual 
reports are time consuming and costly to produce, and companies must rationalise the 
competing demands for space while there is also much other information likely to 
exist…”.  This supports the notion that other media are often used to supplement the 
annual financial reporting system and provide social information (Tilt, 1994).  
Respondents generally believed that social reporting was important but should 
complement the traditional financial report with one respondent stating that “a separate 
annual social responsibility report should be issued with the annual report and freely 
available to all stakeholders.” 
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7.6 Multi-disciplinary approach to reporting 
Capra (1982) has been critical of economics and current financial reporting stating that 
most economists fail to recognise that the economy is merely one aspect of a whole 
ecological and social fabric.  He argues that economists tend to dissociate the economy 
from this fabric, in which it is embedded, and to describe it in terms of simplistic and 
highly unrealistic models.  The only values appearing in current economic models are 
those that can be quantified by being assigned monetary weightings.  Capra (1982) 
argues that this emphasis on quantification gives economics the appearance of an exact 
science, whilst at the same time severely restricting the scope of economic theories by 
‘excluding qualitative distinctions that are crucial to understanding the ecological, 
social, and psychological dimensions of economic activity.’  (p. 198)  The orientation 
of these economic models, Capra argues, is the pursuit of economic growth which is 
typically defined as purely quantitative in terms of maximisation of production.  He 
further states that since the conceptual framework of economics is ill suited to account 
for the social and environmental costs generated by all economic activity, economists 
have tended to ignore these costs, labelling them ‘external’ variables that do not fit 
into their theoretical models.   
Accounting is often considered in a constrained systems perspective, as part of an 
economic system, but accounting also interacts with social, political and ethical 
systems and is directly related to organisational systems and their interactions with 
individuals, groups, societies and nations.  Gray et al (1996, p. 14) state that 
conventional accounting ignores these interactions and accordingly social accounting 
must attempt to account for these missing elements.  Capra (1982, p. 247) states a new 
theory, or set of models, is likely to involve a systems approach that will ‘integrate 
biology, psychology, political philosophy, and several other branches of human 
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knowledge, together with economics, into a broad ecological framework.”  While 
some organisations use the current financial reporting system to communicate aspects 
of their activity, not just their financial performance, there is scope for all 
organisations to supplement their financial performance reporting with greater 
explanation of strategy, value drivers and other performance data critical to 
understanding the organisation’s success and prospects (ICAA, 2008). 
Question nine asked those who believed that financial reporting was inadequate to 
capture the impact of an organisation’s activities and social impact to list what other 
disciplines or associations they believed was necessary to capture management’s 
accountability for periodic performance and social impacts.  Responses to this 
question identified three areas or disciplines: 
1. Human Capital 
2. Environmental science and impact 
3. Community impact. 
7.6.1. Human capital 
Associations with human capital or labour were considered important to capture 
management’s accountability for periodic performance and social impacts.  
Associations listed included job creation, worker safety, traineeships and cadetships 
offered, employee satisfaction and turnover, staff diversity and employee training 
programs.  This supports the earlier finding of employees as the most important 
stakeholder group.  It appears that the human capital of the organisation is seen by 
respondents as a major resource of the organisation that current reporting does not 
adequately address. 
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7.6.2 Environmental science and impact 
Environmental science and environmental management experts were considered by 
respondents to be a necessary discipline to capture management’s accountability for 
periodic performance and social impacts.  The environmental impact and 
environmental performance needed to be measured and reported on in terms of carbon 
footprint, eco efficiency, etc.  Certain aspects of environmental impacts are currently 
included in financial reporting but these are limited and it is an area where further 
disclosure is considered important. 
7.6.3 Community impact 
Community impact, involvement and associations were considered  important by 
respondents to capture management’s accountability for periodic performance and 
social impacts.  Specific items mentioned related to community and government 
consultation and level of community involvement and engagement.  Disciplines 
related to community involvement were listed as sociology.  This supports the earlier 
finding that communities, in particular local communities, are considered to be a very 
important stakeholder. 
 
In summary it was found that respondents believed that current financial reporting is 
not sufficient to capture the impact of the organisation’s impact on society.  Limited 
additional suggestions for further disclosures or disciplines to be included were 
suggested which is indicative of the difficulty in establishing a broad based reporting 
system.  However there was a belief that other disciplines or associations need to be 
included in a social report.  The difficulty of establishing a cohesive and multi-
discipline approach to social reporting was summed up by one respondent involved in 
manufacturing who stated that such reporting should include “whatever disciplines are 
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necessary for the management of the organisation and to increase sustainable 
performance.”. 
7.7 Conclusions 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study.  First, Australian organisations 
consider the identification of stakeholders to be important with employees considered 
the most important stakeholder group.  Organisations appear to be increasingly 
recognizing the importance of employees when assessing the development of a 
corporate responsibility agenda.  This is largely because human capital is an important 
part of the value of a company, and the quality of an organisation’s human resources is 
paramount.  An organisation’s ability to attract and retain employees is critical.  
Community was also perceived as one of the most influential stakeholder groups for 
organisations in disclosing social activities.  This study found that as regards 
community, it is local communities that are most important.  In terms of a theoretical 
basis, these results suggest that legitimacy theory is applicable.  Deegan (2002) 
suggests that organisations need to adapt to community expectations if they want to be 
successful.  In contrast, organisations will be penalized if they do not operate in a 
manner consistent with community expectations or demands. 
Second, results of this study indicate that the primary motive for reporting social 
information is to be transparent and accountable to stakeholders.  According to a 
report by Ernst & Young (2002) there has been a decrease in the level of trust relating 
to corporate behavior by key stakeholder groups, resulting in an increased demand for 
transparency.  This study supports this view, finding that most organisations recognize 
that the quality of their relationships with stakeholders is important.  This lends 
support to stakeholder theory as organisations try to report social information to fulfill 
their stakeholders’ needs. 
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Third, generally respondents ranked disclosure of policies, procedures and 
management systems higher then disclosure of statistical or performance data.  The 
items considered most important to disclose were issues relating to labour health and 
safety and impact of operations on communities.  This is consistent and supports the 
identification of employees and local communities as the most important stakeholder 
groups.  Items listed for further disclosure by respondents related to resource usage or 
environmental footprint, community support, including philanthropy and non-
compliance with relevant laws/regulation. 
Finally, organisations consider that current financial reporting systems are insufficient to 
fully capture the impact of an organisation’s activities.  Financial information alone was 
not considered to provide sufficient insight into the impact of an organisation’s activities 
on stakeholders and the community.  However disclosure of social information was not 
seen as replacing the current financial reporting system but as a complementary system of 
reporting to more fully disclose aspects of the organisation’s activities not covered by the 
financial reporting system.  A broader based reporting was found to be required and 
disciplines or associations suggested to broaden the current reporting included human 
capital, environmental science and impact and community impact. 
7.8 Limitations and future research 
There are a number of limitations to this study that need to be noted.  Inherent in all 
research undertaken using a postal survey is the issue of the adequacy of the response 
rate, whether the intended recipient responds to the questionnaire, whether the 
questions are interpreted in the way intended and whether there are sufficient 
questions to gather the information sought.  These issues are reflective of the inherent 
difficulties associated with this type of research.  In addition, the questionnaire was 
developed on the basis of prior research but had not been used in previous research 
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and as a consequence has not been validated.  To mitigate these issues, extensive 
piloting testing of the questionnaire and its format was undertaken and non-structured 
interviews with a number of respondents were conducted.  In addition, non-response 
testing indicated that there were no significant differences between respondents to the 
postal survey.  This limitation raises the opportunity for future research adopting a 
case study approach to look in greater depth at the issues raised and the motivations 
identified.   
This study addresses the motivations identified by senior managers of the top 500 
organisations in Australia in a decision to report social information as well as the types 
of social information that should be reported.  Results indicate that the reporting 
decision is influenced by the different motivations but does not identify how important 
each is in the decision to report.  However, this was not the purpose of this study, and 
is likely to vary between organisations as pressures vary between organisations and 
managers may bring differing beliefs and views to the social reporting decision.  
Future research could be directed to identifying the relative importance of differing 
motivations to the social reporting decision. 
This study investigates senior management of Australian companies’ perceptions of 
which stakeholder groups influence, and what are the major motivations for, social 
information disclosures in organisations in Australia and whether current financial 
reporting practices are sufficient to capture the impact of an organisation’s activities.  
As a result this study reflects senior management perceptions or views.  This study 
could be furthered by a study that analyses differing stakeholders to identify whether 
the motives senior managers say influence the decision to report social information 
and the types of social information to be disclosed are also the perceptions of differing 
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stakeholder groups This could potentially add significantly to the field of research if 
there is significant differences between senior managers and other stakeholder groups. 
This study addressed the top 500 organisations in Australia identified from the 
Business Review Weekly list of the one thousand largest organisations as large 
organisations are generally considered more ideally to disclose social and 
environmental information (Tilt, 1997).  The measure used to determine size was total 
revenue.  The results may differ if smaller or all organisations were sampled.  
Additionally the sample was limited to Australian organisations.  The study could be 
extended to include more generally all organisations and other countries.  Management 
in different countries may approach social reporting issues in different ways due to 
influences on them.  Extending the research to other countries would also provide 
opportunity for research into possible differences in management motivations in 
different parts of the world. 
Finally, this study was carried out at a point in time.  Societal beliefs change over time 
responding to a variety of pressures that impact on members of that society, including 
organisations.  It is considered that society’s expectations of business have changed 
over time with business expected to adhere to much higher social standard today 
(BRW, 2000).  Examples of this include occupational health and safety issues as well 
as the environment.  Therefore the motivations and types of disclosure, and their 
relative importance, may change over time.  A longitudinal study would be an addition 
to research in the area. 
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Project Information Statement 
 
Project Title:   
Social Reporting and Stakeholder Determination 
 
Investigators: 
Associate Professor Kevin Adams  (PhD student)  Phone: 9925 5720   email: kevin.adams@rmit.edu.au 
Professor Max Aiken  (Senior Supervisor)   Phone: 9925 5700   email: max.aiken@rmit.edu.au 
Professor Clive Morley (Co-Supervisor)  Phone: 9925 5586   email: clive.morley@rmit.edu.au 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by RMIT University.  
This information sheet describes the project in straightforward language, or ‘plain English’.  
Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents before 
deciding whether to participate.  If you have any questions about the project, please ask 
one of the investigators. 
 
Who is involved in this research project?  Why is it being conducted? 
o This research is being conducted as part of my PhD candidature in the School of 
Accounting & Law at RMIT University.  
o The project has been approved by the RMIT Business Human Research Ethics 
Subcommittee. 
 
Why have you been approached? 
I am seeking data from the Top 500 Australian organisations, as determined on the basis 
of annual revenue/turnover, per the BRW Top 1000 list.   Your organisation has been 
approached as part of this group. 
 
What is the project about?  What are the questions being addressed? 
The project will involve an analysis of the social reporting practices of organisations.  It will 
also explore how organisations identify their stakeholders and the expectations of the 
stakeholders with regards to the organisation’s activities and performance.  I am seeking 
to understand this complex issue more fully and to obtain empirical data.  The research 
questions being investigated include:  
o How organisations identify the stakeholders to whom they will report and which 
stakeholders are considered relevant for social reporting? 
o What social information do organisations consider important to include in a social 
report? 
 
The Top 500 organisations in Australia have been invited to participate in this research. 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do? 
You are being asked to respond to a short questionnaire.  This should take at most twenty 
minutes of your time.  There is also provision at the end of the questionnaire for you to 
indicate your willingness to participate in the project in the future.  
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Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to either of my 
supervisors, Professor Max Aiken or Professor Clive Morley, whose contact details are 
included below.  Alternatively, you may contact the Secretary, Portfolio Human Research 
Ethics Sub Committee, Business Portfolio, RMIT, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, VIC 3001.  
The telephone number is (03) 9925 5594 or email address rdu@rmit.edu.au  
 
What are the benefits associated with participation? 
There is no direct benefit to you as a result of your participation, however, your 
participation in the project will contribute to the body of knowledge on corporate social 
responsibility.  The results of the study will also be of direct relevance to the increasing 
number of entities embarking on social reporting.  Knowledge of how to assess 
stakeholder expectations and how to report against such expectations will be directly 
relevant to moves towards organizational sustainability. 
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
The data collected from the questionnaire and any follow-up interviews will be kept 
confidential and seen only by the investigators named above.  It will be analysed and 
aggregated for my thesis and results may appear in publications.  The results will be 
reported in a manner which ensures your anonymity and that of your employer institution 
at all times. 
 
Any information that you provide can be disclosed only if (1) it is to protect you or others 
from harm, (2) a court order is produced, or (3) you provide the researchers with written 
permission. 
 
The research data will be kept securely at RMIT for a period of 5 years before being 
destroyed. 
 
What are my rights as a participant? 
You have the following rights in respect of this project: 
 The right to withdraw your participation at any time, without prejudice. 
 The right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed, provided it can 
be reliably identified, and provided that so doing does not increase the risk to you. 
 The right to have any questions answered at any time. 
 
Whom should I contact if I have any questions? 
Associate Professor Kevin Adams  (PhD student)  Phone: 9925 5720   email: kevin.adams@rmit.edu.au 
Professor Max Aiken  (Senior Supervisor)   Phone: 9925 5700   email: max.aiken@rmit.edu.au 
Professor Clive Morley (Co-Supervisor)  Phone: 9925 5586   email: clive.morley@rmit.edu.au 
 
The success of the project depends on your contribution and I look forward to your 
support and enclose a reply paid envelope for your convenience.  Thanking you in 
advance for your time and effort in completing the questionnaire. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
A/Prof Kevin Adams  Professor Max Aiken  Professor Clive Morley 
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Questionnaire 
 
Social Reporting and Stakeholder Determination 
 
Stakeholders are those individuals or groups to whom the company chooses to report 
information about the company’s activities.  Typically stakeholders will be perceived to 
have an effect or impact on the company and may include, for example, shareholders, 
customers, a regulatory body, etc. 
 
Social information includes all information reported to stakeholders about the social and 
environmental effects of a company’s economic actions.  As such it involves extending the 
accountability of the company beyond the traditional role of providing a financial account 
to the owners of capital, in particular, shareholders.  This information could be of a 
quantitative or qualitative nature or both.  It may be reported in the annual report, a specific 
social report, a media release or other form to achieve the company’s objectives. 
   
 
1. What industry does your firm belong to?  (please tick) 
 
     Chemical  
    Construction 
    Food and Household    
    Industrial    
    Mining   
    Oil / Gas / Petroleum    
    Transport    
    Tourism    
    Other (please specify) ______________________________ 
 
 
2. The annual revenue of your company is:  (please tick) 
 
    less than $1,000 million  
    $1,000 million to $2,000 million   
    $2,001 million to $3,000 million   
    $3,001 million to $4,000 million   
    $4,001 million to $5,000 million   
    Greater than $5,000 million   
 
 
3. The number of employees in your company is:  (please tick) 
 
    1 – 10,000 employees   
    10,001 – 20,000 employees   
    20,001 – 30,000 employees   
    30,001 - 40,000 employees   
    40,001 to 50,000 employees   
    Greater than 50,000 employees   
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4.  How important is the identification of 
stakeholders to your company? (please circle) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
5.    In a decision to report social information to stakeholder groups, indicate whether you 
agree or disagree with the following statements:  (please circle)   
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1.    Stakeholder groups have a right to be informed 
about the activities undertaken by the firm. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2.    Social reporting enhances accountability to 
stakeholders. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.    Social reporting helps ensure an informal licence to 
operate by which business survival is dictated. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.    Corporations should take into account concerns of 
stakeholders, other than shareholders, when making 
decisions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.    The long-term commercial viability of a corporation 
is dependent upon consideration of all stakeholder 
interests. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.    Social reporting is required to help overcome 
deficiencies in the current financial reporting 
framework. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.    Better management and reporting of a company’s 
social issues benefits shareholders. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.    Financial performance is more important than social 
concerns. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
9.    The interests of the shareholders and other 
stakeholders should be of equal importance to the 
company. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.  A company would be more sensitive to its social 
impacts if it was required to report on them. 1 2 3 4 5 
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11.  A company’s social information is only worthwhile 
if it is subject to independent audit. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.  Social reporting by a company is important as 
investors making investment decisions consider such 
information. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
6. How important or unimportant would each of the following stakeholders be to your 
firm in regard to reporting social information?  (please circle)   
 
 
 Very 
Unimportant 
 
Unimportant 
 
Neutral 
 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Consumers 1 2 3 4 5 
Employees 1 2 3 4 5 
Suppliers 1 2 3 4 5 
Finance providers 1 2 3 4 5 
Shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 
Regulators 1 2 3 4 5 
Government 1 2 3 4 5 
Professional Groups 1 2 3 4 5 
Community 1 2 3 4 5 
Lobby Groups 1 2 3 4 5 
Media 1 2 3 4 5 
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7.    In a company social report to stakeholders, please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with each of the proposed disclosures for your company:  (please circle)   
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Labour: Employment      
1.    Breakdown of workforce 1 2 3 4 5 
2.    Net employment creation  1 2 3 4 5 
3.    Average employment turnover segmented by 
country/region 1 2 3 4 5 
Labour: Labour/management relations      
4.    Percentage represented by trade unions 1 2 3 4 5 
5.    Policy and procedures relating to changes like 
restructuring 1 2 3 4 5 
Labour: Health and safety      
6.    Practices on recording and notification of 
accidents and diseases 1 2 3 4 5 
7.    Description of formal joint health and safety 
committees 1 2 3 4 5 
8.    Standard injury, lost days, and absence rates and 
number of fatalities 1 2 3 4 5 
9.    Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS 1 2 3 4 5 
Labour: Training and education      
10.  Hours of training per year per employee, by 
category of employee 1 2 3 4 5 
Labour: Diversity and opportunity      
11.  Description of equal opportunity policies and 
programmes 1 2 3 4 5 
12.  Composition of senior management and 
corporate governance bodies, including 
male/female ratio and so on 
1 2 3 4 5 
Human rights: Strategy and management      
13.  Description of policies, guidelines, corporate 
structure, and procedures to deal with all aspects 
of human rights 
1 2 3 4 5 
14.  Evidence of consideration of human rights 
impacts as part of investment and procurement 
decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 
15.  Description of policies and procedures to 
evaluate and address human rights performance 
within the supply chain and contractors 
1 2 3 4 5 
Human rights: Policies, procedures and 
management systems      
16.  Discrimination 1 2 3 4 5 
17.  Freedom of association 1 2 3 4 5 
18.  Child labour 1 2 3 4 5 
19.  Forced and compulsory labour 1 2 3 4 5 
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Society:  Policies, procedures and management 
systems      
20.  Impacts of operations on communities 1 2 3 4 5 
21.  Bribery and corruption 1 2 3 4 5 
22.  Political lobbying and contributions 1 2 3 4 5 
Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and 
management systems      
23.  Customer health and safety 1 2 3 4 5 
24.  Product information and labelling 1 2 3 4 5 
25.  Consumer privacy 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Please list any further disclosures that you feel should be included in a social report: 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
8. Do you believe that current financial reporting of  
predominantly economic data is sufficiently broad 
to capture the impact of a company’s activities  
and social impact.   (please circle) …………………………….    Agree     Disagree 
 
If you answered Disagree to question 8 please answer question 9, otherwise go to question 10. 
 
9. In addition to financial accounting, what other disciplines or associations do you 
believe are necessary to capture managements’ accountability for periodic 
performance and social impacts? 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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10.   Does your firm currently report social information? (please circle) ………   Yes        No 
 
11. Please explain why your firm engages in social reporting. 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
12.      Is your social report audited?  (please circle)  …………………………. Yes  No 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOLLOW-UP 
 
The enclosed card has been separated from the survey to ensure your confidentiality.  
Complete the card if you answer YES to the question below: 
 
13. Please indicate by ticking the appropriate box, your willingness to participate in any 
follow-up discussions and /or focus groups. 
 
     YES.  I am willing to discuss these issues further in a follow-up interview.  (Please 
complete details on the enclosed green sheet) 
 
    NO.  I do not wish to participate in any follow-up to this questionnaire. 
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Appendix Two:  Pre-test Instrument 
 
 
 
13 July 2007 
 
 
 
 
Dear Partcipant, 
 
I am undertaking PhD research and am currently at the stage of pilot-testing the research 
instrument intended for use in data collection. 
 
I would greatly appreciate your time in completing the attached questionnaire AND the 
Pre-test questionnaire.  This pre-test questionnaire will be used as formal feedback.  If 
preferred, please write your comments on the survey instrument directly.  Anonymity and 
confidentiality are assured.  I would also welcome any informal feedback and would be 
happy to discuss this with you at a convenient time. 
 
I would appreciate if you could return the completed questionnaire and pre-test 
questionnaire to me by 20 July 2007. 
 
Thank you, in anticipation of your response. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Kevin Adams 
(03) 9925 5720 
kevin.adams@rmit.edu.au  
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Pre-test Questionnaire 
 
The information provided in this document will act as formal feedback to modify questions 
to enhance the reliability and validity of responses. 
 
1. Completion of research instrument 
 
Please record the time taken to complete the survey.   _______ minutes 
 
As indicated, please circle your response to the following questions. 
 
2. Instructions 
Are the instructions? 
• Clearly written  YES  / NO 
• Easily understood  YES  / NO 
 
3. Definitions 
Are the definitions? 
• Clearly written  YES  / NO 
• Easily understood  YES  / NO 
• Too wordy  YES  / NO 
• Appropriately placed YES  / NO 
(easily located) 
 
4. Question content and form 
Are the questions? 
• Clearly written  YES  / NO 
• Easily understood  YES  / NO 
• Too wordy  YES  / NO 
• Ambiguous  YES  / NO 
 
5. Comments.  Please specify and comment on any question that troubled you with 
respect to the criteria above (instructions, definitions, content and form). 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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6. Research instrument 
Is the questionnaire? 
• Easy to complete  YES  / NO 
• Too long   YES  / NO 
• Too cluttered  YES  / NO 
Overall comments: 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Procedures and Processes 
 Do you understand the purpose of the research?    YES  / NO 
 
 Does the research instrument reflect the purpose of the research? YES  / NO 
 
 Comments 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Please identify any significant questions that you felt could have been included in the 
questionnaire. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thanks for your feedback. 
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Appendix Three: Responses by Respondents 
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1 4 3 4 3 4 4 2 3 5 5 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 D Y N 4 3 4 3 4 4 2 3 5 5 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 D Y N 
2 2 2 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 2 5 2 5 D Y N 2 2 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 2 5 2 5 D Y N 
3 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 D Y N 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 D Y N 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 A Y N 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 A Y N 
5 2 1 2 5 4 2 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 . 3 5 5 5 D Y N 2 1 2 5 4 2 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 . 3 5 5 5 D Y N 
6 3 3 3 5 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 D Y N 3 3 3 5 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 D Y N 
7 3 4 3 4 5 5 2 3 4 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 3 3 D N N 3 4 3 4 5 5 2 3 4 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 3 3 D N N 
8 2 1 3 3 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 D N N 2 1 3 3 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 D N N 
9 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 A N N 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 A N N 
10 3 3 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 3 3 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 
11 4 2 2 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N - 4 2 2 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N - 
12 3 2 3 2 2 4 2 3 4 3 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 Y N N 3 2 3 2 2 4 2 3 4 3 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 Y N N 
13 3 3 2 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 A Y N 3 3 2 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 A Y N 
14 2 2 3 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 2 2 3 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 
15 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 A N . 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 A N . 
16 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N N 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N N 
17 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N - 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N - 
18 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 D Y N 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 D Y N 
19 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 
20 4 4 3 5 3 5 3 4 5 5 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 D N . 4 4 3 5 3 5 3 4 5 5 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 D N . 
21 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 4 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D N . 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 4 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D N . 
22 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 A N N 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 A N N 
23 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A N . 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A N . 
24 4 3 3 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 D Y N 4 3 3 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 D Y N 
25 2 1 3 5 4 5 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 A Y N 2 1 3 5 4 5 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 A Y N 
26 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 
27 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 
28 3 2 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 D N N 3 2 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 D N N 
29 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 3 3 D N . 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 3 3 D N . 
30 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N N 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N N 
31 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N . 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N . 
32 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 A Y N 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 A Y N 
 218 
33 3 3 4 4 3 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 3 D Y N 3 3 4 4 3 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 3 D Y N 
34 1 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 D Y N 1 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 D Y N 
35 3 3 4 4 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 D Y Y 3 3 4 4 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 D Y Y 
36 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A Y Y 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A Y Y 
37 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 . 5 5 4 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y N 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 . 5 5 4 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y N 
38 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 D Y Y 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 D Y Y 
39 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A Y N 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A Y N 
40 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 A N - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 A N - 
41 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 A N . 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 A N . 
42 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 D Y N 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 D Y N 
43 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N N 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N N 
44 . 4 . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 . . . 4 4 4 4 4 4 A . . . 4 . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 . . . 4 4 4 4 4 4 A . . 
45 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 3 4 3 5 4 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 5 A Y . 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 3 4 3 5 4 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 5 A Y . 
46 2 4 4 3 5 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 5 5 5  . Y N 2 4 4 3 5 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 5 5 5  . Y N 
47 3 3 4 3 4 4 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 2 D Y N 3 3 4 3 4 4 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 4 2 D Y N 
48 2 3 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 D Y N 2 3 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 D Y N 
49 2 2 2 5 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 4 4 4 D N N 2 2 2 5 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 4 4 4 D N N 
50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y Y 
51 3 3 4 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 4 3 5 2 2 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 D Y N 3 3 4 5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 4 3 5 2 2 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 D Y N 
52 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 D Y N 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 D Y N 
53 2 2 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 D Y N 2 2 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 D Y N 
54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y N 
55 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 D N N 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 D N N 
56 4 3 5 5 4 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 5 4 3 3 3 D N N 4 3 5 5 4 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 5 4 3 3 3 D N N 
57 5 3 4 4 4 5 3 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 4 D Y Y 5 3 4 4 4 5 3 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 4 D Y Y 
58 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A Y N 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A Y N 
59 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 2 2 4 2 3 4 3 3 D Y Y 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 2 2 4 2 3 4 3 3 D Y Y 
60 4 2 5 4 3 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 4 2 5 4 3 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 
61 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 D Y N 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 D Y N 
62 2 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 2 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 
63 4 1 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 A Y N 4 1 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 A Y N 
64 4 . . 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 4 . . 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 
65 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 4 3 4 D Y N 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 4 3 4 D Y N 
66 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N - 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N - 
67 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 
68 4 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 5 5 D Y N 4 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 5 5 D Y N 
69 1  5 5 5 2 2 5 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y . 1  5 5 5 2 2 5 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y . 
70 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 4 A Y Y 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 5 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 4 A Y Y 
71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y N 
72 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 4 2 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 
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73 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 A Y Y 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 A Y Y 
74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
75 4 1 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 4 1 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 
76 3 4 4 5 3 5 5 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y Y 3 4 4 5 3 5 5 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y Y 
77 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 . . . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 . . . 
78 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D N . 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D N . 
79 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y Y 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y Y 
80 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 
81 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 D N N 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 D N N 
82 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 D Y Y 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 D Y Y 
83 4 . . 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 4 . . 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 
84 4 3 5 5 5 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 5 5 4 4 D Y Y 4 3 5 5 5 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 5 5 4 4 D Y Y 
85 3 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 A Y . 3 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 A Y . 
86 4 4 2 5 5 5 2 2 5 5 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 5 3 3 5 4 3 D Y N 4 4 2 5 5 5 2 2 5 5 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 5 3 3 5 4 3 D Y N 
87 3 4 4 5 4 4 2 4 5 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 5 5 4 5 5 3 D N N 3 4 4 5 4 4 2 4 5 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 5 5 4 5 5 3 D N N 
88 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y Y 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y Y 
89 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 4 5 5 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 5 A N . 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 4 5 5 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 5 5 A N . 
90 5 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y Y 5 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 D Y Y 
91 3 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 5 3 4 1 5 3 D Y N 3 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 5 3 4 1 5 3 D Y N 
92 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 
93 4 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 5 4 D Y N 4 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 5 4 D Y N 
94 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 D Y Y 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 D Y Y 
95 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 A Y Y 4 3 3 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 A Y Y 
96 4 3 3 5 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 4 3 3 5 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 
97 4 1 3 5 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 A N N 4 1 3 5 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 A N N 
98 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 D Y N 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 D Y N 
99 2 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y . 2 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y . 
100 2 3 4 5 5 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N N 2 3 4 5 5 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D N N 
101 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 D N N 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 D N N 
102 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y N 
103 3 2 2 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 5 4 A Y N 3 2 2 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 4 5 4 A Y N 
104 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 D N . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 D N . 
105 2 2 2 3 3 4 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 A Y Y 2 2 2 3 3 4 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 A Y Y 
106 3 3 3 5 3 5 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 D Y N 3 3 3 5 3 5 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 D Y N 
107 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A N  3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 A N  
108 1 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 D Y N 1 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 D Y N 
109 4 3 4 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 4 3 4 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 D Y Y 
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Appendix Four:  Analysis of Question 6: Importance of Stakeholders 
 
Respondents were asked to identify the importance of eleven different identified stakeholder 
groups to their organisation.  Table 15 shows the responses on a percentage of respondents’ 
basis for each stakeholder group. 
Table 15:  Importance of stakeholders 
 
Very 
Unimportant 
 
Unimportant 
 
Neutral 
 
Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Consumers 1% 4% 10% 50% 35% 106 
Employees -- -- 6% 41% 54% 108 
Suppliers 1% 7% 27% 46% 19% 108 
Finance providers 3% 8% 34% 38% 17% 108 
Shareholders 1% 5% 9% 43% 43% 106 
Regulators 1% 4% 10% 49% 36% 108 
Government 1% 2% 16% 44% 37% 108 
Professional Groups 2% 9% 36% 44% 8% 108 
Community 1% 2% 14% 48% 35% 108 
Lobby Groups 2% 8% 28% 46% 16% 108 
Media -- 7% 24% 49% 20% 108 
 
Each of the eleven stakeholder groups was then analysed by the three descriptors of Industry, 
Annual Revenue and Number of Employees to determine if there were any significant 
differences.  The following tables show the responses on a percentage of respondents’’ basis.  
CONSUMERS 
Table 16 (a):  Importance of Consumers: By Industry: 
The importance of CONSUMERS to your firm in regard to reporting social information. 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- -- 33% 67% 9 4.67 
Industrial 
-- -- 13% 40% 47% 15 4.33 
Mining 
-- 25% 38% -- 38% 8 3.50 
Oil/Gas 25% -- -- 75% -- 4 3.25 
Transport 
-- 14% 14% 43% 29% 7 3.86 
Manufacturing 
-- 6% -- 82% 12% 17 4.00 
Financial 
-- -- 18% 47% 35% 17 4.18 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 43% 57% 7 4.57 
Other 
-- -- 9% 59% 32% 22 4.23 
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Table 16 (b): Importance of Consumers:  By Annual Revenue 
The importance of CONSUMERS to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Annual 
Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 2% 13% 54% 29% 52 4.06 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 5% 42% 53% 19 4.47 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- 40% 60% 5 4.60 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 60% 40% 5 4.40 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- 17% 17% 33% 33% 6 3.83 
More then 
$5bn 
-- 11% 11% 56% 22% 18 3.89 
 
Table 16 (c):  Importance of Consumers: By Number of Employees 
The importance of CONSUMERS to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Number of 
Employees 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 3% 11% 56% 34% 89 4.12 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- -- 43% 57% 7 4.57 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 2 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- 100% -- -- 1 3.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 25% 75% 4 4.75 
 
Analysis of Variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Consumers according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
Table 16 (d):  Importance of Consumers: Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: The importance of CONSUMERS to your 
firm in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.811 .010 
Revenue 5 1.466 .214 
Employees 4 1.399 .245 
Residual df = 60 
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EMPLOYEES 
 
Table 17 (a):  Importance of Employees: By Industry: 
 
The importance of EMPLOYEES to your firm in regard to reporting social information. 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- -- 30% 70% 10 4.70 
Industrial 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 15 4.33 
Mining 
-- -- -- 13% 88% 8 4.88 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 4 4.50 
Transport 
-- -- -- 43% 57% 7 4.57 
Manufacturing 
-- -- -- 29% 71% 17 4.71 
Financial 
-- -- 
27.78
% 39% 33% 18 4.06 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 29% 71% 7 4.71 
Other 
-- -- 4.55% 50% 45% 22 4.41 
 
 
 
Table 17 (b): Importance of Employees: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of EMPLOYEES to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Total Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- -- 9% 43% 47% 53 4.38 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 5% 37% 58% 19 4.53 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- 40% 60% 5 4.60 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 40% 60% 5 4.60 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- -- -- 100% 6 5.00 
More then $5bn 
-- -- -- 53% 47% 19 4.47 
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Table 17 (c):  Importance of Employees: By Number of Employees 
 
The importance of EMPLOYEES to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information 
Number of 
Employees 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- -- 7% 42% 51% 90 4.44 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- -- 29% 71% 7 4.71 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 33% 67% 3 4.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 4 5.00 
 
 
Analysis of Variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Employees according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 17 (d): Importance of Employees: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of EMPLOYEES to your firm 
in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .699 .691 
Revenue 5 .774 .572 
Employees 4 .919 .459 
Residual df = 61 
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SUPPLIERS 
 
Table 18 (a):  Importance of Suppliers: By Industry: 
 
The importance of SUPPLIERS to your firm in regard to reporting social information. 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Total Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- -- 80% 20% 10 4.20 
Industrial 7% 7% 27% 60% -- 15 3.40 
Mining 
-- -- -- 63% 38% 8 4.38 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- 75% 25% -- 4 3.25 
Transport 
-- -- 43% 29% 29% 7 3.86 
Manufacturing 
-- 6% 18% 53% 24% 17 3.94 
Financial 
-- 11% 44% 39% 6% 18 3.39 
Utilities 
-- -- 29% 29% 43% 7 4.14 
Other 
-- 14% 27% 32% 27% 22 3.73 
 
 
 
Table 18 (b): Importance of Suppliers: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of SUPPLIERS to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Annual 
Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 8% 28% 45% 19% 53 3.75 
$1bn - $2bn 5% -- 21% 53% 21% 19 3.84 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 40% 40% 20% 5 3.80 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 40% 20% 40% -- 5 3.00 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 33% 50% 6 4.33 
More then $5bn 
-- 5% 32% 47% 16% 19 3.74 
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Table 18 (c):  Importance of Suppliers: By Number of Employees 
 
The importance of SUPPLIERS to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Number of 
Employees 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 7% 31% 42% 19% 90 3.71 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% 14% 57% 14% 7 3.71 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 75% 25% 4 4.25 
 
 
Analysis of Variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Suppliers according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 18 (d):  Importance of Suppliers: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of SUPPLIERS to your firm 
in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.271 .275 
Revenue 5 2.674 .030 
Employees 4 3.252 .018 
Residual df = 61 
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FINANCE PROVIDERS 
 
Table 19 (a):  Importance of Finance Providers: By Industry: 
 
The importance of FINANCE PROVIDERS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information. 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- 10% 50% 40% -- 10 3.30 
Industrial 
-- 7% 40% 40% 13% 15 3.60 
Mining 
-- -- 13% 38% 50% 8 4.38 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 75% 25% 4 4.25 
Transport 
-- 14% 14% 57% 14% 7 3.71 
Manufacturing 
-- 6% 29% 41% 24% 17 3.82 
Financial 
-- 17% 39% 33% 11% 18 3.39 
Utilities 
-- -- 86% 14% -- 7 3.14 
Other 14% 9% 27% 32% 18% 22 3.32 
 
 
 
Table 19 (b): Importance of Finance Providers: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of SUPPLIERS to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Annual 
Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 8% 42% 34% 15% 53 3.53 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 5% 32% 37% 26% 19 3.84 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 20% 20% 60% -- 5 3.40 
$3bn - $4bn 20% -- 20% 60% -- 5 3.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 33% 17% 50% 6 4.17 
More then $5bn 
-- 16% 26% 47% 11% 19 3.53 
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Table 19 (c):  Importance of Finance Providers: By Number of Employees 
 
The importance of FINANCE PROVIDERS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 8% 37% 39% 16% 90 3.60 
10,001 – 20,000 14% -- 29% 29% 29% 7 3.57 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% 33% -- 33% 3 3.33 
More then 50,000 25% -- 25% 50% -- 4 3.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Finance Providers according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and 
Q3 Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 19 (d):  Importance of Finance Providers: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of FINANCE PROVIDERS to 
your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.812 .092 
Revenue 5 3.220 .012 
Employees 4 .681 .608 
Residual df = 61 
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SHAREHOLDERS 
 
Table 20 (a):  Importance of Shareholders: By Industry: 
 
The importance of SHAREHOLDERS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information. 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- 10% 10% 20% 60% 10 4.30 
Industrial 
-- -- 7% 47% 47% 15 4.40 
Mining 
-- -- -- 25% 75% 8 4.75 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 75% 25% 4 4.25 
Transport 
-- 14% -- 29% 57% 7 4.29 
Manufacturing 
-- -- -- 41% 59% 17 4.59 
Financial 
-- 13% 25% 31% 31% 16 3.81 
Utilities 
-- -- 29% 71% -- 7 3.71 
Other 5% 5% 9% 55% 27% 22 3.95 
 
 
Table 20 (b): Importance of Shareholders: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of SHAREHOLDERS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information 
Annual 
Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 4% 12% 38% 46% 52 4.27 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 6% 11% 44% 39% 18 4.17 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- -- 100% 5 5.00 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 50% 33% 6 4.17 
More then $5bn 
-- 11% 5% 53% 32% 19 4.05 
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Table 20 (c):  Importance of Shareholders: By Number of Employees 
The importance of SHAREHOLDERS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 5% 11% 42% 42% 88 4.22 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- -- 43% 57% 7 4.57 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
More then 50,000 25% -- -- 25% 50% 4 3.75 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Shareholders according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 20 (d):  Importance of Shareholders: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of SHAREHOLDERS to your 
firm in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.496 .021 
Revenue 5 2.521 .039 
Employees 4 2.227 .077 
Residual df = 59 
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REGULATORS 
 
Table 21 (a):  Importance of Regulators: By Industry: 
 
The importance of REGULATORS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information. 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 10% 60% 30% 10 4.20 
Industrial 
-- -- 67% 53% 40% 15 4.33 
Mining 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 8 4.50 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- 25% 25% 50% 4 4.25 
Transport 
-- -- 14% 43% 43% 7 4.29 
Manufacturing 
-- -- 6% 59% 35% 17 4.29 
Financial 
-- 56% 28% 33% 33% 18 3.94 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 86% 14% 7 4.14 
Other 5% 14% 5% 41% 36% 22 3.91 
 
 
 
Table 21 (b): Importance of Regulators: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of REGULATORS to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Annual 
Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 4% 9% 47% 38% 53 4.15 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 11% 11% 37% 42% 19 4.11 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- 60% 40% 5 4.40 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 60% 40% 5 4.40 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 6 4.50 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 21% 63% 16% 19 3.95 
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Table 21 (c):  Importance of Regulators: By Number of Employees 
 
The importance of REGULATORS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 4% 10% 43% 41% 90 4.19 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 14% 71% 14% 7 4.00 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 75% 25% 4 4.25 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Regulators according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 21 (d): Importance of Regulators: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of REGULATORS to your 
firm in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .439 .893 
Revenue 5 .713 .616 
Employees 4 .215 .929 
Residual df = 61 
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GOVERNMENT 
 
Table 22 (a):  Importance of Government: By Industry: 
 
The importance of GOVERNMENT to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information. 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- -- 70% 30% 10 4.30 
Industrial 
-- -- 7% 67% 27% 15 4.20 
Mining 
-- -- -- 25% 75% 8 4.75 
Oil/Gas 25% -- 25% 25% 25% 4 3.25 
Transport 
-- -- 14% 43% 43% 7 4.29 
Manufacturing 
-- -- 12% 59% 29% 17 4.18 
Financial 
-- -- 39% 33% 28% 18 3.89 
Utilities 
-- -- 15% 57% 29% 7 4.14 
Other 
-- 9% 18% 23% 50% 22 4.14 
 
 
 
Table 22 (b): Importance of Government: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of GOVERNMENT to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Annual 
Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 4% 19% 42% 34% 53 4.02 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 21% 37% 42% 19 4.21 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- 40% 60% 5 4.60 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 60% 40% 5 4.40 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 6 4.50 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 16% 58% 26% 19 4.11 
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Table 22 (c):  Importance of Government: By Number of Employees 
 
The importance of GOVERNMENT to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 2% 17% 40% 40% 90 4.16 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 29% 57% 14% 7 3.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 4 4.50 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Government according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees. No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 22 (d): Importance of Government: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of GOVERNMENT to your 
firm in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.411 .210 
Revenue 5 1.881 .111 
Employees 4 .604 .661 
Residual df = 61 
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PROFESSIONAL GROUPS 
 
Table 23 (a):  Importance of Professional Groups: By Industry: 
 
The importance of PROFESSIONAL GROUPS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information. 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 40% 60% -- 10 3.60 
Industrial 
-- 67% 60% 33% -- 15 3.27 
Mining 
-- -- 25% 50.00% 25.00% 8 4.00 
Oil/Gas 25% -- 50% 25% -- 4 2.75 
Transport 
-- 14% 43% 43% -- 7 3.29 
Manufacturing 
-- 12% 29% 59% -- 17 3.47 
Financial 
-- 11% 33% 39% 17% 18 3.61 
Utilities 
-- -- 43% 43% 14% 7 3.71 
Other 5% 18% 23% 41% 14% 22 3.41 
 
 
 
Table 23 (b): Importance of Professional Groups: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of PROFESSIONAL GROUPS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 4% 11% 36% 45% 4% 53 3.34 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 37% 37% 26% 19 3.89 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 20% 40% 40% -- 5 3.20 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 20% 40% 40% -- 5 3.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 50% 33% 17% 6 3.67 
More then $5bn 
-- 11% 32% 59% -- 19 3.47 
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Table 23 (c):  Importance of Professional Groups: By Number of Employees 
 
The importance of PROFESSIONAL GROUPS to your firm in regard to reporting 
social information 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 2% 9% 36% 44% 9% 90 3.49 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% 71% 14% -- 7 3.00 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 50% 25% 25% 4 3.75 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Professional Groups according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue 
and Q3 Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 23 (d): Importance of Professional Groups: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of PROFESSIONAL 
GROUPS to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.454 .193 
Revenue 5 .344 .884 
Employees 4 .748 .563 
Residual df = 61 
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COMMUNITY 
 
Table 24 (a):  Importance of Community: By Industry: 
 
The importance of COMMUNITY to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information. 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 10% 60% 30% 10 4.20 
Industrial 
-- 7% 7% 33% 53% 15 4.33 
Mining 
-- -- -- 12% 88% 8 4.88 
Oil/Gas 25% 25% -- 25% 25% 4 3.00 
Transport 
-- -- 29% 43% 29% 7 4.00 
Manufacturing 
-- -- 12% 53% 35% 17 4.24 
Financial 
-- -- 33% 61% 6% 18 3.72 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 71% 29% 7 4.29 
Other 
-- -- 14% 50% 36% 22 4.23 
 
 
 
Table 24 (b): Importance of Community: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of COMMUNITY to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% -- 21% 51% 26% 53 4.00 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 11% 47% 42% 19 4.32 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- -- 100% 5 5.00 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 40% 60% 5 4.60 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 6 4.50 
More then $5bn 
-- 11% 11% 58% 21% 19 3.89 
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Table 24 (c):  Importance of Community: By Number of Employees 
 
The importance of COMMUNITY to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 1% 17% 44% 37% 90 4.14 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% -- 57% 29% 7 4.00 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 4 4.50 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Community according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  Tests of significance show significant difference by Industry and 
Revenue.  Oil/Gas industry respondents were more widely spread on their ranking of the 
importance of Community in regard to social reporting with 50% of respondents’ ranking the 
Community as Unimportant or Very Unimportant. 
 
Table 24 (d): Importance of Community: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of COMMUNITY to your 
firm in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 3.238 .004 
Revenue 5 3.841 .004 
Employees 4 1.060 .384 
Residual df = 61 
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LOBBY GROUPS 
 
 
Table 25 (a):  Importance of Lobby Groups: By Industry: 
 
The importance of LOBBY GROUPS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information. 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 20% 70% 10% 10 3.90 
Industrial 7% 7% 27% 53% 7% 15 3.47 
Mining 
-- -- 12% 50% 38% 8 4.25 
Oil/Gas 25% 25% -- 25% 25% 4 3.00 
Transport 
-- 14% 43% 29% 14% 7 3.43 
Manufacturing 
-- 18% 24% 47% 12% 17 3.53 
Financial 
-- -- 50% 44% 6% 18 3.56 
Utilities 
-- -- 43% 43% 14% 7 3.71 
Other 
-- 14% 18% 41% 27% 22 3.82 
 
 
 
Table 25 (b): Importance of Lobby Groups: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of LOBBY GROUPS to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 4% 8% 36% 43% 9% 53 3.47 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 6% 16% 53% 26% 19 4.00 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 20% 40% 40% 5 4.20 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 33% 50% 17% 6 3.83 
More then $5bn 
-- 21% 21% 42% 16% 19 3.53 
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Table 25 (c):  Importance of Lobby Groups: By Number of Employees 
 
The importance of LOBBY GROUPS to your firm in regard to reporting social 
information 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 2% 8% 28% 46% 17% 90 3.67 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% 43% 43% -- 7 3.29 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% 33% 33% -- 3 3.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 25% 75% -- 4 3.75 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Lobby Groups according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 25 (d): Importance of Lobby Groups: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of LOBBY GROUPS to your 
firm in regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .738 .657 
Revenue 5 1.989 .093 
Employees 4 1.059 .384 
Residual df = 61 
 241
MEDIA 
 
Table 26 (a):  Importance of Media: By Industry: 
 
The importance of the MEDIA to your firm in regard to reporting social information. 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 40% 50% 10% 10 3.70 
Industrial 
-- 7% 27% 53% 13% 15 3.73 
Mining 
-- -- 12% 63% 25% 8 4.13 
Oil/Gas 
-- 50% 25% 25% -- 4 2.75 
Transport 
-- -- 43% 43% 14% 7 3.71 
Manufacturing 
-- 6% 18% 59% 18% 17 3.88 
Financial 
-- -- 33% 44% 22% 18 3.89 
Utilities 
-- 14% 29% 43% 14% 7 3.57 
Other 
-- 9% 9% 45% 36% 22 4.09 
 
 
 
Table 26 (b): Importance of Media: By Annual Revenue 
 
The importance of the MEDIA to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 9% 30% 43% 17% 53 3.68 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 11% 53% 37% 19 4.26 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 20% 40% 40% 5 4.20 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 20% 60% 20% 5 4.00 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 6 4.33 
More then $5bn 
-- 11% 32% 53% 5% 19 3.53 
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Table 26 (c):  Importance of Media: By Number of Employees 
 
The importance of the MEDIA to your firm in regard to reporting social information 
Number of 
Employees 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 7% 26% 44% 23% 90 3.84 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% -- 71% 14% 7 3.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 25% 75% -- 4 3.75 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
6 Lobby Groups according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 26 (d): Importance of Media: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: The importance of the MEDIA to your firm in 
regard to reporting social information 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.029 .425 
Revenue 5 1.476 .211 
Employees 4 .592 .670 
Residual df = 61 
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Appendix Five: 
 
Analysis of Question 5 
 
Motivations to report social information 
 
 
 
 
 244
Appendix Five: Analysis of Question 5: Motivations to report social information 
 
Respondents were asked to identify in a decision to report social information to stakeholder 
groups, the importance of twelve statements to their organisation.  Responses to each of the 
twelve statements are presented below together with a statistical analysis to test for significant 
differences according to the three descriptors of Industry, Annual Revenue and Number of 
Employees. 
 
1. Stakeholder groups have a right to be informed about the activities undertaken by the 
firm. 
 
 
Table 27 (a):   Stakeholder Groups have a right to be informed about the activities of the 
firm: By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household -- -- 10% 60% 30% 10 4.2 
Industrial -- -- 7% 87% 7% 15 4.0 
Mining -- -- -- 63% 37% 8 4.38 
Oil/Gas -- -- -- 100% -- 4 4.0 
Transport -- -- 14% 71% 14% 7 4.0 
Manufacturing -- 6% 12% 59% 24% 17 4.0 
Financial -- -- 17% 50% 33% 18 4.16 
Utilities -- -- -- 100% -- 7 4.0 
Other -- -- -- 55% 45% 22 4.45 
Graph 5: Stakeholder groups have a right to be informed 
about the activities of the firm 
26%
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Important 
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Table 27 (b):  Stakeholder Groups have a right to be informed about the activities of the 
firm By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn -- -- 9% 72% 19% 53 4.09 
$1bn - $2bn -- -- 11% 56% 33% 19 4.22 
$2bn - $3bn -- -- -- 50% 50% 5 4.5 
$3bn - $4bn -- -- -- 60% 40% 5 4.4 
$4bn - $5bn -- -- -- 67% 33% 6 4.33 
More then $5bn -- 5% 5% 6% 21% 19 4.05 
 
Table 27 (c): Stakeholder Groups have a right to be informed about the activities of the 
firm By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 -- 1% 8% 64% 27% 90 4.17 
10,001 – 20,000 -- -- 14% 71% 14% 7 4.0 
20,001 – 30,000 -- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.0 
30,001 – 40,000 -- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.0 
40,001 – 50,000 -- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
More then 50,000 -- -- -- 50% 50% 4 4.5 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.1 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  Significant difference by Number of Employees (F = 3.79, df = 4, sig. = 0.008) 
with larger employers tending to consider that stakeholder groups have the right to be informed 
about the activities of the firm. 
Table 27 (d): Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Stakeholder Groups have a right to be 
informed about the activities of the firm 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.655 .128 
Revenue 5 1.451 .219 
Employees 4 3.790 .008 
Residual df = 61 
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2. Social reporting enhances accountability to stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28 (a):  Social reporting enhances accountability to stakeholders: By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household -- -- -- 70% 30% 10 4.3 
Industrial -- -- -- 87% 13% 15 4.13 
Mining -- -- -- 50% 50% 8 4.5 
Oil/Gas 25% -- -- 75% 25% 4 3.25 
Transport -- -- 29% 43% 29% 7 4.0 
Manufacturing -- -- 24% 59% 18% 17 3.94 
Financial -- -- 22% 61% 17% 18 3.94 
Utilities -- -- -- 100% -- 7 4.0 
Other -- -- 9% 50% 41% 22 4.32 
 
Graph 6: Social reporting enhances accountability to 
stakeholders
24%
64%
11%
0%
1%
Very Important
Important 
Neutral
Unimportant 
Very Unimportant
 247
Table 28 (b):  Social reporting enhances accountability to stakeholders: By Annual 
Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% -- 11% 64% 23% 53 4.06 
$1bn - $2bn -- -- 28% 56% 17% 19 3.89 
$2bn - $3bn -- -- -- 50% 50% 5 4.5 
$3bn - $4bn -- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.2 
$4bn - $5bn -- -- -- 83% 17% 6 4.17 
More then $5bn -- -- 5% 68% 26% 19 4.21 
 
Table 28 (c): Social reporting enhances accountability to stakeholders: By Number of 
Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% -- 13% 63% 22% 90 4.06 
10,001 – 20,000 -- -- -- 71% 29% 7 4.29 
20,001 – 30,000 -- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 -- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.0 
40,001 – 50,000 -- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
More then 50,000 -- -- -- 75% 25% 4 4.25 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.2 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  Significant difference by Annual Revenue (F = 3.842, df = 5, sig. = 0.004) with 
larger employers tending to consider that social reporting enhances accountability to 
stakeholders. 
Table 28 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: Social reporting enhances accountability to 
stakeholders 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.668 .014 
Revenue 5 3.842 .004 
Employees 4 .260 .903 
Residual df = 61 
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3. Social reporting helps to ensure an informal licence to operate by which business survival is 
dictated. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29 (a): Social reporting helps ensure an informal license to operate by which 
business survival is dictated: By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household -- -- 50% 30% 20% 10 3.7 
Industrial -- -- 20% 67% 13% 15 3.93 
Mining -- 13% 13% 25% 50% 8 4.125 
Oil/Gas -- 50% 25% 25% -- 4 2.75 
Transport -- 33% 33% -- 33% 6 3.33 
Manufacturing -- 13% 19% 56% 13% 16 3.69 
Financial -- 12% 41% 41% 6% 17 3.41 
Utilities -- -- 29% 71% -- 7 3.71 
Other 5% 5% 40% 45% 5% 20 3.4 
 
 
Graph 7: Social Reporting helps ensure an informal license 
to operate by which business survival is dictated.
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Table 29 (b): Social reporting helps ensure an informal license to operate by which 
business survival is dictated: By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 12% 31% 41% 14% 51 3.53 
$1bn - $2bn -- 6% 39% 50% 6% 19 3.56 
$2bn - $3bn -- -- 33% 50% 17% 5 3.83 
$3bn - $4bn -- 20% 20% 60% -- 5 3.4 
$4bn - $5bn -- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.2 
More then $5bn -- 11% 33% 33% 22% 18 3.67 
 
 
Table 29 (c): Social reporting helps ensure an informal license to operate by which 
business survival is dictated: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 12% 29% 45% 14% 87 3.59 
10,001 – 20,000 -- -- 43% 57% -- 7 3.57 
20,001 – 30,000 -- -- 67% 33% -- 3 3.33 
30,001 – 40,000 -- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.0 
40,001 – 50,000 -- -- -- 50% 50% 2 4.5 
More then 50,000 -- -- 67% 33% -- 3 3.33 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.3 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 29 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: Social reporting enhances accountability to 
stakeholders 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .377 .928 
Revenue 5 .397 .849 
Employees 4 .339 .851 
Residual df = 58 
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4. Corporations should take into account concerns of stakeholders, other than shareholders, when 
making decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 30 (a): Corporations should take into account concerns of stakeholders, other than 
shareholders, when making decisions: By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household -- -- 10% 60% 30% 10 4.2 
Industrial -- -- 13% 67% 20% 15 4.07 
Mining -- -- -- 37% 63% 8 4.63 
Oil/Gas -- -- -- 75% 25% 4 4.25 
Transport -- -- -- 71% 29% 7 4.29 
Manufacturing -- -- 18% 82% -- 17 3.82 
Financial -- -- 12% 65% 23% 17 4.12 
Utilities -- -- 14% 43% 43% 7 4.29 
Other -- -- 5% 68% 27% 22 4.23 
 
 
Graph 8: Corporations should take into account concerns of 
Stakeholders, other then shareholders, when making 
decisions 
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Table 30 (b): Corporations should take into account concerns of stakeholders, other than 
shareholders, when making decisions: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn -- -- 8% 75% 17% 52 4.10 
$1bn - $2bn -- -- 17% 61% 22% 19 4.06 
$2bn - $3bn -- -- 17% 17% 67% 5 4.50 
$3bn - $4bn -- -- -- 40% 60% 5 4.60 
$4bn - $5bn -- -- -- 667% 33% 6 4.33 
More then $5bn -- -- 11% 68% 21% 19 4.11 
 
Table 30 (c): Corporations should take into account concerns of stakeholders, other than 
shareholders, when making decisions: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 -- -- 10% 64% 26% 89 4.16 
10,001 – 20,000 -- -- -- 86% 14% 7 4.14 
20,001 – 30,000 -- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.0 
30,001 – 40,000 -- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.0 
40,001 – 50,000 -- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
More then 50,000 -- -- -- 25% 75% 4 4.75 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.4 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
Table 30 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: Corporations should take into account 
concerns of stakeholders, other than shareholders, when making 
decisions. 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.628 .136 
Revenue 5 1.096 .372 
Employees 4 1.582 .191 
Residual df = 60 
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5. The long-term commercial viability of a corporation is dependent upon consideration of all 
stakeholder interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 31 (a): The long-term commercial viability of a corporation is dependent upon 
consideration of all stakeholders interests: By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household -- -- 20% 50% 30% 10 4.1 
Industrial -- -- 20% 60% 20% 15 4.0 
Mining -- -- -- 37% 63% 9 4.63 
Oil/Gas -- 25% 25% 25% 25% 4 3.5 
Transport -- -- 29% 71% -- 7 3.71 
Manufacturing -- 12% 24% 47% 18% 17 3.71 
Financial -- -- 22% 56% 22% 18 4.0 
Utilities -- -- 29% 57% 14% 7 3.86 
Other -- -- 20% 60% 20% 20 4.0 
 
 
 
Graph 9:  The long-term commercial viability of a corporation is 
dependent upon consideration of all stakeholders interests. 
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Table 31 (b):  The long-term commercial viability of a corporation is dependent upon 
consideration of all stakeholders interests: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn -- 2% 17% 68% 13% 53 3.92 
$1bn - $2bn -- -- 33% 39% 28% 19 3.94 
$2bn - $3bn -- -- 50% 17% 33% 5 3.83 
$3bn - $4bn -- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.2 
$4bn - $5bn -- -- -- 60% 40% 5 4.4 
More then $5bn -- 11% 21% 32% 37% 19 3.95 
 
Table 31 (c): The long-term commercial viability of a corporation is dependent upon 
consideration of all stakeholders interests: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 -- 2% 24% 49% 25% 89 3.97 
10,001 – 20,000 -- -- -- 100% -- 7 4.0 
20,001 – 30,000 -- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 -- -- -- -- -- 1 5.0 
40,001 – 50,000 -- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
More then 50,000 -- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.5 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 31 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: The long-term commercial viability of a corporation is 
dependent upon consideration of all stakeholders interests. 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.413 .209 
Revenue 5 1.075 .383 
Employees 4 1.831 .134 
Residual df = 61 
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6. Social reporting is required to help overcome deficiencies in the current financial 
framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 32 (a): Social reporting is required to help overcome deficiencies in the current 
financial reporting framework: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household -- 10% 60% 30% -- 10 3.2 
Industrial -- 20% 53% 27% -- 15 3.07 
Mining -- 25% 12% 38% 25% 8 3.63 
Oil/Gas 25% -- 25% 50% -- 4 3.0 
Transport 14% 43% 29% 14% -- 7 2.43 
Manufacturing -- 35% 53% 12% -- 17 2.76 
Financial -- 17% 39% 39% 6% 18 3.33 
Utilities -- 14% 43% 43% -- 7 3.29 
Other 5% 19% 29% 38% 10% 21 3.29 
 
 
 
Graph 10:  Social reporting is required to help overcome deficiencies 
in the financial current reporting framework  
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Table 32 (b):  Social reporting is required to help overcome deficiencies in the current 
financial reporting framework: By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 6% 17% 40% 36% 2% 53 3.11 
$1bn - $2bn -- 17% 61% 6% 17% 19 3.22 
$2bn - $3bn -- 50% 33% 17% -- 5 2.67 
$3bn - $4bn -- 40% 40% 20% -- 5 2.8 
$4bn - $5bn -- -- 17% 83% -- 6 3.83 
More then $5bn -- 32% 32% 32% 5% 19 3.11 
 
Table 32 (c): Social reporting is required to help overcome deficiencies in the current 
financial reporting framework: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 3% 21% 41% 30% 4% 90 3.11 
10,001 – 20,000 -- 29% 43% 29% -- 7 3.0 
20,001 – 30,000 -- -- 67% 33% -- 3 3.33 
30,001 – 40,000 -- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.0 
40,001 – 50,000 -- 67% 33% -- -- 3 2.33 
More then 50,000 -- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.0 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.6 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 32 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: Social reporting is required to help overcome 
deficiencies in the current financial reporting framework. 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .882 .537 
Revenue 5 1.270 .289 
Employees 4 1.327 .270 
Residual df = 61 
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7. Better management and reporting of a company’s social issues benefits shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 33 (a): Better management and reporting of a company's social issues benefits 
shareholders: By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household -- -- 10% 70% 20% 10 4.10 
Industrial -- -- 20% 60% 20% 15 4.00 
Mining -- -- 12% 50% 38% 8 4.25 
Oil/Gas 25% -- -- 75% -- 4 3.25 
Transport -- 14% 14% 71% -- 7 3.57 
Manufacturing -- 6% 24% 71% -- 17 3.65 
Financial -- -- 39% 50% 11% 18 3.72 
Utilities -- -- -- 86% 14% 7 4.14 
Other 5% -- 19% 67% 10% 21 3.76 
 
 
 
Graph 11: Better management and reporting of a company's 
social issues benefits shareholders 
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Table 33 (b):  Better management and reporting of a company's social issues benefits 
shareholders: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 4% -- 28% 57% 11% 53 3.72 
$1bn - $2bn -- -- 16% 68% 16% 19 4.00 
$2bn - $3bn -- 20% -- 60% 20% 5 3.80 
$3bn - $4bn -- -- 20% 80% -- 5 3.80 
$4bn - $5bn -- -- -- 83% 17% 6 3.50 
More then $5bn -- 5% 11% 74% 11% 19 3.89 
 
 
Table 33 (c): Better management and reporting of a company's social issues benefits 
shareholders: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 2% 2% 22% 60% 13% 90 3.80 
10,001 – 20,000 -- -- -- 100% -- 7 4.00 
20,001 – 30,000 -- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 -- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 -- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 -- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.7 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 33 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: Better management and reporting of a 
company's social issues benefits shareholders. 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.287 .033 
Revenue 5 .526 .756 
Employees 4 .912 .463 
Residual df = 61 
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8. Financial performance is more important than social concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34 (a): Financial performance is more important than social concerns: 
By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 10% -- 60% 30% -- 10 3.10 
Industrial 
-- 20.00% 73% -- 7% 15 2.93 
Mining 
-- 12% 38% 38% 12% 8 3.50 
Oil/Gas 
-- 25% 25% 25% 25% 4 3.50 
Transport 
-- 29% 57% 14% -- 7 2.86 
Manufacturing 6% 29% 24% 35% 6% 17 3.06 
Financial 
-- 22% 22% 56% -- 18 3.33 
Utilities 
-- 14% 43% 43% -- 7 3.29 
Other 5% 14% 55% 14% 14% 22 3.18 
 
 
Graph 12: Financial performance is more important than  
social concerns. 
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Table 34 (b):  Financial performance is more important than social concerns: 
 By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 15% 47% 26% 9% 53 3.26 
$1bn - $2bn -- 16% 42% 37% 5% 19 3.32 
$2bn - $3bn -- 20% 80% -- -- 5 2.80 
$3bn - $4bn -- 40% 40% 20% -- 5 2.80 
$4bn - $5bn -- -- 67% 17% 17% 6 3.50 
More then $5bn 5% 32% 26% 37% -- 19 2.95 
 
 
Table 34 (c): Financial performance is more important than social concerns: 
By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 17% 44% 30% 8% 90 3.27 
10,001 – 20,000 -- 14% 86% -- -- 7 2.86 
20,001 – 30,000 -- 33% 67% -- -- 3 2.67 
30,001 – 40,000 -- 100% -- -- -- 1 2.00 
40,001 – 50,000 -- 67% -- 33% -- 3 2.67 
More then 50,000 50% -- -- 50% -- 4 2.50 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.8 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 34 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: Financial performance is more important than 
social concerns. 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .608 .768 
Revenue 5 .635 .673 
Employees 4 .961 .436 
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9. The interests of the shareholders and other stakeholders should be of equal importance to the 
company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 35 (a): The interests of shareholders and other shareholders should be of equal 
importance to the company: By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- 30% 30% 30% 10% 10 3.20 
Industrial 
-- 47% 7% 40% 7% 15 3.07 
Mining 
-- 25% 12% 38% 25% 8 3.63 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- 50% 50% -- 4 3.50 
Transport 
-- 14% 29% 57% -- 7 3.43 
Manufacturing 
-- 41% 18% 41% -- 17 3.00 
Financial 
-- 28% 28% 28% 17% 18 3.33 
Utilities 
-- 14% 14% 71% -- 7 3.57 
Other 
-- 38% 19% 43% -- 21 3.05 
 
 
Graph 13:  The interests of shareholders and other shareholders  
Should be of equal importance to the company.
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Table 35 (b):  The interests of shareholders and other shareholders should be of equal 
importance to the company: By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 36% 25% 38% 2% 53 3.06 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 37% 21% 21% 21% 19 3.26 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- 100% -- 5 4.00 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 20% 20% 60% -- 5 3.40 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- 17% -- 67% 17% 6 3.83 
More then $5bn 
-- 32% 21% 42% 5% 19 3.21 
 
 
Table 35 (c): The interests of shareholders and other shareholders should be of equal 
importance to the company: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 30% 22% 40% 8% 90 3.26 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 57% -- 43% -- 7 2.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- 33% 33% 33% -- 3 3.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- 100%-- -- -- 1 3.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
More then 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.9 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 35 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: The interests of shareholders and other 
shareholders should be of equal importance to the company. 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.758 .103 
Revenue 5 1.487 .207 
Employees 4 .761 .555 
Residual df = 61 
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10. A company would be more sensitive to its social impacts if it was required to report on 
them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 36 (a): A company would be more sensitive to its social impacts if it was required 
to report on them: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- 20% 10% 60% 10% 10 3.60 
Industrial 
-- 20% 20% 53% 7% 15 3.47 
Mining 
-- -- 25% 38% 38% 8 4.13 
Oil/Gas 
-- 25% -- 50% 25% 4 3.75 
Transport 
-- 14% -- 71% 14% 7 3.86 
Manufacturing 
-- 18% 12% 65% 6% 17 3.59 
Financial 
-- 11% 17% 56% 17% 18 3.78 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 100% -- 7 4.00 
Other 
-- -- 18% 55% 27% 22 4.09 
 
 
Graph 14:  A company would be more sensitive to its social 
Impacts if it was required to report on them.
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Table 36 (b): A company would be more sensitive to its social impacts if it was required 
to report on them: By Annual Revenue 
Annual 
Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 13% 9% 64% 13% 53 3.77 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 11% 11% 63% 16% 19 3.84 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 40% 60% -- 5 3.60 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 50% 50% -- 6 3.50 
More then $5bn 
-- 16% 16% 42% 26% 19 3.79 
 
Table 36 (c): A company would be more sensitive to its social impacts if it was required 
to report on them: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 10% 12% 63% 14% 90 3.82 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 29% 43% 29% 7 4.00 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 100% -- -- -- 3 2.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 25% 50% 25% 4 4.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.10 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 36 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: A company would be more sensitive to its 
social impacts if it was required to report on them. 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .553 .811 
Revenue 5 1.833 .120 
Employees 4 .509 .729 
Residual df = 61 
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11. A company’s social information is only worthwhile if it is subject to independent audit. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 37 (a):  A company's social information is only worthwhile if it is subject to 
independent audit: By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- 40% 20% 30% 10% 10 3.10 
Industrial 7% 27% 47% 13% 7% 15 2.87 
Mining 
-- 38% 25% 25% 12% 8 3.13 
Oil/Gas 
-- 50% 25% 25% -- 4 2.75 
Transport 
-- 57% -- 29% 14% 7 3.00 
Manufacturing 
-- 35% 35% 29% -- 17 2.94 
Financial 
-- 28% 33% 33% 6% 18 3.17 
Utilities 
-- 29% 14% 57% -- 7 3.29 
Other 5% 24% 38% 19% 14% 21 3.14 
 
 
 Graph 15:  A company's social information is only worthwhile 
If it is subject to independent audit. 
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Table 37 (b):  A company's social information is only worthwhile if it is subject to 
independent audit: By Annual Revenue 
Annual 
Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 30% 23% 36% 11% 53 3.28 
$1bn - $2bn 6% 32% 42% 16% 5% 19 2.84 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 40% 60% -- -- 5 2.60 
$3bn - $4bn 20% 20% 40% 20% -- 5 2.60 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- 17% 67% 17% -- 6 3.00 
More then $5bn 
-- 47% 21% 26% 5% 19 2.89 
 
 
Table 37 (c):  A company's social information is only worthwhile if it is subject to 
independent audit: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 33% 28% 29% 9% 90 3.11 
10,001 – 20,000 14% 14% 71% -- -- 7 2.57 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- 67% 33% -- -- 3 2.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% 33% 33% -- 3 3.00 
More then 50,000 
-- 33% 33% 33% -- 3 3.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.11 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 37 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: A company's social information is only 
worthwhile if it is subject to independent audit. 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .329 .952 
Revenue 5 1.792 .128 
Employees 4 .485 .747 
Residual df = 61 
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12. Social reporting by a company is important as investors making investment decisions consider 
such information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 38 (a):  Social reporting by a company is important as investors making investment 
decisions consider such information: By Industry: 
Industry 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 40% 50% 10% 10 3.70 
Industrial 
-- 7% 60% 20% 13% 15 3.40 
Mining 
-- 25% 25% 12% 38% 8 3.63 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- 25% 75% -- 4 3.75 
Transport 
-- 14% -- 71% 14% 7 3.86 
Manufacturing 
-- 24% 41% 35% -- 17 3.12 
Financial 
-- 11% 28% 50% 11% 18 3.61 
Utilities 
-- 14% 29% 57% -- 7 3.43 
Other 5% 9% 27% 50% 9% 22 3.50 
 
 
 Graph 16:  Social reporting by a company is important as investors 
making investment decisions consider such information.
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Table 38 (b):  Social reporting by a company is important as investors making investment 
decisions consider such information: By Annual Revenue 
Annual 
Revenue 
Very 
Unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important 
Very 
Important 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 11% 30% 49% 8% 53 3.49 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 11% 47% 26% 16% 19 3.47 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 20% 80% -- 5 3.80 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 40% 20% 40% -- 5 3.00 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 67% 33% -- 6 3.33 
More then $5bn 
-- 16% 26% 42% 16% 19 3.58 
 
 
Table 38 (c): Social reporting by a company is important as investors making investment 
decisions consider such information: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 11% 34% 44% 9% 90 3.49 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 29% 57% 14% 7 3.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- 33% 33% 33% -- 3 3.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 67% 33% -- -- 3 2.33 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 25% 50% 25% 4 4.00 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted: to see if there were any significant differences on Q 
5.12 according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 38 (d): Analysis of variance test 
Dependent Variable: Social reporting by a company is important as 
investors making investment decisions consider such information. 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .601 .773 
Revenue 5 1.990 .093 
Employees 4 3.192 .019 
Residual df = 61 
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Appendix Six: 
 
Analysis of Question 7 
 
Agreement with GRI Social Disclosures 
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Appendix Six: Analysis of Question 7: Agreement with GRI social disclosures 
 
Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with a list of 
recommended disclosures as per the Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Reporting 
Framework.  Responses to each of the recommended disclosures are presented below together 
with a statistical analysis to test for significant differences according to the three descriptors of 
Industry, Annual Revenue and Number of Employees. 
 
1. Labour: Employment - Breakdown of workforce 
Table 39 (a):  Disclosure of Employment - Breakdown of workforce: By Industry: 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 10% 10% 30% 40% 10% 10 3.30 
Industrial 
-- 13% 20% 67% -- 15 3.53 
Mining 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 8 4.50 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- -- 50% 17% 33% 6 3.83 
Manufacturing 6% 24% 29% 41% -- 17 3.06 
Financial 
-- 6% 24% 71% -- 17 3.65 
Utilities 
-- -- 29% 71% -- 7 3.71 
Other 
-- 19% 14% 62% 5% 21 3.52 
 
Table 39 (b): Disclosure of Employment - Breakdown of workforce: By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 4% 8% 24% 57% 8% 51 3.57 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 11% 33% 39% 17% 18 3.61 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% 17% 67% -- 6 3.50 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 40% -- 60% -- 5 3.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- 17% 17% 61% 6% 18 3.56 
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Table 39 (c):  Disclosure of Employment - Breakdown of workforce: By Number of 
Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 2% 9% 23% 56% 9% 87 3.61 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 43% 29% 29% -- 7 2.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.1 Labour: Employment - Breakdown of workforce according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 
Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 
0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 39 (d): Labour: Employment - Breakdown of Workforce: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Diclosure of Labour: Employment - 
Breakdown of Workforce 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.273 .035 
Revenue 5 1.051 .397 
Employees 4 1.357 .260 
Residual df = 57 
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2. Labour: Employment - Net employment creation 
 
Table 40 (a):   Disclosure of Labour: Employment – Net employment creation: By 
Industry: 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 10% 10% 30% 40% 10% 10 3.30 
Industrial 
-- 7% 27% 60% 7% 15 3.67 
Mining 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 8 4.50 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- -- 60% 20% 20% 5 3.60 
Manufacturing 
-- 18% 29% 53% -- 17 3.35 
Financial 
-- 6% 24% 71% -- 17 3.65 
Utilities 
-- 14% 57% 29% -- 7 3.14 
Other 
-- 10% 29% 52% 10% 21 3.62 
 
 
Table 40 (b):  Disclosure of Labour: Employment – Net employment creation: By Annual 
Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 8% 28% 54% 8% 50 3.58 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 11% 39% 33% 17% 18 3.56 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 50% 50% -- 6 3.50 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 20% -- 80% -- 5 3.60 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- 11% 22% 56% 11% 18 3.67 
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Table 40 (c):  Disclosure of Labour: Employment – Net employment creation: By Number 
of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 8% 29% 52% 9% 86 3.60 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% 43% 43% -- 7 3.29 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- 33% 33% 33% -- 3 3.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.2 Labour: Employment - Net employment creation according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 
Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 
0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 40 (d):  Disclosure of Labour: Employment – Net employment creation: Analysis of 
variance test 
 
Dependent Disclosure of Labour: Employment - Net employment 
creation 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.963 .068 
Revenue 5 .400 .847 
Employees 4 1.524 .208 
Residual df = 56 
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3. Labour: Employment - Average employment turnover segmented by country/region 
 
Table 41 (a):  Disclosure of Labour: Employment - Average employment turnover 
segmented by country/region: By Industry: 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 10% 30% 40% 20% -- 10 2.70 
Industrial 
-- 13% 47% 40% -- 15 3.27 
Mining 
-- -- 25% 25% 50% 8 4.25 
Oil/Gas 
-- 33% -- 33% 33% 3 3.67 
Transport 
-- -- 50% 33% 17% 6 3.67 
Manufacturing 6% 35% 24% 35% -- 17 2.88 
Financial 
-- 24% 47% 29% -- 17 3.06 
Utilities 
-- 29% 43% 14% 14% 7 3.14 
Other 10% 24% 24% 43% -- 21 3.00 
 
 
 
Table 41 (b):  Disclosure of Labour: Employment - Average employment turnover 
segmented by country/region: By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 6% 24% 24% 39% 8% 51 3.20 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 11% 67% 17% 6% 18 3.17 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 100% -- -- 6 3.00 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 40% 20% 40% -- 5 3.00 
$4bn - $5bn 17% -- 33% 33% 17% 6 3.33 
More then $5bn 
-- 39% 17% 39% 6% 18 3.11 
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Table 41 (c):  Disclosure of Labour: Employment - Average employment Revenue 
segmented by country/region: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 5% 21% 37% 31% 7% 87 3.15 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 29% 57% 14% -- 7 2.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
More then 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.3 Labour: Employment - Average employment Revenue segmented by country/region 
according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 41 (d):  Disclosure of Labour: Employment - Average employment turnover 
segmented by country/region: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour: Employment - Average 
employment turnover segmented by country/region 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.480 .185 
Revenue 5 2.006 .091 
Employees 4 .535 .711 
Residual df = 57 
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4. Labour: Labour/Management relations - Percentage represented by trade union 
 
Table 42 (a):  Disclosure of Labour: Labour/Management relations - Percentage 
represented by trade union: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 30% -- 50% 10% 10% 10 2.70 
Industrial 
-- 21% 50% 29% -- 14 3.07 
Mining 
-- 13% 38% 25% 25% 8 3.63 
Oil/Gas 
-- 33% 33% -- 33% 3 3.33 
Transport 
-- -- 50% 50% -- 6 3.50 
Manufacturing 10% 38% 43% 10% -- 21 2.52 
Financial 6% 24% 53% 18% -- 17 2.82 
Utilities 
-- 14% 57% 29% -- 7 3.14 
Other 10% 38% 43% 10% -- 21 2.52 
 
 
 
Table 42 (b):  Disclosure of Labour: Labour/Management relations - Percentage 
represented by trade union: By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 14% 26% 42% 16% 2% 50 2.66 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 22% 50% 22% 6% 18 3.11 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% 50% 33% -- 6 3.17 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 40% 20% 40% -- 5 3.00 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 60% 40% -- 5 3.40 
More then $5bn 6% 28% 39% 17% 11% 18 3.00 
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Table 42 (c):  Disclosure of Labour: Labour/Management relations - Percentage 
represented by trade union: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 7% 26% 45% 20% 2% 86 2.85 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 33% 33% 33% -- 6 3.00 
20,001 – 30,000 33% -- 33% -- 33% 3 3.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
More then 50,000 33% -- 67% -- -- 3 2.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.4 Labour/management relations – Percentage represented by trade unions segmented by 
country/region according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 42 (d):  Disclosure of Labour: Labour/Management relations - Percentage 
represented by trade union: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour/management relations – 
Percentage represented by trade unions 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.758 .106 
Revenue 5 1.166 .338 
Employees 4 .786 .539 
Residual df = 55 
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5. Labour: Labour/Management relations - Policy and procedures relating to changes like 
restructuring 
 
Table 43 (a):  Disclosure of Labour: Labour/Management relations - Policy and 
procedures relating to changes like restructuring: By Industry 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 10% 10% 20% 60% -- 10 3.30 
Industrial 
-- 14% 43% 36% 7% 14 3.36 
Mining 
-- 13% 13% 50% 25% 8 3.88 
Oil/Gas 
-- 33% 33% -- 33% 3 3.33 
Transport 
-- 17% 17% 67% -- 6 3.50 
Manufacturing 
-- 24% 19% 48% 10% 21 3.43 
Financial 
-- 19% 31% 50% -- 16 3.31 
Utilities 
-- 29% 29% 43% -- 7 3.14 
Other 
-- 24% 19% 48% 10% 21 3.43 
 
 
 
Table 43 (b):  Disclosure of Labour: Labour/Management relations - Policy and 
procedures relating to changes like restructuring: By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 24% 28% 36% 10% 50 3.28 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 17% 44% 33% 6% 18 3.28 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 33% 17% 50% -- 6 3.17 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 40% 60% -- 5 3.60 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 20% 60% 20% 5 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- 28% 17% 50% 6% 18 3.33 
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Table 43 (c):  Disclosure of Labour: Labour/Management relations - Policy and 
procedures relating to changes like restructuring: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 24% 27% 41% 7% 86 3.28 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 67% 33% -- 6 3.33 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.5 Labour/management relations – Policy and procedures relating to changes like 
restructuring according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 43 (d):  Disclosure of Labour: Labour/Management relations - Policy and 
procedures relating to changes like restructuring: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour/management relations – 
Policy and procedures relating to changes like restructuring 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .595 .777 
Revenue 5 .452 .810 
Employees 4 1.152 .342 
Residual df = 55 
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6. Labour: Health and safety - Practices on recording and notification of accidents and 
diseases 
 
Table 44 (a):  Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety - Practices on recording and 
notification of accidents and diseases: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 20% 40% 40% 10 4.20 
Industrial 
-- 7% 13% 47% 33% 15 4.07 
Mining 
-- -- -- 25% 75% 8 4.75 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
Manufacturing 
-- -- 6% 59% 35% 17 4.82 
Financial 
-- -- 28% 56% 17% 18 3.89 
Utilities 
-- 14% 14% 57% 14% 7 3.71 
Other 
-- 5% 14% 67% 14% 21 3.90 
 
 
 
Table 44 (b):  Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety - Practices on recording and 
notification of accidents and diseases: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 6% 13% 52% 29% 52 4.04 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 28% 44% 28% 18 4.00 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 17% 50% 33% 6 4.17 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 6 4.33 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 11% 61% 28% 18 4.17 
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Table 44 (c):  Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety - Practices on recording and 
notification of accidents and diseases: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 3% 16% 52% 28% 88 4.06 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- -- 71% 29% 7 4.29 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.6 Labour: Health and safety – Practices on recording and notification of accidents and 
diseases according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 44 (d):  Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety - Practices on recording and 
notification of accidents and diseases: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety – 
Practices on recording and notification of accidents and diseases 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .566 .802 
Revenue 5 .082 .995 
Employees 4 1.258 .297 
Residual df = 58 
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7. Labour: Health and safety - Description of formal joint health and safety committees 
 
Table 45 (a):  Labour: Health and safety - Description of formal joint health and safety 
committees: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 30% 50% 20% 10 3.90 
Industrial 
-- 13% 7% 60% 20% 15 3.87 
Mining 
-- -- 38% 13% 50% 8 4.13 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 6 3.67 
Manufacturing 
-- -- 24% 65% 12% 17 4.53 
Financial 
-- -- 22% 56% 22% 18 4.00 
Utilities 
-- 14% -- 71% 14% 7 3.86 
Other 
-- 10% 29% 48% 14% 21 3.67 
 
 
 
Table 45 (b):  Labour: Health and safety - Description of formal joint health and safety 
committees: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 8% 17% 56% 19% 52 3.87 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 6% 39% 28% 28% 18 3.78 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 50% 50% -- 6 3.50 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 33% 50% 17% 6 3.83 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 11% 72% 17% 18 4.06 
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Table 45 (c):  Labour: Health and safety - Description of formal joint health and safety 
committees: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 6% 25% 50% 19% 88 3.83 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 14% 57% 29% 7 4.14 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.7 Labour: Health and safety – Description of formal joint health and safety committees 
according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 45 (d):  Labour: Health and safety - Description of formal joint health and safety 
committees: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety – 
Description of formal joint health and safety committees 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .251 .979 
Revenue 5 .533 .750 
Employees 4 .565 .689 
Residual df = 58 
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8. Labour: Health and safety - Standard injury, lost days, and absence rates and number 
of fatalities 
 
Table 46 (a):  Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety - Standard injury, lost days, and 
absence rates and number of fatalities: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- 10% 30% 40% 20% 10 3.70 
Industrial 
-- -- 7% 60% 33% 15 4.27 
Mining 
-- -- -- 25% 75% 8 4.75 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- 17% 17% 67% -- 6 3.50 
Manufacturing 
-- 18% -- 59% 24% 17 4.41 
Financial 
-- 6% 28% 50% 17% 18 3.78 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 86% 14% 7 4.14 
Other 
-- 14% 24% 52% 10% 21 3.57 
 
 
 
Table 46 (b):  Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety - Standard injury, lost days, and 
absence rates and number of fatalities: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 12% 17% 52% 19% 52 3.79 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 17% 22% 33% 28% 18 3.72 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- 83% 17% 6 4.17 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 33% 50% 6 4.33 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 6% 72% 22% 18 4.17 
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Table 46 (c):  Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety - Standard injury, lost days, and 
absence rates and number of fatalities: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 10% 17% 52% 20% 88 3.83 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- -- 57% 43% 7 4.43 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
 
 
Analysis of variances were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on Q 7.8 
Labour: Health and safety – Standard injury, lost days, and absence rates and number of 
fatalities according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 46 (d):  Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety - Standard injury, lost days, and 
absence rates and number of fatalities: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety – 
Standard injury, lost days, and absence rates and number of fatalities 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .738 .658 
Revenue 5 .134 .984 
Employees 4 .335 .853 
Residual df = 58 
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9. Labour: Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS 
 
Table 47 (a):  Disclosure of Labour: Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS: By 
Industry: 
Agreement or disagreement with proposed disclosures by your organisation: 
Labour: Health and safety – Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 30% 50% 20% 10 3.90 
Industrial 
-- 33% 47% 13% 7% 15 2.93 
Mining 
-- -- 25% 38% 38% 8 4.13 
Oil/Gas 
-- 33% -- 33% 33% 3 3.67 
Transport 
-- 33% 50% 17% -- 6 2.83 
Manufacturing 
-- 65% 18% 18% -- 17 3.29 
Financial 6% 11% 67% 6% 11% 18 3.06 
Utilities 
-- 29% 43% 29% -- 7 3.00 
Other 10% 29% 48% 14% -- 21 2.67 
 
 
 
Table 47 (b):  Disclosure of Labour: Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS: By Annual 
Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 27% 52% 13% 6% 52 2.94 
$1bn - $2bn 11% 33% 22% 17% 17% 18 2.94 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 33% 33% 33% -- 6 3.00 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 40% 60% -- 5 3.60 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- 17% 67% 17% -- 6 3.00 
More then $5bn 
-- 33% 22% 28% 17% 18 3.28 
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Table 47 (c):  Disclosure of Labour: Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS: By Number 
of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 3% 30% 41% 19% 7% 88 2.97 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 57% 29% 14% 7 3.57 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 67% -- 33% 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 67% -- 33% -- 3 2.67 
More then 50,000 
-- 33% 33% 33% -- 3 3.00 
 
 
Analysis of variances were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on Q 7.9 
Labour: Health and safety – Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS according to the three 
descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of Employees.  Significant 
difference by Industry (F = 3.933, df = 8, sig. = 0.001) with the Food/Household industry 
ranking this recommended disclosure higher than other industries.  This is probably reflective 
of the sensitivity of this industry to health issues, particularly in the food segment. 
 
Table 47 (d):  Disclosure of Labour: Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS: Analysis of 
variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour: Health and safety – 
Policies and programmes for HIV/AIDS 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 3.933 .001 
Revenue 5 .653 .661 
Employees 4 2.129 .089 
Residual df = 57 
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10. Labour: Training and education - Hours of training per year per employee, by category 
of employee 
 
Table 48 (a):  Disclosure of Labour: Training and education - Hours of training per year 
per employee, by category of employee: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- 20% 40% 30% 10% 10 3.30 
Industrial 
-- 20% 53% 27% -- 15 3.07 
Mining 
-- -- 29% 43% 29% 7 4.00 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- 17% 33% 50% -- 6 3.33 
Manufacturing 
-- 24% 35% 29% 12% 17 4.18 
Financial 
-- 11% 50% 28% 11% 18 3.39 
Utilities 
-- 14% 29% 43% 14% 7 3.57 
Other 
-- 19% 24% 57% -- 21 3.38 
 
 
 
Table 48 (b):  Disclosure of Labour: Training and education - Hours of training per year 
per employee, by category of employee: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 17% 31% 44% 8% 52 3.42 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 22% 33% 28% 17% 18 3.39 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 50% 50% -- 6 3.50 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 20% 20% 60% -- 5 3.40 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 80% 20% -- 5 3.20 
More then $5bn 
-- 17% 44% 28% 11% 18 3.33 
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Table 48 (c):  Disclosure of Labour: Training and education - Hours of training per year 
per employee, by category of employee: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 17% 34% 40% 8% 87 3.39 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% 43% 43% -- 7 3.29 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- 100% -- -- 1 3.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% -- 33% 33% 3 3.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 100% -- -- 3 3.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.10 Labour: Training and education – Hours of training per year per employee, by category 
of employee according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 48 (d):  Disclosure of Labour: Training and education - Hours of training per year 
per employee, by category of employee: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour: Training and education 
– Hours of training per year per employee, by category of employee 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.632 .136 
Revenue 5 .561 .729 
Employees 4 .720 .582 
Residual df = 57 
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11. Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Description of equal opportunity policies and 
programmes 
 
Table 49 (a):  Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Description of equal 
opportunity policies and programmes: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 20% 70% 10% 10 3.90 
Industrial 
-- 7% 13% 67% 13% 15 3.87 
Mining 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 8 4.50 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- 17% 17% 50% 17% 6 3.67 
Manufacturing 
-- -- 29% 53% 18% 17 5.00 
Financial 
-- -- 33% 50% 17% 18 3.83 
Utilities 
-- 14% -- 57% 29% 7 4.00 
Other 
-- -- 10% 76% 14% 21 4.05 
 
 
 
Table 49 (b): Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Description of equal 
opportunity policies and programmes: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 4% 19% 65% 12% 52 3.85 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 28% 39% 33% 18 4.06 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 17% 50% 33% 6 4.17 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 80% 20% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- 6% 6% 67% 22% 18 4.06 
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Table 49 (c):  Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Description of equal 
opportunity policies and programmes: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 2% 20% 60% 17% 88 3.92 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% -- 71% 14% 7 3.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 33% 67% 3 4.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.11 Labour: Diversity and opportunity – Description of equal opportunity policies and 
programmes according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 49 (d):  Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Description of equal 
opportunity policies and programmes: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and 
opportunity – Description of equal opportunity policies and 
programmes 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .997 .448 
Revenue 5 1.077 .383 
Employees 4 .895 .473 
Residual df = 58 
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12. Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Composition of senior management and corporate 
governance bodies, including male/female ratio and so on 
 
Table 50 (a): Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Composition of senior 
management and corporate governance bodies, including male/female ratio 
and so on: By Industry: 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 30% 50% 20% 10 3.90 
Industrial 
-- 20% 27% 47% 7% 15 3.40 
Mining 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 8 4.50 
Oil/Gas 
-- 33% -- 33% 33% 3 3.67 
Transport 
-- 17% 17% 67% -- 6 3.50 
Manufacturing 
-- 6% 35% 41% 18% 17 4.76 
Financial 
-- -- 50% 33% 17% 18 3.67 
Utilities 
-- -- 14% 71% 14% 7 4.00 
Other 
-- 5% 10% 81% 5% 21 3.86 
 
 
Table 50 (b): Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Composition of senior 
management and corporate governance bodies, including male/female 
ratio and so on: By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 
-- 6% 25% 62% 8% 52 3.71 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 6% 39% 22% 33% 18 3.83 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 17% 83% -- 6 3.83 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 20% -- 80% -- 5 3.60 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- 11% 22% 39% 28% 18 3.83 
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Table 50 (c): Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Composition of senior 
management and corporate governance bodies, including male/female ratio 
and so on: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 
-- 6% 28% 53% 13% 88 3.73 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 29% 14% 57% -- 7 3.29 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 33% 67% 3 4.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.12 Labour: Diversity and opportunity – Composition of senior management and corporate 
governance bodies, including male/female ratio according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 
Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 
0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 50 (d): Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and opportunity - Composition of senior 
management and corporate governance bodies, including male/female ratio 
and so on: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Labour: Diversity and 
opportunity – Composition of senior management and corporate 
governance bodies, including male/female ratio 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.239 .293 
Revenue 5 3.095 .015 
Employees 4 2.047 .100 
Residual df = 58 
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13. Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of policies, guidelines, 
corporate structure, and procedures to deal with all aspects of human rights 
 
Table 51 (a): Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of 
policies, guidelines, corporate structure, and procedures to deal with all 
aspects of human rights: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 30% 50% 20% 10 3.90 
Industrial 
-- 13% 33% 53% -- 15 3.40 
Mining 
-- -- 13% 50% 38% 8 4.25 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- 50% 17% 33% -- 6 2.83 
Manufacturing 
-- 6% 41% 47% 6% 17 4.24 
Financial 
-- -- 50% 39% 11% 18 3.61 
Utilities 
-- 14% 14% 57% 14% 7 3.71 
Other 5% 5% 33% 57% -- 21 3.43 
 
 
Table 51 (b): Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of 
policies, guidelines, corporate structure, and procedures to deal with all 
aspects of human rights:By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 10% 29% 52% 8% 52 3.54 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 6% 50% 28% 17% 18 3.56 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% 50% 33% -- 6 3.17 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 20% 80% -- 5 3.80 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 83% -- 6 3.83 
More then $5bn 
-- 6% 28% 50% 17% 18 3.78 
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Table 51 (c):  Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of 
policies, guidelines, corporate structure, and procedures to deal with all 
aspects of human rights: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 9% 32% 50% 8% 88 3.55 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 43% 57% -- 7 3.57 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.13 Human Rights: Strategy and management – Description of policies, guidelines, 
corporate structure, and procedures to deal with all aspects of human rights according to the 
three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of Employees.  No 
significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 51 (d): Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of 
policies, guidelines, corporate structure, and procedures to deal with all 
aspects of human rights: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and 
management – Description of policies, guidelines, corporate structure, 
and procedures to deal with all aspects of human rights 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.756 .105 
Revenue 5 .610 .692 
Employees 4 .376 .825 
Residual df = 58 
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14. Human Rights: Strategy and management - Evidence of consideration of human rights 
impacts as part of investment and procurement decisions 
 
Table 52 (a):  Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and management - Evidence of 
consideration of human rights impacts as part of investment and 
procurement decisions: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- 10% 30% 30% 30% 10 3.80 
Industrial 
-- 27% 40% 27% 7% 15 3.13 
Mining 
-- -- 13% 63% 25% 8 4.13 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- 50% 33% 17% -- 6 2.67 
Manufacturing 
-- 6% 47% 41% 6% 17 4.18 
Financial 
-- -- 72% 22% 6% 18 3.33 
Utilities 
-- 14% -- 86% -- 7 3.71 
Other 5% 5% 38% 52% -- 21 3.38 
 
Table 52 (b): Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and management - Evidence of 
consideration of human rights impacts as part of investment and 
procurement decisions: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 12% 38% 42% 6% 52 3.38 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 11% 56% 17% 17% 18 3.39 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% 33% 33% 17% 6 3.50 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 60% 40% -- 5 3.40 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 6 3.67 
More then $5bn 
-- 11% 22% 56% 11% 18 3.67 
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Table 52 (c): Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and management - Evidence of 
consideration of human rights impacts as part of investment and 
procurement decisions: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 11% 40% 40% 8% 88 3.42 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 57% 43% -- 7 3.43 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- 33% -- 67% -- 3 3.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.14 Human Rights: Strategy and management – Evidence of consideration of human rights 
impacts as part of investment and procurement decisions according to the three descriptors, ie 
Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of Employees.  No significant differences at 
the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 52 (d): Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and management - Evidence of 
consideration of human rights impacts as part of investment and 
procurement decisions: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and 
management – Evidence of consideration of human rights impacts as 
part of investment and procurement decisions 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.743 .012 
Revenue 5 .060 .998 
Employees 4 .796 .533 
Residual df = 58 
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15. Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of policies and procedures to 
evaluate and address human rights performance within the supply chain and contractors 
 
Table 53 (a): Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of policies and 
procedures to evaluate and address human rights performance within the 
supply chain and contractors: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 30% 60% 10% 10 3.80 
Industrial 
-- 27% 53% 20% -- 15 2.93 
Mining 
-- -- 38% 38% 25% 8 3.88 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- 33% 17% 50% -- 6 3.17 
Manufacturing 
-- 12% 47% 41% -- 17 4.29 
Financial 
-- -- 78% 17% 6% 18 3.28 
Utilities 
-- 14% -- 71% 14% 7 3.86 
Other 5% 5% 29% 62% -- 21 3.48 
 
Table 53 (b): Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of policies and 
procedures to evaluate and address human rights performance within the 
supply chain and contractors: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 13% 38% 42% 4% 52 3.33 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 6% 44% 33% 17% 18 3.61 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% 50% 33% -- 6 3.17 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 40% 60% -- 5 3.60 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 67% 33% -- 6 3.33 
More then $5bn 
-- 6% 33% 56% 6% 18 3.61 
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Table 53 (c): Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of policies and 
procedures to evaluate and address human rights performance within the 
supply chain and contractors: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 11% 41% 41% 6% 88 3.39 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 57% 43% -- 7 3.43 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.15 Human Rights: Strategy and management – Description of policies and procedures to 
evaluate and address human rights performance within the supply chain and contractors 
according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 53 (d): Human Rights: Strategy and management - Description of policies and 
procedures to evaluate and address human rights performance within the 
supply chain and contractors: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Human Rights: Strategy and 
management – Description of policies and procedures to evaluate and 
address human rights performance within the supply chain and 
contractors 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.483 .022 
Revenue 5 .327 .894 
Employees 4 .355 .840 
Residual df = 58 
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16. Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems - Discrimination 
 
Table 54 (a): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
– Discrimination: By Industry: 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 20% 50% 30% 10 4.10 
Industrial 
-- 7% 20% 60% 13% 15 3.80 
Mining 
-- -- -- 38% 63% 8 4.63 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- 17% 17% 67% -- 6 3.50 
Manufacturing 
-- 12% 18% 53% 18% 17 4.71 
Financial 
-- -- 33% 56% 11% 18 3.78 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 57% 43% 7 4.43 
Other 5% -- 19% 62% 14% 21 3.81 
 
 
 
Table 54 (b): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
– Discrimination: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 6% 15% 62% 15% 52 3.83 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 28% 50% 22% 18 3.94 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% -- 67% 17% 6 3.83 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 20% 60% 20% 5 4.00 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 6 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 17% 50% 33% 18 4.17 
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Table 54 (c): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
– Discrimination: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 5% 19% 57% 18% 88 3.86 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 14% 71% 14% 7 4.00 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 33% 67% 3 4.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.16 Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems – Discrimination 
according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 54 (d):  Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
– Discrimination: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, 
procedures and management systems – Discrimination 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.034 .058 
Revenue 5 .343 .885 
Employees 4 .760 .555 
Residual df = 58 
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17. Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems - Freedom of association 
 
Table 55 (a): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
- Freedom of association: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 20% 50% 30% 10 4.10 
Industrial 
-- 7% 27% 60% 7% 15 3.67 
Mining 
-- -- 13% 25% 63% 8 4.50 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
Transport 
-- 17% 17% 67% -- 6 3.50 
Manufacturing 
-- 12% 35% 41% 12% 17 4.59 
Financial 
-- 6% 35% 53% 6% 17 3.59 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 71% 29% 7 4.29 
Other 5% 5% 19% 57% 14% 21 3.71 
 
 
 
Table 55 (b): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
- Freedom of association: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 8% 24% 57% 10% 51 3.65 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 6% 22% 50% 22% 18 3.89 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% 17% 50% 17% 6 3.67 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 40% 40% 20% 5 3.80 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 6 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 22% 50% 28% 18 4.06 
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Table 55 (c): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Freedom of association: By Number of Employees 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 7% 26% 51% 15% 87 3.71 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 14% 86% -- 7 3.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 33% 67% 3 4.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.17 Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems – Freedom of association 
according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 55 (d): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
- Freedom of association: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, 
procedures and management systems – Freedom of association 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.358 .029 
Revenue 5 .689 .633 
Employees 4 1.325 .272 
Residual df = 57 
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18. Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems: Child labour 
 
Table 56 (a): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management 
systems: Child labour: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 30% 40% 30% 10 4.00 
Industrial 
-- 20% 33% 33% 13% 15 3.40 
Mining 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 8 4.50 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- 17% 33% 50% -- 6 3.33 
Manufacturing 
-- 24% 29% 29% 18% 17 4.47 
Financial 
-- 6% 35% 47% 12% 17 3.65 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 57% 43% 7 4.43 
Other 5% 5% 29% 48% 14% 21 3.62 
 
 
 
Table 56 (b): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management 
systems: Child labour: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 10% 24% 49% 16% 51 3.67 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 11% 28% 39% 22% 18 3.72 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% 17% 50% 17% 6 3.67 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 40% 40% 20% 5 3.80 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 6 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- 11% 28% 33% 28% 18 3.78 
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Table 56 (c): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management 
systems: Child labour: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 10% 26% 44% 18% 87 3.68 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 29% 57% 14% 7 3.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 67% -- 33% 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% -- -- 67% 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.18 Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems – Child labour according 
to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of Employees.  
No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 56 (d): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management 
systems: Child labour: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, 
procedures and management systems – Child labour 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 2.198 .041 
Revenue 5 .243 .942 
Employees 4 1.346 .264 
Residual df = 57 
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19. Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems - Forced and compulsory 
labour 
 
Table 57 (a): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
- Forced and compulsory labour: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 10% 60% 30% 10 4.20 
Industrial 
-- 20% 27% 40% 13% 15 3.47 
Mining 
-- -- -- 38% 63% 8 4.63 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- -- 50% 50% -- 6 3.50 
Manufacturing 
-- 24% 29% 24% 24% 17 3.47 
Financial 
-- 6% 29% 53% 12% 17 3.71 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 57% 43% 7 4.43 
Other 5% 5% 24% 52% 14% 21 3.67 
 
 
 
Table 57 (b): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
- Forced and compulsory labour: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 8% 20% 55% 16% 51 3.75 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- 11% 22% 39% 28% 18 3.83 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% 33% 17% 33% 6 3.67 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 40% 40% 20% 5 3.80 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 6 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- 11% 17% 44% 28% 18 3.89 
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Table 57 (c): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems 
- Forced and compulsory labour: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 9% 23% 46% 21% 87 3.76 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 29% 57% 14% 7 3.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 1 4.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- 33% -- -- 67% 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.19 Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management systems – Forced and compulsory 
labour according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number 
of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 57 (d): Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Forced and compulsory labour: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Human Rights: Policies, 
procedures and management systems – Forced and compulsory 
labour 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.963 .068 
Revenue 5 .400 .847 
Employees 4 1.524 .208 
Residual df = 56 
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20. Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - Impacts of operations on 
communities 
 
Table 58 (a): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Impacts of operations on communities: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 30% 40% 30% 10 4.00 
Industrial 
-- -- 7% 73% 20% 15 4.13 
Mining 
-- -- -- 25% 75% 8 4.75 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
Manufacturing 
-- -- 12% 76% 12% 17 4.94 
Financial 
-- -- 28% 50% 22% 18 3.94 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 86% 14% 7 4.14 
Other 5% -- 5% 71% 19% 21 4.00 
 
 
 
Table 58 (b): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Impacts of operations on communities: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% -- 13% 67% 17% 52 3.98 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 17% 56% 28% 18 4.11 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- 33% 67% 6 4.67 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- -- 100% -- 5 4.00 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 6 4.50 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 17% 61% 22% 18 4.06 
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Table 58 (c): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Impacts of operations on communities: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% -- 14% 60% 25% 88 4.08 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 7 4.00 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.20 Society: Policies, procedures and management systems – Impacts of operations on 
communities according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 58 (d): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Impacts of operations on communities: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and 
management systems – Impacts of operations on communities 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.480 .185 
Revenue 5 2.006 .091 
Employees 4 .535 .711 
Residual df = 57 
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21. Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - Bribery and corruption 
 
Table 59 (a): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Bribery and corruption: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 22% 33% 44% 9 4.22 
Industrial 
-- 7% 20% 60% 13% 15 3.80 
Mining 
-- -- -- 38% 63% 8 4.63 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
Manufacturing 
-- 12% 6% 59% 24% 17 4.82 
Financial 
-- -- 33% 61% 6% 18 3.72 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 57% 43% 7 4.43 
Other 5% -- 10% 71% 14% 21 3.90 
 
 
 
Table 59 (b): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Bribery and corruption: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 2% 10% 75% 12% 51 3.92 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 28% 56% 17% 18 3.89 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% -- 33% 50% 6 4.17 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 20% 40% 40% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 33% 50% 6 4.33 
More then $5bn 
-- 6% 17% 39% 39% 18 4.11 
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Table 59 (c): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Bribery and corruption: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 3% 16% 60% 20% 87 3.93 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 14% 57% 29% 7 4.14 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 33% 67% 3 4.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.21 Society: Policies, procedures and management systems – Bribery and corruption 
according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number of 
Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 59 (d): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Bribery and corruption: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and 
management systems – Bribery and corruption 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.758 .106 
Revenue 5 1.166 .338 
Employees 4 .786 .538 
Residual df = 56 
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22. Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - Political lobbying and 
contributions 
 
Table 60 (a): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Political lobbying and contributions: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 20% 40% 40% 10 4.20 
Industrial 
-- 7% 27% 60% 7% 15 3.67 
Mining 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 8 4.50 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
Transport 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 6 3.67 
Manufacturing 
-- 12% 24% 65% -- 17 4.65 
Financial 
-- -- 39% 50% 11% 18 3.72 
Utilities 
-- -- 14% 71% 14% 7 4.00 
Other 5% 5% 5% 81% 5% 21 3.76 
 
 
 
Table 60 (b): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Political lobbying and contributions: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 4% 12% 69% 13% 52 3.88 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 39% 39% 22% 18 3.83 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- 17% 17% 67% -- 6 3.50 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 20% 20% 60% -- 5 3.40 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 28% 61% 11% 18 3.83 
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Table 60 (c): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Political lobbying and contributions: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 3% 22% 60% 14% 88 3.82 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% 29% 57% -- 7 3.43 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- -- 67% 33% 3 4.33 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.22 Society: Policies, procedures and management systems – Political lobbying and 
contributions according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 
Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 60 (d): Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Political lobbying and contributions: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Society: Policies, procedures and 
management systems – Political lobbying and contributions 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .587 .765 
Revenue 5 .463 .809 
Employees 4 1.125 .332 
Residual df = 56 
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23. Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems - Customer 
health and safety 
 
Table 61 (a): Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Customer health and safety: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- -- 70% 30% 10 4.30 
Industrial 
-- -- 13% 47% 40% 15 4.27 
Mining 
-- -- -- 25% 75% 8 4.75 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
Transport 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
Manufacturing 
-- 6% 18% 59% 18% 17 4.71 
Financial 
-- -- 28% 44% 28% 18 4.00 
Utilities 
-- -- -- 71% 29% 7 4.29 
Other 10% -- 10% 62% 19% 21 3.81 
 
 
 
Table 61 (b): Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Customer health and safety: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 2% 12% 60% 25% 52 4.04 
$1bn - $2bn 6% -- 11% 50% 33% 18 4.06 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 6 4.50 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 20% 40% 40% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 33% 50% 6 4.33 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 22% 56% 22% 18 4.00 
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Table 61 (c): Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Customer health and safety: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 2% 1% 14% 53% 30% 88 4.07 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- -- 71% 29% 7 4.29 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.23 Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems – Consumer 
health and safety according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and 
Q3 Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 61 (d): Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Customer health and safety: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, 
procedures and management systems – Consumer health and safety 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .546 .802 
Revenue 5 .082 .967 
Employees 4 1.237 .297 
Residual df = 58 
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24. Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems - Product 
information and labeling 
 
Table 62 (a): Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Product information and labeling: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 10% 70% 20% 10 4.10 
Industrial 
-- -- 13% 67% 20% 15 4.07 
Mining 
-- -- -- 38% 63% 8 4.63 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
Transport 
-- -- 33% 50% 17% 6 3.83 
Manufacturing 
-- -- 29% 47% 24% 17 4.71 
Financial 
-- -- 17% 56% 28% 18 4.11 
Utilities 
-- -- 14% 71% 14% 7 4.00 
Other 5% 5% 14% 57% 19% 21 3.81 
 
 
 
Table 62 (b): Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Product information and labeling: By Annual Revenue 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% -- 13% 63% 21% 52 4.02 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 22% 39% 39% 18 4.17 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- -- 50% 50% 6 4.50 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- 20% 20% 40% 20% 5 3.60 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 17% 50% 33% 6 4.17 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 28% 61% 11% 18 3.83 
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Table 62 (c): Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Product information and labeling: By Number of Employees 
 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% -- 18% 53% 27% 88 4.06 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- 14% -- 71% 14% 7 3.86 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- -- 100% -- 3 4.00 
 
 
Analysis of variance tests were conducted to see if there were any significant differences on  
Q 7.24 Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems – Product 
information and labeling according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual 
Revenue and Q3 Number of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were 
found. 
 
Table 62 (d): Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management 
systems - Product information and labeling: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, 
procedures and management systems – Product information and 
labeling 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 1.758 .106 
Revenue 5 1.166 .338 
Employees 4 .786 .539 
Residual df = 57 
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25. Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems - Consumer 
privacy 
 
Table 63 (a): Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Consumer privacy: By Industry 
 
Industry 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Food/Household 
-- -- 10% 60% 30% 10 4.20 
Industrial 
-- 7% 20% 60% 13% 15 3.80 
Mining 
-- -- 13% 38% 50% 8 4.38 
Oil/Gas 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
Transport 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 6 3.67 
Manufacturing 
-- -- 35% 59% 6% 17 4.82 
Financial 
-- -- 18% 59% 24% 17 4.06 
Utilities 
-- -- 14% 71% 14% 7 4.00 
Other 5% -- 14% 62% 19% 21 3.90 
 
 
 
Table 63 (b): Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Consumer privacy: By Annual Revenue 
 
Annual Revenue 
V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than $1bn 2% 2% 8% 73% 16% 51 3.98 
$1bn - $2bn 
-- -- 39% 44% 17% 18 3.78 
$2bn - $3bn 
-- -- 17% 67% 17% 6 4.00 
$3bn - $4bn 
-- -- 20% 40% 40% 5 4.20 
$4bn - $5bn 
-- -- 50% 17% 33% 6 3.83 
More then $5bn 
-- -- 28% 50% 22% 18 3.94 
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Table 63 (c): Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Consumer privacy: By Number of Employees 
 
Agreement or disagreement with proposed disclosures by your organisation.  
Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems – Consumer 
privacy 
Number of 
Employees V
er
y 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
U
n
im
po
rt
an
t 
N
eu
tr
al
 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
V
er
y 
Im
po
rt
an
t 
Sample 
Size 
Mean 
Less than 10,000 1% 1% 20% 60% 18% 87 3.93 
10,001 – 20,000 
-- -- 14% 57% 29% 7 4.14 
20,001 – 30,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
30,001 – 40,000 
-- -- -- -- 100% 1 5.00 
40,001 – 50,000 
-- -- 33% 67% -- 3 3.67 
More then 50,000 
-- -- 33% 33% 33% 3 4.00 
 
 
Analysis of variances tests were conducted to see if there was any significant differences on  
Q 7.25 Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems – Consumer 
privacy according to the three descriptors, ie Q1 Industry, Q2 Annual Revenue and Q3 Number 
of Employees.  No significant differences at the 0.01 level were found. 
 
Table 63 (d): Product responsibility: Policies, procedures and management systems - 
Consumer privacy: Analysis of variance test 
 
Dependent Variable: Disclosure of Product responsibility: Policies, 
procedures and management systems – Consumer privacy 
Source df F Sig. 
Industry 8 .738 .658 
Revenue 5 .134 .984 
Employees 4 .335 .853 
Residual df = 58 
 
 
